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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an examination of the emergence and development of Sir Oswald 
Mosley’s British Union of Fascists in the Midlands between 1932 and 1940. It charts the 
fascist presence in four major cities: Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester. 
The BUF is the largest and most important fascist movement to have ever existed in Britain. 
Mosleyite fascism in the Midlands as a region has never before been investigated and 
represents a significant gap in the historiography of British fascist studies.  
Alongside affording valuable insight into Mosleyite fascism at the regional level, the 
study will illuminate further understanding of the BUF nationally. The fascist experience in the 
Midlands is used to test and contribute to arguments about the national movement in the 
secondary literature relating to three themes: (a) the social class composition of BUF 
membership; (b) the strength of BUF membership; and (c) the focus of BUF propaganda. 
Finally, four main areas generally recognised as the reasons for national failure are discussed 
to explain the long-term marginalisation of the BUF in the Midlands.  
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Introduction 
 
Founded by Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932 and proscribed in summer 19401, the British 
Union of Fascists (hereafter BUF) remains Britain’s largest and most significant fascist 
movement. Although an enduring scholarly interest has generated a sizeable volume of 
critical literature considerable gaps remain in our understanding of the BUF. A major gap in 
the historiography is a lack of knowledge of the BUF in the Midlands. 
 The first aim of this thesis is to fill this gap by producing a detailed empirical 
examination of the emergence and development of the BUF in the region between 1932 and 
1940. The BUF in the Midlands has been under researched. This is despite the Midlands’ 
large population and economic importance during the 1930s, and even though non-fascist 
contemporaries and a number of post-war scholars have noted that the Mosley movement 
was active in the region and at various points in the decade able to attract a following. The 
Midlands as a region has never been subjected to study in regard to its experience of 
Mosleyite fascism. This thesis will consider four cities: Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry, 
and Leicester; the leading municipalities of the west Midlands, north Midlands, south Midlands 
and east Midlands respectively. Birmingham is the only principal city in the region to have 
been examined concerning the presence of the BUF. It was explored by Brewer in 1975 and 
his book on the subject was published in 1984 before the release of invaluable government 
documentation on British fascism and the local Mosley movement2. The current study, in 
discussing Birmingham, both draws on and critically considers Brewer’s work and 
incorporates relevant new information. The BUF in Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester 
                                                 
1 The BUF was dissolved in summer 1940 when hundreds of Mosleyites were interned and the 
organisation pronounced illegal. Defence Regulation 18b (1a) was introduced into British law which 
allowed for the arrest and internment without trial of members of organisations which were adjudged to 
be subject to foreign influence or control, or whose leaders enjoyed past or present associations with 
leaders of now enemy governments, or who were deemed sympathetic to the system of government of 
enemy powers. Between 23 May and 24 May 1940 at least 24 leading members of the BUF were 
arrested, including Sir Oswald Mosley, and on 4 June the decision was made to extend the round-up to 
include some 350 local officials. The dragnet continued throughout June and July so that by the end of 
summer 1940 the number of BUF members and supporters arrested and interned under Defence 
Regulation 18b (1a) totalled 747. On 10 July 1940 under the freshly-passed Defence Regulation 18b 
(AA) the government declared the BUF a proscribed organisation. A. Simpson, In the Highest Degree 
Odious. Detention Without Trial in Wartime Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp172-
191. 
2 J. Brewer, ‘The British Union of Fascists, Sir Oswald Mosley and Birmingham: An analysis of the 
Content and Context of an Ideology’ (MSocSc, University of Birmingham, 1975); J. Brewer, Mosley’s 
Men. The British Union of Fascists in the West Midlands (Aldershot, Gower, 1984). 
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has never been studied. The Mosleyite effort to establish a grass roots presence in the 
Midlands remains, therefore, substantially uncharted. In light of this sizeable knowledge gap 
the study of the fascist movement in Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry, and Leicester 
intends to represent a significant addition to the history of politics and right-wing extremism in 
the Midlands. 
The second aim is to test and contribute to arguments about the national Mosleyite 
movement. It is intended that this will illuminate further understanding of the BUF nationally as 
well as regionally. Pryce-Jones has written that: ‘English fascism cannot be studied in detail 
until the histories of local branches are written’3, and in recent years detailed local studies 
have not only added to our stock of knowledge of the BUF at the regional level but have 
reshaped debate on the fascist movement at the national level. From the immediate post-war 
period until the early 1980s, scholarly studies of the BUF were, in the words of Rawnsley, 
‘history written ‘’’from the top down’’’4. Analysis of the BUF focused almost exclusively on the 
Mosley movement at the national level. Little or no attention was paid to the movement’s 
experiences in branches throughout the country. What reference existed to Mosleyite fascism 
on the ground was limited almost uniformly to a brief mention of the East End of London. 
From the mid-1980s onwards major local studies have emerged which uncovered an 
abundance of previously neglected source material. As we shall see, through focusing 
attention on the experiences of fascist branches in regions of Britain these local studies have 
challenged a number of long-standing contentions about the national movement in the 
established literature and raised fresh questions about Mosleyite fascism.  
 Chapter one will review the arguments in the secondary literature surrounding the 
themes to be addressed in this study and will then consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
relevant primary sources. Chapters two, three, four, and five chart chronologically the 
emergence and development of the BUF in Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry, and 
Leicester between 1932 and 1940 respectively. The concluding chapter will reflect on what 
these four case-studies reveal about the themes in relation to the local and national Mosley 
movement.
                                                 
3 D. Pryce-Jones, Unity Mitford  (London, Book Club Associates, 1977), p76. 
4 S. Rawnsley, ‘The Membership of the British Union of Fascists’, in K. Lunn and R. Thurlow (eds.) 
British Fascism (London, Croom Helm, 1980), p150. 
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Chapter One: Themes and Sources.    
 
Having explained why a regional study of the BUF in the Midlands represents a much 
required addition to knowledge of the Mosley movement our attention will now move to the 
themes which will be addressed and to a reflection on the primary sources which will be 
utilised in this undertaking.   
 
1. Themes.   
 
To date three detailed and extensive studies have been written on the BUF in particular 
regions. Rawnsley’s reconstruction of the BUF presence in the north of England represented 
the first such study1. Linehan extended the field of local research into east London, ‘a region 
where the impact of Mosleyite fascism was more pronounced than at any other location in 
Britain’2. In an attempt to broaden our knowledge of the BUF’s political fortunes in rural areas 
Mitchell investigated the development of the Mosley movement in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex3. 
In an examination of the findings of these studies three important themes regarding the 
character of Mosleyite fascism emerge which need to be explored further. These themes are 
to be discussed in the framework of an existing secondary literature. They are: (a) the social 
class composition of BUF membership; (b) the strength of BUF membership; and (c) the 
focus of BUF propaganda. The relevant arguments relating to these themes in the 
historiography and the way in which they will be engaged in the following account will now be 
considered.  
 
(a) The social class composition of the BUF membership. 
 
The nature of the social class composition of the BUF’s membership is recognised as a 
                                                 
1 S. Rawnsley, ‘Fascists and Fascism in the North of England in the 1930s’ (Ph.D., University of 
Bradford, 1983). 
2 T. Linehan, East London for Mosley (London, Frank Cass, 1996), pxvii.  
3 A. Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia: The British Union of Fascists in Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex 
1933-1940’ (Ph.D., University of Sheffield, 1999), p1. 
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contentious question within the historiography of British fascist studies4. The first account in 
the post-war scholarship on fascism in Britain to discuss the social composition of the BUF 
membership was produced by Cross who argued that the ranks of the fascist movement were 
dominated by ‘middle-class’ recruits. Cross identified a ‘typical’ rank and file member as a 
‘middle-class’ man who was ‘not particularly clever but capable of loyalty and sacrifice’5. 
Crucially for efforts to establish a detailed picture of BUF membership Cross failed to make 
any attempt to define the term ‘middle-class’. Since the publication of Cross’s research the 
trend among academics has been to stress the diversity of recruits to the BUF6 but it is the 
findings of the major regional studies which have most openly challenged the notion the 
fascist membership was dominated by a single social class7. In his study of the fascist 
presence in northern England Rawnsley concluded that the appeal of the Mosley movement 
cut across social class divisions, writing: ‘the BUF attracted the support of different sorts of 
people from different class backgrounds’8. In his analysis Rawnsley claimed that a 
considerable ‘working-class’ contingent was present alongside numerous ‘middle-class’ 
recruits in the northern BUF and that no single social class grouping was dominant within the 
membership. Rawnsley’s research has been described as marking ‘a significant breakthrough 
in the treatment of the Mosleyite membership’9 but like Cross before him it offers no definition 
of the social class categories employed to describe BUF recruits. While Rawnsley does not 
provide a definition of what kind of person constitutes somebody of the ‘working-class’ a 
pattern is discernable with regard to the people to whom he applies the term. Warehouse 
workers, weavers, carpenters, railway workers, factory workers, chemical plant operatives, 
taxi drivers, one-man painter and decorators, and window cleaners, are all at one point or 
another in his text associated with the social group ‘working-class’, which suggests that 
Rawnsley without ever explicitly stating that this was the case restricted himself to using this 
social categorisation to describe people engaged in manual occupations and in relation to 
such men and women amalgamated the employee and self-employed. The BUF members 
                                                 
4 Linehan, East London for Mosley, p210. 
5 Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London, Barrie and Rockliff, 1961), p70. 
6 Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.19, No.4 (1984), pp589-590. 
7 Linehan, British fascism 1918-39 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), pp161-165.  
8 Rawnsley, ‘Fascists and Fascism’, p348.  
9 Linehan, British fascism, p163.  
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Rawnsley associates with the social categorisation ‘middle-class’ are people who had 
attended public school, ex-military officers, the children of mill-owners and those employed in 
the following occupations: company managers, civil engineers, merchants, bank managers, 
shopkeepers, and small businessmen10. Criticism of Rawnsley’s approach came in the work 
of Webber. Webber was the first academic to specifically highlight the lack of a sophisticated 
conception of social class within the post-war historiography about the composition of BUF 
membership. Assessing the analyses of Cross and Rawnsley as ‘far too simple’, Webber 
argued that the existing observations on the class composition of the fascist movement were 
consequently of only limited value11. A response to Webber’s critique arrived with Linehan’s 
detailed investigation into the fascist movement in east London. Recognising the need to 
employ a precise and workable conceptual model to address the question of social class in 
the BUF, Linehan adopted a methodological approach to appraise membership composition 
based on an analytical framework previously developed by Kater in a groundbreaking study of 
the social structure of the Nazi Party12. The procedure utilised by Kater, whereby a 
stratification of occupational sub-groups is divided into three broad social class categories, 
‘lower’; ‘lower-middle’; and ‘elite’ is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. 
Social Class classification according to Occupational Sub-Group 
 
Social Class      Occupational Sub-Group 
 
Lower       1. Unskilled workers (inclusive of semi-skilled workers)  
   2. Skilled (craft) workers 
   3. Other skilled workers 
 
Lower middle       4. Master craftsmen (independent)   
       5. Non-academic professionals   
   6. Lower/intermediate (petty) employees 
   7. Lower/intermediate (civil) servants 
   8. Merchants 
                                                 
10 Rawnsley, ‘Fascists and Fascism’, pp233-244.  
11 Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership’, pp594-595. 
12 M. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945 (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1983).  
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   9. Farmers (self-employed) 
 
Elite     10. Managers      
 11. Higher civil servants 
 12 Students (upper school/university) 
 13. Academic professionals 
 14. Entrepreneurs 
 
Source: M. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945   
             (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), p241. 
 
Kater’s social class model was later successfully adopted by Muhlberger in a pioneering study 
of Nazi recruitment patterns13. Linehan retained when adapting this conceptual model for use 
in the East End of London a small number of slight alterations Muhlberger made to Kater’s 
approach with regard to the assigning of particular individuals to their respective social class 
categories. Firstly, believing there was a need to include a ‘space’ for those social groups that 
fell between the ‘lower-middle’ and the ‘elite’ classes Linehan altered these categories to 
‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ and ‘elite or upper-middle’ respectively. Secondly, he 
introduced a ‘status unclear’ category, so as to take account of individuals whose class 
affiliation cannot be established. Thirdly, the occupational sub-group in Kater’s model relating 
to farmers was eliminated owing to the exclusively urban nature of the East End. Fourthly, 
Kater’s decision to allocate railway workers to an occupational sub-group which classified 
them in social-class terms as members of the ‘lower-middle’ class was adjudged to be 
inappropriate in the English context. Finally, Kater’s division between ‘skilled craft workers’ 
and ‘other skilled workers’ was discarded in favour of a single occupational sub-group 
category for all types of skilled workers14. Linehan’s amendments are set out in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. 
Social Class classification in East London according to Occupational Sub-Group 
 
Social Class      Occupational Sub-Group 
                                                 
13 D. Muhlberger, ‘Germany’ in D. Muhlberger (ed.) The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements 
(London, Croom Helm, 1987), pp40-139.  
14 Linehan, East London for Mosley, p211.  
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 Lower                                           1. Unskilled workers (inclusive of semi-skilled)  
       2. Skilled workers 
 
 
Lower-Middle      4. Master craftsmen      
and Middle-Middle                         5. Non-academic professionals    
   6. Lower/intermediate (petty) employees 
                                                       7. Lower/intermediate civil servants 
   8. Merchants (self-employed) 
 
Elite or Upper-Middle                   10. Managers       
 11. Higher civil servants    
 12. Students (upper school/university) 
 13. Academic professionals 
 14. Entrepreneurs   
 
Status Unclear    15. Non-university students    
 16. Retired 
 17. Married women 
              18. Military personnel  
                                                     19. Unemployed 
                                                     20. School pupils 
                                                     21. Full-time salaried employees on the staff of the BUF 
 
Source: T. Linehan, East London for Mosley (London, Frank Cass, 1996), p212. 
 
Linehan’s conceptual model allowed for the first time a nuanced analysis of social class 
composition of BUF membership which enabled his investigation into the emergence and 
development of Mosleyite fascism in the East End to be much more specific about who 
supported the fascist movement than any previous scholarly study. Linehan’s research 
rejected the theory that the fascist general rank-and-file was dominated by one social class in 
general and a certain ‘type’ of member, the ‘middle-class’ recruit, in particular. He in his own 
words was able to go ‘much further’ than Rawnsley in ‘pointing up’ the ‘lower class’ aspect of 
BUF membership15. Linehan revealed that in the East End ‘not insubstantial’ numbers of 
‘lower-middle and middle-middle class’ types could be found in the local branches but it was 
                                                 
15 Linehan, British fascism, p164. 
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the ‘lower class’ grouping of unskilled and skilled workers that comprised the largest social 
class contribution to membership in the region16. Members who could be classified as 
belonging to the ‘elite or upper-middle class’ were especially under-represented17. The 
effectiveness of this methodological approach for providing detailed insight into the social 
class composition of BUF membership was corroborated by Mitchell in his major regional 
study of the Mosley movement’s attempts to establish a ‘heartland’ in East Anglia during the 
1930s18. Mitchell adopted Linehan’s conceptual model except for a minor alteration. Of vital 
relevance to a predominantly agricultural region, Kater’s occupational sub-group ‘farmers 
(self-employed)’ was restored to the social class category ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’19. 
The deployment of this amended model revealed that contrary to Cross’s proposition the BUF 
membership in East Anglia was diverse in terms of social class composition. Although a 
majority of members were classified as belonging to the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ 
social class a substantial percentage of unskilled and skilled workers was found to have 
participated alongside them in the ranks of the local branches20. People of the ‘elite or upper-
middle’ class were recruited on a modest scale 21.  
 The following study of the BUF in the Midlands represents a new contribution to this 
debate on the Mosley movement’s social composition. An extensive account of the 
emergence and development of the BUF in the Midlands will examine the fascist membership 
in the region to determine whether it was as suggested by Cross dominated by the ‘middle-
class’ or whether the ranks of the local Mosley movement were as the existing major regional 
studies have concluded diverse in terms of social class composition. A diverse rank and file in 
the Midlands revealing substantial ‘lower-class’ intakes would confirm Linehan’s suggestion 
that what he terms the ‘middle-class fascism paradigm’ in the British fascist historiography is 
‘cracking under the strain’ of the findings of major regional studies22. The sophisticated 
typology introduced by Linehan into British fascist studies will be drawn upon to determine the 
social class categories to which BUF members in the Midlands should be ascribed. Although 
                                                 
16 Linehan, East London for Mosley, pp164-165.  
17 Linehan, East London for Mosley, p229. 
18 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, p2. 
19 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, pp388, 393. 
20 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, p393. 
21 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, p415. 
22 Linehan, British fascism, pp164-165.  
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this conceptual model has proven a useful analytical device I propose that a number of fresh 
alterations can be made to further improve its effectiveness. In regard to its applicability to the 
Midlands I have followed Mitchell in restoring the occupational sub-group nine ‘farmers (self-
employed)’ to the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ social class category; this correction is 
needed owing to the large number of rural districts in Leicestershire during the 1930s. It is 
suggested that the occupational sub-groups ‘married women’ and ‘full-time salaried 
employees on the staff of the BUF’ are an unnecessary feature of the existing model. The 
notion that the class affiliation of individuals previously allocated to these categories is 
‘unclear’ is deemed disputable. The social class status of married women in paid employment 
will be defined by the occupational sub-group relevant to their job while married women not in 
employment can be acceptably adjudged as sharing their spouse’s social class. Full-time 
salaried employees on the staff of the BUF can be subsumed within the occupational 
framework, depending on the nature of their specific occupation. These two sub-groups have 
been discarded accordingly. Also removed from the ‘status unclear’ category is the 
occupational sub-group ‘military personnel’. The suggestion that members of the armed 
forces cannot be integrated into the ‘lower’, ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’, and ‘elite or 
upper-middle’ social class categories is considered unsatisfactory. Therefore while it is 
recognised that these allocations are contestable, non-commissioned military men in the 
Midlands membership will be regarded as ‘lower’ class in social status while commissioned 
service personnel will be allocated to higher occupational sub-groups. The final alterations 
aim to more accurately reflect the social class based structure of the British educational 
system in the 1930s. The occupational sub-group ‘school pupils’ of the ‘status unclear’ social 
class category will be amended. It is suggested that this sub-group should be altered to 
exclude those who attend public schools. Public school pupils recruited will constitute a new 
sub-group and classified as being of ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class. Consequently, the 
sub-group ‘school pupils’ will be changed to ‘non-public school pupils’. The enhanced 
conceptual model which will be used to identify the social class of BUF members in the 
Midlands is set out in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. 
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Social Class classification in the Midlands according to Occupational Sub-Group 
 
Social Class      Occupational Sub-Group 
 
Lower       1. Unskilled workers (inclusive of semi skilled)   
   2. Skilled workers 
   
Lower-Middle      3. Master craftsmen 
and Middle-Middle     4. Non-academic professionals   
   5. Lower/intermediate (petty) employees 
   6. Lower/intermediate civil servants 
   7. Merchants (self-employed) 
   8. Farmers (self-employed) 
 
Elite or Upper-Middle     9. Managers 
                                                     10. Higher civil servants     
 11. Public school pupils 
 12. Students (upper school/university) 
 13. Academic professionals 
 14. Entrepreneurs   
 
Status Unclear    15. Non-university students 
 16. Retired  
 17. Unemployed 
 18. Non-public school pupils 
 
The analysis of social class affiliation allowed by the application of this model to BUF recruits 
in the Midlands will, it is suggested, provide unprecedented insight into the type of people 
attracted into the ranks of the Mosley movement in the region while supplementing further a 
wider understanding of the composition of membership at the national level. 
 
(b) The strength of BUF membership. 
 
The theme of how many people joined the Mosley movement in Britain has developed into a 
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major area of investigation in studies of the BUF23. Indeed, Thurlow has suggested that any 
account of the BUF should include analysis of the size of the membership24. The first post-
war studies on membership trends were produced by Cross and Benewick respectively who 
painted a picture of a movement that peaked in members nationwide in mid-1934 and which 
subsequently entered a terminal decline. According to this view the BUF enjoyed steady 
recruitment in branches across Britain throughout 1933. The prospects for Mosleyite fascism 
brightened further at the start of 1934 when press baron Lord Rothermere publicly endorsed 
Mosley and threw the full weight of his publishing empire behind the fascist movement. The 
support of the Daily Mail proprietor accelerated recruitment nationwide at a rapid rate and in 
May and early June 1934 the BUF attained what would prove to be the pinnacle of its national 
membership with 40,000 recruits and a general image in the country of respectability. This 
respectability was shattered permanently by the violent events that unfolded at the mass BUF 
rally staged at Olympia Hall, London, on the evening of 8 June 1934 when fascist stewards 
and anti-fascist protestors clashed repeatedly in an evening of sustained violence and 
brutality. ‘Whatever were the rights or wrongs of Olympia’, Cross writes, ‘there was one 
unchallengeable consequence. Justly or unjustly the BUF became associated in the public 
mind with violence’25. In the wake of the hostile publicity following this outbreak of disorder, 
Rothermere severed his compact with Mosley and by early 1935 membership in the BUF 
branches across the country had collapsed into steep and continuous downward trends. The 
only region in the country that contradicted the nationwide trend of a terminal collapse in 
membership over the course of the second half of the decade was the East End of London. It 
is suggested that by the time of the Second World War total membership numbered little more 
than 1,00026. 
 As Linehan and Thurlow have said, the most ‘intelligent’ and ‘sophisticated’ academic 
challenge to the Cross and Benewick estimate of BUF membership strength has come in the 
form of the research of Webber27. Webber believed that the picture painted by Cross and 
                                                 
23 Linehan, British fascism, pp160-161; R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987), 
pp122-127. 
24 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p122. 
25 Cross, The Fascists in Britain, p131. 
26 R. Benewick, Political Violence and Public Order (London, Allen Lane, 1969), pp108-110; Cross, 
The Fascists in Britain, pp130-132.  
27 Linehan, British fascism p161; Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, pp122-125. 
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Benewick was accurate only to the point where membership plummeted following the 
negative media coverage generated by events at Olympia and subsequent withdrawal of 
Rothermere’s sponsorship. The fate of the national movement and recruitment trends in 
branches in parts of the country after 1935 was, however, radically different. Webber believed 
that the experience of fascists in Leeds was ‘broadly representative’ of the branches in 
provincial regions. Whereas Cross and Benewick suggest a terminal collapse in membership 
in all areas other than East London, Webber argues that although by 1935 most provincial 
branches in the country had suffered a haemorrhage in numbers many of the BUF regional 
formations did not enter into a permanent decline and experienced a limited increase in 
recruitment during the late 1930s. Indispensable to the revival of branch membership in the 
regions, Webber says, was the BUF ‘Peace Campaign’ position of appeasing Nazi Germany. 
It is argued that by the outbreak of war in 1939 total national BUF membership had recovered 
to 22,500 and that many of the regional formations had achieved a level of membership 
higher than at any time other than 193428.  
While confident that his account was more ‘plausible’ than the interpretation of 
membership trends put forward by Cross and Benewick, Webber called for his argument to be 
‘tested’ by regional studies that were extensive, detailed and widely distributed across the 
country29. The two existing major studies of BUF regional formations in the provinces have 
both offered support for his position. Rawnsley and Mitchell found that membership numbers 
in northern England and East Anglia revealed that not all provincial mobilisations collapsed 
into irreversible downward trends after 1935. The BUF formations in northern England and 
East Anglia enjoyed sustained and solid growth throughout 1933 and on into 1934 but 
although both were to later experience a sustained collapse in membership the respective 
declines, though prolonged, did not prove to be permanent and recruitment rose during the 
late 1930s. In addition, Rawnsley and Mitchell found that fascist branches in northern England 
and East Anglia benefited significantly from a flow of pro-appeasement enlistments from 1938 
onwards which increased membership in these regions to their highest respective levels since 
the period of Rothermere’s official support. A detailed investigation into the BUF presence in 
                                                 
28 Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership’, pp575-606. While commending Webber’s research Thurlow 
suggests ‘a small downward revision’ of the total membership figure of 22,500 by the outbreak of war 
to 20,000. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, pp124-125.    
29 Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership’, p596. 
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the Midlands would continue this important process of subjecting Webber’s theories on 
regional membership strength in the provinces to academic scrutiny. A study of the Midlands 
BUF with regard to membership strength would establish for the first time how many people 
joined the Mosley movement in the region. Charting of recruitment levels for BUF members in 
Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Leicester and Coventry between 1932 and 1940 will determine 
whether, as was the case with northern England and East Anglia, the Midlands region 
conforms to Webber’s paradigm. Therefore the following study of the BUF in the Midlands will 
provide data on membership numbers in a previously unexamined region of the country which 
will expand our knowledge of BUF membership strength. 
 
(c) The focus of BUF propaganda. 
 
Much has been written in the historiography on the various aspects of ‘Mosley’s fascist 
ideas’30. A significant number of these studies focus on the historical roots of Mosley’s 
thought. How local branches made use of the ideas of Mosley represents an area which has 
not received sufficient attention. Most works that discuss BUF ideas in relation to the content 
of the fascist message communicated to the British public invariably do so from a 
predominantly national perspective in the form of analysis of the pronouncements of the 
national leadership. Few attempt to relate their subject matter to the experiences of 
Mosleyites on the ground across the country to any greater extent than a summary mention31. 
It has been left to regional studies to break new ground in shedding light on the focus of 
propaganda pursued by fascists at the local level. A reading of the secondary literature which 
examines the Mosley movement at the national level suggests that there are three principal 
themes of BUF propaganda and the major regional studies support this. These themes are: 
corporatism; non-intervention in foreign disputes; and anti-Semitism. Each will be discussed 
                                                 
30 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p146. 
31 P. Coupland, ‘The Blackshirted Utopians’, Journal of Contemporary History Vol.33, No.2 (1998), 
pp255-272; S. Cullen, ‘The Development of the Ideas and Policy of the British Union of Fascists, 
1932-40’, Journal of Contemporary History Vol.22, No.1 (1987), pp115-136; R. Griffin, The Nature of 
Fascism (London, Routledge, 1991), pp26-55; B. Farr, ‘The development and impact of right wing 
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1977), pp133-164; S. Woodbridge, ‘The Nature and Development of the Concept of National Synthesis 
in British Fascist Ideology 1920-1940’ (Ph.D., Kingston University, 1997).  
 13
in turn.  
 Firstly we will look at corporatism. Mosley elaborated his idea of the Corporate State 
in his three main statements on BUF ideology which appeared during the fascist movement’s 
lifetime: The Greater Britain in 1932, Fascism – 100 Questions Asked and Answered in 1936, 
and Tomorrow We Live in 1938. In these documents Mosley asserted that because of chronic 
underconsumption Britain faced an impending economic crisis which would lead to mass 
unemployment and attendant social chaos. Only the introduction of the Corporate State could 
reverse Britain’s decline and this radical economic proposal was entirely dependent on the 
establishment of a fascist dictatorship.  
The Corporate State would reorganise British industry to expand the home market 
greatly and manage the economy in the interest of the nation. Corporations with an equal 
quota of employee, employer, and consumer representation were to be created for every 
industry and profession in the country. Although tasked with a wide range of responsibilities, 
the chief function of each Corporation was to raise salaries and wages to rebalance 
consumption with production. These Corporations would operate under guidelines set out by 
the fascist government and enforced by a general economic body, the National Council of 
Corporations. This National Council of Corporations was to be composed of representatives 
from every respective Corporation. Mosley identified international trade as a fundamental 
threat to the corporate economy and advocated the exclusion of all foreign goods which could 
be produced in Britain. A completely self-contained or autarkic British Empire system of 
preference would be created wherein Britain purchased primary products and raw materials 
from the Dominions and colonies in exchange for the equivalent value in British manufactured 
goods. Imperial territories would have direct representation in London where the development 
of their resources would be planned to satisfy Britain’s requirements.  
Mosley’s corporate economic programme was reliant on an authoritarian revolution in 
British government and political practice. Following the election by legal and constitutional 
means of the first fascist Parliament the fascist leadership principle would apply to the 
governance of the country in the same way as it applied in the BUF. A General Powers Bill 
would be passed empowering a fascist executive, consisting of Prime Minister and small 
cabinet, to govern British affairs by Order. Parliament would meet periodically and be allowed 
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to conduct votes of censure against the executive but debate and the blocking of legislation 
would be banned along with all opposition parties. Future national elections would be based 
on an occupational franchise, according to industry or profession. The entire population would, 
however, be allowed to vote in plebiscites held at intervals of not longer than five years to 
judge the government’s performance. If the people voted against the government, the King 
would be tasked with appointing new fascist ministers who would then in turn be approved or 
rejected by another national direct vote. The House of Lords would be abolished and replaced 
by an Assembly containing representatives of British science, industry, culture, education, 
armed forces, and religion. Under the new fascist model the traditional system of local 
government would be disbanded. Local authority areas would be greatly expanded and 
placed under the executive control of a MP specially acquainted with the area. Councils would 
be elected by occupational franchise with the role of advising the MP32. 
Linehan has demonstrated that the BUF was unable to sustain an ongoing branch 
presence capable of conducting propaganda campaigns in east London until the mid-1930s33. 
By contrast Rawnsley and Mitchell reveal that active and durable BUF branches were 
founded in northern England and East Anglia from the earliest years of the Mosley movement 
and have been able to chart the focus of local propaganda disseminated in these regions 
between 1932 and 1935. They show that during these years in northern England and East 
Anglia the local BUF branches concentrated their propaganda campaigns on promoting the 
economic programme of the fascist Corporate State as the only viable solution to the 
problems of the respective regions’ staple but ailing industries34. The propaganda message 
disseminated by the local fascists in Lancashire and Yorkshire focused directly on the 
purported benefits corporatism would bring to the textile industries of northern England. 
According to the BUF branches in the region the corporate system would restore declining 
markets and thus save thousands of jobs and cure unemployment in the area by excluding 
from the home market and the Crown Colonies cheap cotton and woollen goods produced in 
low-wage Asian countries like Japan and forcing India as an imperial territory to suppress its 
                                                 
32 O. Mosley, The Greater Britain (London, BUF Publications, 1932); O. Mosley, Fascism -  100 
Questions Asked and Answered (London, BUF Publications, 1936); O. Mosley, Tomorrow We Live 
(London, Abbey Supplies, 1938). 
33 Linehan, East London for Mosley, p22, 59, 79-80, 92.  
34 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, pp9-14, 40-291; Rawnsley, ‘Fascists and Fascism’, pp125-138. 
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manufacturers and eliminate import tariffs erected against British textiles35. In East Anglia the 
propaganda activism of the local fascists concentrated on explaining how the Mosleyites 
believed that under the corporate economic system the distressed domestic agricultural 
market would be revived and expanded by hundreds of millions of pounds. The Corporate 
State, it was claimed, would boost agriculture in the region by introducing a number of 
measures, among which were: the prevention of cheap and popular Russian wheat and 
Argentine beef from entering the country; doubling domestic output under an intensive three-
year plan which involved the establishment of an Agricultural Bank to offer credit to local 
farmers to enable the meeting of corporate planning targets; and the abolition of the at times 
violently unpopular practice of farmers and landowners paying rent charges and tithes to the 
Church of England36.  
This study will explore whether the Midlands BUF mirrored the fascist movement in 
northern England and East Anglia in focusing its propaganda on the Mosleyite corporate 
economic message when operating in the region in the first half of the 1930s. If this is found 
to be the case the propaganda output of the Midlands BUF will be analysed to determine 
whether the content was tailored to suit local economic grievances and which particular local 
emphases were pursued. A concentration on Mosley’s economic ideas in the fascist message 
disseminated to the public in the Midlands would suggest a pattern may be discernable 
among the propaganda output of the BUF branches in the provinces during the years 1932 to 
1935. The absence of this focus in the Midlands would suggest the concentrating of 
propaganda content in this way was reserved for BUF branches in regions which like northern 
England and East Anglia were dominated by a single industry. 
Thurlow has suggested that from the national perspective the focus of BUF 
propaganda during the second half of the 1930s moved away from the one theme of 
promoting corporatism and towards the two themes of non-intervention in foreign disputes, 
and anti-Semitism37. These two themes are not of equal significance in the secondary 
literature. Isolationism is an important feature of BUF propaganda but discussion has been 
brief and unproblematic. It is for this reason that non-intervention in foreign disputes will be 
                                                 
35 Rawnsley, ‘Fascists and Fascism’, pp125-138. 
36 Mitchell, ‘Fascism in East Anglia’, pp9-14, 40-291. 
37 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p127. 
 16
considered first. Anti-Semitism, by contrast, has attracted great interest. In the secondary 
literature there are different ways of explaining the emergence of anti-Semitism as a theme of 
BUF propaganda. When discussing this third theme I will provide a brief summary of the five 
principal positions on its role in the BUF, and the usefulness of these in relation to the 
experience of the fascists in the Midlands will be reflected upon in this study’s concluding 
chapter.   
We will now turn to the theme of isolationism. Mosley believed that the fascist 
movements of the principal continental European countries had the inalienable right to define 
their individual spheres of influence predicated on the solitary condition that their actions did 
not challenge the interests of the British Empire. It was in response to the Italo-Abyssinian 
dispute in summer 1935 that Mosley ordered the BUF’s first national ‘Peace Campaign’ in 
favour of non-intervention in foreign disputes, demanding that the political class ‘Mind Britain’s 
Business’ and remain strictly neutral while he simultaneously asserted that Abyssinian society 
required the civilising influence of Mussolini’s Italy. This vigorous propaganda campaign was 
a preview of the ‘Peace Campaigns’ which would follow throughout the remainder of the 
decade as Mosley attempted to persuade public opinion to reject British interventionism upon 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and acquiesce to ever bolder Nazi actions to expand 
the borders or at least the influence of the Third Reich. Nationally the BUF’s principal activity 
in the eight months that remained before the outbreak of the Second World War was an 
energetic ‘Peace Campaign’ demanding appeasement of Hitler’s warmongering towards 
Poland38. 
 Finally, we will discuss the theme of anti-Semitism. Mosley had faced allegations of 
anti-Semitic tendencies from the earliest days of his national movement. In response the 
fascist leader had insisted that ‘at the level of the official leadership anti-Semitism was 
forbidden’39 and the ‘Jewish Question’ was a ‘topic which had no place whatever’ in the 
BUF40. However, at a rally held in the Albert Hall on 28 October 1934 he announced the BUF 
leadership had decided to openly endorse anti-Semitism and the fascist movement would 
                                                 
38 NA: HO144/21062, pp277-284; NA: HO144/2128, pp150-153; NA: HO144/21381, pp88-90, 139-
141, 177-179; Action 8 April 1939, p4; Blackshirt 12 December 1936, p1; Mosley, Tomorrow We Live, 
p141. 
39 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p104. 
40 S. Dorril, Blackshirt. Sir Oswald Mosley & British Fascism (London, Viking, 2006), p304.  
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now be overtly campaigning against the perceived ‘Jewish threat’ in Britain. Thurlow observes 
of this new development: ‘the official attitude to British Jewry taken by the BUF saw Jews in 
terms of a national rather than a religious or racial issue’41. This can be illustrated by a 
perusal of fascist literature. According to the BUF Jews should be opposed only on account of 
conduct rather than on grounds of race or religion. It followed that there were ‘good’ Jews who 
had assimilated fully into the culture of the host nation and ‘bad’ Jews who preferred to form a 
nation within a nation and whose allegiance was with ‘World Jewry’ rather than the British 
state. These ‘bad’ Jews conspired to undermine the British national interest: they swamped 
the patriotic identity of the areas where they settled, manipulated the British media, dominated 
the Labour and Communist parties, controlled ‘International Finance’ to the detriment of the 
native economy, and ultimately, sought to bring about war between Britain and the 
Continental fascist powers. All Jews actively engaged in ‘anti-British’ activities would, it was 
held, be expelled from the country42. 
As stated above, there are five principal explanations for the introduction of the theme 
of anti-Semitism into BUF propaganda. The first, supported by Benewick and Mandle, is that 
the adoption of anti-Semitism as a propaganda priority should be interpreted as a cynical act 
of political opportunism designed to resuscitate the Mosley movement’s flagging prospects43. 
There is an assumption in this perspective that Mosley’s anti-Jewish rhetoric was wholly 
insincere, lacking foundation in a set of beliefs that were genuinely held. In the words of 
Benewick, for Mosley ‘anti-Semitism was more a weapon than a belief’44. The second 
explanation was proposed by Skidelsky, who suggests the theme of anti-Semitism was 
introduced into BUF propaganda as a reaction to anti-fascist opposition from Jews and 
Jewish groups. He asserts Mosley had no history of anti-Semitism prior to founding the BUF 
and from 1932 to 1934 ‘regarded the Jewish issue as more of a liability than an asset’45. The 
BUF thus got under way without an anti-Jewish position although there were a number of anti-
Semites in its ranks. ‘What started to change it’, he writes, ‘was the attitude of the Jews 
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44 Benewick, Political Violence, p134. 
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themselves’46. Jewish attacks on the BUF, especially disruptive attendance at fascist 
meetings, made the movement ‘Jew-conscious’47. Mosley was working closely with ardent 
anti-Semites and Skidelsky claims ‘it was inevitable that once he started imagining himself an 
innocent victim of Jewish malevolence some of the classic anti-Semitic arguments would start 
to rub off on him’48. The implication in this theory is that without Jewish opposition to the BUF, 
anti-Semitism would have remained off the fascist propaganda agenda. A third explanation 
comes from Dorril. He claims the anti-Semitic campaigning of the BUF was ‘pre-planned and 
worked to a timetable’. According to this argument Mosley had fully embraced anti-Semitism 
prior to his adoption of fascism and had intended from before the launch of the BUF that the 
fascist movement would be militantly anti-Jewish. The promotion of anti-Semitism was central 
to Mosley’s ambitions but the fascist leader conspired to avoid openly advocating hostility 
towards Jews until he judged his movement ‘strong enough to confront the inevitable 
backlash’49. A fourth explanation, provided by Holmes, suggests the use of anti-Semitism in 
BUF campaigning was the product of ‘a specific social milieu’50. For Holmes anti-Semitic 
feeling was present in the fascist movement early on but it took the combination of the 
‘interacting pressures’51 of socio-economic uncertainty, cultural and historical narratives of 
nativist racism, and physical clashes with Jews to ‘trigger it forward’52 in the BUF until it was 
adopted in late 1934. According to Holmes’ theory the depression of the 1930s was essential 
to the development of overt BUF anti-Semitism. Economic distress, he argues, heightened in 
the BUF a cultural tension which was long-standing and prevalent in Britain about the role of 
Jews in society and was particularly strong in trades and localities where Jews were visibly 
ethnically concentrated. These tensions revolved around Jews being perceived as an 
exclusive interest group with external loyalties who were in direct economic competition with 
the majority Gentile population. The influence of militant Jewish opposition then came into 
play. The disruption of BUF meetings by Jewish anti-fascists, Holmes asserts, had the effect, 
in turn, of further accelerating anti-Semitic sentiment in the Mosley movement. Finally, this 
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conflict with Jews in the present derived ‘supportive strength’ from an ‘anti-Semitic folk 
memory’ of earlier ‘battles’ which had been fought by native organised anti-Semitic and fascist 
groups against Jews and Jewish influence53. The fifth explanation is provided by Linehan, 
who in his study of the BUF in east London was the first commentator to examine exclusively 
at a local level the decision to incorporate anti-Semitism into the fascist propaganda message 
disseminated to the public. He suggests it was principally dependent on the presence or 
otherwise of ‘uncompromising anti-Jewish elements’54 within the local leadership pushing for 
aggressive overt anti-Semitic campaigning55. 
Examining the content of the propaganda message the local fascists chose to 
concentrate on when publicising the Mosley movement during the second half of the 1930s, 
Rawnsley and Linehan found that the national trend identified by Thurlow was recreated on 
the ground throughout northern England and east London. From 1935 onwards in these 
regions corporatism was de-emphasised by the activists of the local branches when 
communicating with the public in favour of the two themes of promoting anti-Semitism and 
campaigning against British intervention in crises occurring in continental Europe56. In East 
Anglia, however, Mitchell discovered that the single theme of corporatism was replaced by the 
two themes of anti-Semitism and isolationism in only one of the region’s three counties, Essex. 
In Norfolk and Suffolk the focus of the local propaganda did move away from advocating the 
benefits of the Corporate State onto demanding Britain refrain from becoming involved in 
foreign disputes but anti-Semitic campaigning was not adopted57.  
In the study that follows the propaganda activity of the BUF in the Midlands will be 
assessed to determine which of Mosley’s ideas were communicated by the fascist branches 
to the local public over the course of the second half of the 1930s. It will be determined 
whether the propaganda disseminated in the region from 1935 onwards conforms to the 
national pattern identified by Thurlow of campaigns focused on promoting hostility towards 
Jews and demanding Britain maintain a position of neutrality towards foreign quarrels. With 
regard to the principal explanations for the adoption or otherwise of anti-Semitic campaigning 
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the study will determine which if any are applicable to the experience of the BUF in the 
Midlands.  
 
2. Primary sources. 
 
Having reviewed the secondary literature which relates to the three important themes of social 
class composition of BUF membership, the strength of BUF membership and the focus of 
BUF propaganda, we will now turn to a consideration of primary sources and the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of their use. The vast bulk of the internal documents of the 
BUF is unavailable to historians. This material was either hurriedly destroyed by branch 
officials anxious to conceal information from the authorities or seized by the Security Services 
during raids which followed the introduction of Defence Regulation 18b (1a) and have yet to 
be released by the government. A few branch records are known to have survived but these 
relate to the BUF in Dorset and parts of east London58. The whereabouts of other branch 
records which may have escaped seizure and destruction remains, in the words of Linehan, ‘a 
mystery’59. Despite this paucity of official BUF documentary evidence a variety of important 
primary sources are available for consultation in the task of reconstructing the emergence and 
development of the BUF presence in the Midlands. The primary sources which have been 
examined to provide the basis for the following study can be divided into five categories: 
contemporary official documents; personal recollections of fascists; the BUF press; 
contemporary local newspapers; and information collected by contemporary anti-fascist 
organisations. The contemporary official documents are housed at the National Archives at 
Kew and since the first batch was deposited in the 1980s the sporadic release of new material 
has been ongoing. Contained in these documents is a wealth of information about the BUF in 
the Midlands60. Special Branch and MI5 monitored the BUF’s progress from the spring of 
1934 onwards and compiled reports on a fairly regular basis. Security Service and Chief 
Constable’s reports contain data on the membership, branch activities and fortunes, internal 
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politics and rivalries, structure, and finance of the BUF in the Midlands. MI5 personal 
surveillance files are available on a small number of individuals prominent with the BUF in the 
region. Other Home Office files provide additional information on fascist recruits in the region. 
For example there is material relating to recruits who were convicted of public disorder 
offences at political meetings, or, after January 1937, of breaching the Public Order Act. 
Thurlow has noted that invaluable insights into the Mosley movement have resulted from the 
personal recollections of ex-fascists61. As Thompson has observed, autobiographical 
reminiscence often provides the only available first-hand account and allows the historian ‘to 
enter into the experience of people in the past as fully as possible’62. In the following study 
the reminiscences of two former senior officers in particular provide a unique and detailed 
view of many aspects of the nature and activities of the BUF in Birmingham and Leicester63. 
Useful information was uncovered in an inspection of the contemporary fascist press held at 
the Bodleian Library in Oxford. As the weekly newspaper which developed into the ‘house’ 
publication of the BUF the Blackshirt contains regular detailed reports and features on various 
facets of Mosleyite fascism in the Midlands. In addition, local members were found to have 
occasionally contributed material to the Blackshirt and the BUF’s other weekly newspaper 
Action, and these contributions often provide insights into the fascist authors’ principal 
preoccupations and anxieties. Extensive use has been made of material generated by a 
search of the content of every edition of the principal daily local newspapers in Birmingham, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester published between the BUF’s inception in 1932 and 
proscription in 1940. The daily local newspapers examined were: the Birmingham Post; 
Birmingham Mail; Birmingham Gazette; Evening Sentinel; Midland Daily Telegraph; and 
Leicester Mercury. In addition an examination was made of every edition of a monthly 
Birmingham newspaper, the Town Crier, printed during the period of the national Mosley 
movement’s existence. These publications are deposited at the archives and local studies 
centres in the respective city to which they relate. The local newspapers were found to 
contain an abundance of data relating to the composition, numbers and conduct of the 
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membership of BUF branches in the Midlands. Local fascists often wrote letters to the editors 
on a variety of subjects while detailed coverage can sometimes be found of BUF campaigning 
and other activities involving Mosleyites in the leading municipalities in the region. The final 
primary source which has been utilized is information compiled on the BUF in the Midlands by 
contemporary anti-fascist organisations. On 12 June 1934 the Labour Party distributed a 
questionnaire on local fascist activities to 900 Secretaries of all Divisional Labour Parties, 
Industrial Trades Councils, and Party Agents. In response to this questionnaire valuable 
material was collected on the fascists in Stoke-on-Trent64 which provides, in the words of 
Gottlieb, a ‘bird’s eye-view of local fascism just weeks after Mosley’s highly publicized 
Olympia Rally’65. Detailed and informative data on the local BUF was gathered on a regular 
basis over the second half of the 1930s by the national Jewish organisation the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews, with an understandable emphasis placed on monitoring the 
promotion of anti-Semitism in the region66. The ‘dispassionate spirit of inquiry’ with which the 
Board of Deputies approached the question of Mosleyite fascism has drawn especial praise 
from Linehan67.  
 The flaw inbuilt in all the primary sources utilised in this thesis is that of absences and 
biases. It has been suggested that the contemporary official documents tend to emphasise 
the ‘dubious aspects’68 of the BUF because police and Security Services reports often 
followed requests for information from a Home Office alerted to cases of violence by 
questions in the House of Commons, reports in the press, or letters to MPs69. A common 
criticism of autobiographical material is that the author often seizes the opportunity to fight 
past battles by justifying his or her actions in retrospect and to ‘provide evidence before the 
bar of history’70. As Linehan has noted, ‘memory can work actively to erase as well as recall’ 
and omissions and silences can occur with regard to ‘sensitive episodes of personal or 
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historical experience’71. Newspapers contain only what proprietors and editors consider fit for 
public consumption and believe would gratify their readership72. Most publications, Tosh 
observes, are ‘issued with little thought for posterity; they are rather intended to inform, 
influence, mislead or entertain contemporaries’73. Finally, the type of information collected in 
the Labour Party questionnaire and gathered by the Board of Deputies is restricted to 
reflecting the particular pressing concerns displayed by these organisations towards the 
fascist movement at the times of the respective investigations.  
As with other historical records the primary sources which are utilized in the following 
study are imperfect. However, while it is necessary to be aware of the problems at the same 
time we must also be alive to the possibilities. Where feasible a primary source will be 
checked against other primary sources and existing secondary sources. By taking the inbuilt 
flaws into account, interpreting with care, and using the available material judiciously it is 
possible to produce an illuminating account of the BUF presence in the Midlands between 
1932 and 1940 which tests and supplements the secondary works on the fascist movement. 
This has been pursued in the examinations of the Mosley movement in the four leading 
municipalities in the region to which our attention will now turn. The first to be considered is 
Birmingham.  
  
    
                                                 
71 Linehan, East London for Mosley, p274. 
72 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p39. 
73 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p37. 
 24
Chapter Two: The BUF in Birmingham, 1932 – 1940. 
 
The examination of each of the leading municipalities in the Midlands will be divided into two 
parts: 1. 1932 – 1934; and 2. 1934 – 1940. The first section reconstructs the development of the 
BUF in the respective city from the founding of the Mosley movement nationally in October 1932 
until immediately prior to the Olympia rally of mid-1934. The second section charts the progress 
of the local fascist presence from the violence-marred mass meeting in London until the BUF’s 
dissolution in June 1940. This division is in accordance with Thurlow’s observation that ‘in 
retrospect [Olympia] marked the turning-point in the fortunes of the [Mosley] movement’1. 
 
1. 1932 – 1934.   
 
Birmingham had long been the principal city in the west Midlands but by the beginning of the 
1930s had developed into the most sizeable and populous municipality in the entire region, and 
ranked, after London, as the second largest in the country2. The decennial Census records that in 
1931 Birmingham encompassed 51,147 acres3 and was home to a population of 1,002,603 
people4. The city was divided into thirty-one wards5 which were sub-divided into twelve 
parliamentary divisions6. Birmingham’s local economy boasted a tradition of smithing and metal 
working stretching back to the seventeenth century7. Transformation came from the middle of the 
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eighteenth century as the city became established as a pioneering manufacturing town at the 
nucleus of the Industrial Revolution8. By the mid-1800s easy access to raw materials had 
combined with a pivotal strategic position at the centre of the country’s new rail and canal 
transport network to attract major engineers and industrialists to make their base in the area. 
Driven by innovation and investment Birmingham had acquired the popular title ‘Britain’s second 
city’ and emerged as one of the major industrial centres of Europe9. In 1850 Birmingham’s 
manufacturing staples were buttons and brass products10, jewellery11, and guns12. During the 
second half of the century manufacturing in the city diversified, earning Birmingham fresh 
appellations of ‘the workshop of the world’13 and ‘the cradle of invention’14. A dazzling array of 
metal goods were produced; including tools of all descriptions, bedsteads, pen-nibs, lamps, 
gates, screws, and industrial components15. The industrial output of Birmingham continued to 
diversify into the twentieth century. In the early 1930s Birmingham trades encompassed ‘the 
bicycle, motor cycle and car industries, tyre industry, electrical goods, small and heavy 
engineering, chain industry, small arms manufacture, agricultural machinery, jewellery trade, gold 
and silver trade, brewing industry, confectionary and tobacco industries, building and 
construction, pottery and glass manufacture, carpet industry, newspaper trade and paper 
industry’. And these trades supported a range of services, advisors and middlemen16.  
In correspondence with a historian Sir Oswald Mosley proudly boasted late in his life of 
his significant political associations with the second city: ‘Birmingham has a special place in my 
memory’. The former fascist leader claimed to have developed a warm affection for ‘the steadfast 
and loyal character of Birmingham people’, and eulogised them as ‘a natural blend of some of the 
best qualities of the British’. ‘In my political life’, he wrote, ‘my personal relations were closer and 
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warmer than anywhere except East London…The vigour, vitality and warm responsiveness to 
any appeal, either for political action or high idealism, was very similar in the two areas’. 
However, as Brewer recognised, Mosley’s links to Birmingham prior to the formation of the BUF 
were not as steadfast and loyal as his memories recalled17. 
 Mosley had already cemented a reputation outside the region as one of Britain’s most 
promising, if controversial, young politicians when in July 1924 he accepted an invitation to 
contest the Birmingham constituency of Ladywood on behalf of the Labour Party at the next 
General Election. The invitation came after Mosley had defected from the Conservative Party. 
The choice, selected from a multitude of seats on offer, demonstrated his burning political 
ambition. Birmingham at that time was a stronghold of the Chamberlain family, a member of 
whom had held the Ladywood seat for the previous fifty years. The present incumbent was the 
leading Conservative MP and former Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain, whose 
party machine at that time was amongst the strongest in the country. Years after the event 
Mosley’s biographer son accurately reflected the feelings of the time: ‘The Chamberlain family 
enjoyed almost feudal political power in Birmingham: it would be an extraordinary feat if [Mosley] 
could even get near to dislodging him’18. Undaunted, Mosley hoped to begin his parliamentary 
career in the Labour Party with a dramatic success. ‘At the back of his mind, apparently, was the 
additional idea that Birmingham lacked a Labour leader of distinction and that a Mosley tradition 
might come to replace the Chamberlain tradition’19. A General Election was called in October 
1924 just three months after Mosley had accepted the challenge of standing in Ladywood as the 
Labour candidate. In the face of reversals around the country forcing the Labour Government out 
of power after barely a year in office, Mosley’s massive gains and defeat by only 77 votes was 
hailed as a victory. Over the course of the next five years Mosley became the key figure in 
Birmingham and west Midlands politics. Under Mosley’s leadership funds were raised, candidates 
were selected, and constituencies were re-organised. ‘He took an impoverished, sluggish party 
by the scruff of the neck, infused it with his own dynamism (and money) and used it to break the 
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hold of the Chamberlain dynasty’20. Continual campaigning combined with superb organisation to 
make possible Labour’s triumph in the West Midlands in 1929 when at the General Election 
Labour made 11 gains across the region, six in Birmingham and lost only one seat. The results 
confirmed that in five years under Mosley’s leadership Birmingham and the west Midlands area 
had turned into a Labour fortress. Mosley was rightly overjoyed at this success, proudly recalling 
in his autobiography over thirty years later: ‘At the election of 1929 we took half the city from the 
Conservatives, and the tradition of sixty years was at an end. Labour had its chance’21. 
 Skidelsky writes of the 1929 triumph: ‘In Birmingham it was Mosley, not [Labour Party 
leader Ramsay] MacDonald, who ruled’22. As Brewer points out, however, the substantial grass 
roots support Mosley enjoyed was conditional on his remaining loyal to the Labour Party, and for 
years suspicions had been growing in the Birmingham Labour movement that Mosley’s 
association with the second city was governed purely by self-interest23. Within six months of 
failing to unseat Chamberlain he accepted an offer to contest the Forest of Dean constituency in 
a by-election, only for his aspiration to be thwarted when the Birmingham and Ladywood Labour 
parties refused to let him go. ‘A significant consequence of this episode was the first 
demonstration to the Birmingham movement that Mosley’s personal ambition was stronger than 
his connection with the area and greater than his ambition for Birmingham. This was confirmed in 
December 1926 when Mosley readily accepted the opportunity of fighting the Smethwick by-
election’24. The Conservative press made much of the fact that Smethwick, although a 
neighbouring constituency, was a move outside of the city and the city’s borough, proclaiming: 
‘…the soul of Birmingham can go hang for all Mosley cares’25. Many in the Birmingham Labour 
party shared these feelings, including a significant proportion of the Smethwick Labour party. 
Colleagues in Ladywood felt abandoned26. Mosley was duly elected the Member for Smethwick 
in December 1926 increasing the Labour majority five-fold and his ascent in the Labour Party was 
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rapid. But when he resigned from the Labour Party in 1930, impatient and furious at the 
Treasury’s rejection of his reflationary programme known as the ‘Mosley Memorandum’, and 
subsequently founded his own political party, the New Party, he was unable to take noticeable 
support with him. Apart from taking two Birmingham MPs all the local constituency parties 
remained loyal to the Labour Party27. For members ‘Sir Oscillating Mosley’ had sealed his 
reputation as a ‘mere soldier of fortune prepared to sacrifice party and honour in the face of an 
ambition for power’28. While Mosley was confident of retaining the support of the Birmingham 
rank and file29, Brewer and Skidelsky agree Mosley had seriously underestimated the extent to 
which the allegiance he had enjoyed in Birmingham was institutional not personal30. Brewer 
asserts that the hostile reception to the New Party in Birmingham provides a useful commentary 
on the extent to which Mosley’s support among the grass roots was personal31. Opinion in 
Birmingham on the formation of the New Party was a deep disappointment that rapidly hardened 
into a menacing bitterness32. All over the country the New Party met a storm of organised 
violence as the leadership of the Left demanded a militant mobilisation to crush the new party at 
birth. Scenes of wild disorder at the inaugural New Party meeting held at Ashton-under-Lyme and 
a massive meeting at Glasgow were replicated in Birmingham. In Brewer’s opinion the violence 
unleashed represented ‘all the years of sublimated suspicion and doubt about Mosley’s motives 
manifested…with venomous force’33. Speculation that Mosley would contest Smethwick at the 
1931 General Election proved to be without foundation, and he would claim years later that his 
avoidance of the constituency was motivated by a wish not to wound old friends34. A more 
realistic interpretation of Mosley’s decision would be he recognised a campaign based in his old 
constituency would have involved much animosity and anger, evidenced when the appearance of 
Mosley at a public meeting held at the ‘Rag Market’ in Birmingham descended into violent chaos 
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as a mass free fight swiftly developed between New Party stewards and militant organised 
opposition intent on breaking up the meeting35. The turbulent meeting featuring the former ‘blue-
eyed boy of the Birmingham “Reds”’ has since entered local folklore36. ‘The failure of the rank 
and file in Birmingham to continue supporting Mosley showed itself in the 1931 election in 
Birmingham’. Two constituencies were contested. Both candidates were local men. Captain 
Bartlett, leader of the New Party branch in Birmingham, stood in Yardley, and Jesse Williams, a 
Labour councillor on the city council since 1922, stood in Duddeston. In keeping with a miserable 
New Party performance in the country as a whole, the two candidates in Birmingham failed to 
attract much more than 700 votes between them37.  
Birmingham conforms to the belief that after the debacle of the 1931 General Election the 
organisation of the New Party rapidly collapsed38. One of the first branches of the New Party 
formed in the country, Birmingham branch opened an office at 6 New Street from where the entire 
Midland region was administrated by Organiser Dan Davies, who was previously Secretary to 
Aston Divisional Labour Party. The Chairman of the branch was eventual New Party candidate for 
Yardley, Captain Bartlett39. After the miserable failure at the General Election the Birmingham 
office closed, the meagre membership disbanded, and the senior officers retired from 
Birmingham politics. No structural trace of the Birmingham New Party remained intact and its 
former members appear to have been uninterested in Mosley’s later conversion to fascism.  
The General Election represented in Birmingham a personal and political rejection of 
Mosley and the New Party. Brewer believed the New Party’s failure in Birmingham disqualified 
Mosley as a ‘charismatic leader’, writing: ‘it is a fallacy to describe Mosley as a charismatic leader, 
if by that is meant the ability to engender mass support based on personal qualities which lingers 
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irrespective of the ideas or party label the leader supports’40. Personal qualities of ambition, a 
self-orientated view of politics, and political inexperience, combined to evaporate whatever 
personal influence Mosley wielded among Labour supporters before the formation of the BUF. 
This dwindling of loyalty had consequences for the degree of support the first fascist branch in the 
city initially possessed.  
A Birmingham branch of the BUF was formed within weeks of the official founding of the 
Mosley movement, marking the blackshirt presence in the second city among the earliest in the 
country41. Brewer does not mention in his study that the groundwork had been laid when 
prominent Mosleyite official Neil Francis-Hawkins personally approached local man Arthur W. 
Ward and began overtures with a view to his starting and organising a branch of the embryonic 
BUF in the city. The two men were familiar with each other as senior officers in the British 
Fascists, a reactionary anti-labour group the majority of whose small membership seem to have 
been occupational types attributed to the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ and ‘elite or upper 
middle’ social classes in Table 3 and who felt the conservative status quo of British society was 
under perilous threat from a rising radical left. By the early 1930s the organisation was 
experiencing terminal decline42. On Saturday 1 October 1932 Ward was officially appointed 
Organiser of the Birmingham branch of the BUF43.  
The comprehensive collapse of the Birmingham New Party forced N.H.Q. to look outside 
of Mosley’s former associations in Birmingham for the inaugural leader of the Birmingham BUF. 
This leader would be tasked with building support for Mosleyite fascism from scratch without the 
benefit of pre-existing structures or a pool of pre-established popular support. Ward swiftly proved 
himself an astute choice when his programme of careful planning, perseverance and energetic 
activism, often in the face of violent opposition, translated into notable success in building the 
Birmingham movement into one of the leading centres of fascism in the country over the course 
of the next eighteen months. The mantle of leadership would then pass to an equally capable 
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successor who would proceed to guide the Birmingham BUF to what would prove its zenith in the 
city by mid-1934. 
The inaugural Birmingham BUF meeting was held in October 1932 at the house Ward 
shared with his parents in Upper Cox Street West, Balsall Heath, a room of which served as the 
first Headquarters in the city44. In addition to his parents, the attendees were a small circle of 
Ward’s friends45 who were a collection of minor local authority officials and solicitors. These men 
belonged to the occupational sub-groups 6 and 13 listed in Table 3, and as ‘lower/intermediate 
civil servants’ and ‘academic professionals’ are classified as being ‘lower-middle and middle-
middle’ and ‘elite or upper-middle’ in social status respectively. Ward and these friends formed 
the first blackshirt cadre in the city. The meeting at Ward’s house became a weekly occurrence 
and was held every Thursday evening46.   
 Determined to make an immediate impact the small but ardent group of blackshirts 
launched themselves into an enthusiastic first month of propaganda work. The bulk of activism 
centred on publicising the movement in preparation for the city’s first public BUF meeting. 
Leaflets advertising the meeting were distributed to theatre and cinema queues and a lorry 
belonging to a relative of a member was ‘borrowed’, plastered with fascist posters, and driven 
through the streets. Satisfaction at the raising of its public profile triggered an announcement the 
branch was ready to stage its first outdoor meeting47. The location chosen to host the event was 
the Bull Ring, a bustling market-place and traditional home of free public speech in Birmingham. 
Brewer makes no reference in his study to this important event. 
The theme the speaker promoted at the meeting, the general programme of Mosley’s 
Corporate State, would be the focus of the BUF propaganda disseminated in Birmingham until 
the end of 1934. In addition to indoor and outdoor meetings, this local fascist propaganda 
message would be distributed officially through outlets including letters to the local press, 
newspaper selling, and literature distribution48.  
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At the end of 1932 the branch numbered 40 active members49. There were three full time 
officials: Arthur Ward, his mother, and Propaganda Officer Arthur Miles. ‘All the functions 
necessary for the efficient functioning of the branch, such as leadership, finance, administration 
and so on, were undertaken by these three officers’50. All propaganda work had to be conducted 
in the evening as the rank and file members were all employed in the daytime51. Sunday 
afternoons were reserved for meetings in the Bull Ring52. 
The branch continued to grow steadily during 1933. At the beginning of the year the 
number of ‘elite or upper-middle’ class members increased when students belonging to 
occupational sub-group 12 listed in Table 3 established a Fascist Association at Birmingham 
University53. In February Propaganda Officer Charles Dolan was sent on temporary secondment 
from National Headquarters as a speaker. A veteran of radical street politics and a skilled 
propagandist54, Dolan arrived in Birmingham under instruction, with Ward, to develop the 
Birmingham branch and establish an inaugural branch in Coventry. The two men duly supervised 
the first BUF meeting in Coventry, witnessed by a lorry load of Birmingham blackshirts55. The 
Coventry branch was to remain under Birmingham administrative jurisdiction for the early period 
of its life and provides the first illustration of the Birmingham branch acting as a beachhead for 
BUF penetration into the wider Midlands.   
A keenness to support fellow fledgling Midland branches also ensured an enthusiastic 
Birmingham presence at inaugural meetings in Wolverhampton56 and Leicester57. Birmingham 
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fascists also demonstrated themselves dedicated to travelling even further on occasion in pursuit 
of Mosley’s cause. In July 1933, 105 Birmingham members reportedly travelled down to London 
to participate in the first BUF ‘national march’58. Contingents of Birmingham blackshirts often 
served as stewards at Mosley meetings throughout the country59. 
Development progressed at a pace. As numbers and interest rose sharply the branch 
sought to move from Ward’s home into larger premises. 261 Stratford Road, Sparkhill was 
secured in July 1933. According to the reminiscences of ex-fascists, provincial branch buildings 
were usually modest affairs. The Lancashire headquarters constituted two rooms above a shop. 
At Leytonstone in north-east London the fascist branch comprised two rooms, one an office, the 
other used for meetings60. The new Birmingham headquarters was an eight room building fitted 
up complete with club-room and licensed canteen61, and was described in the words of one ex-
member as ‘palatial’62. Rent amounted to four hundred pounds a year. The level of investment 
and the opulence purchased indicates the importance with which N.H.Q. regarded Birmingham63.   
Activity at the new headquarters was swiftly organised into an established routine. ‘Club 
Nights’ were held every Thursday evening at 7:30 and lasted between two and two and a half 
hours long during which the blackshirts were given a quota of fascist newspapers received that 
day from N. H. Q. to sell for the week and lectures were delivered. The fascist literature was 
received on the Thursday so it could be distributed on the streets the next day, which was payday 
for the majority of Birmingham working people. Brewer claims Thursday evenings were chosen 
for ‘Club Nights’ solely because it fitted with the arrival of the fascist press. The lectures were part 
of a speakers’ school founded at the branch by a visiting medium ranking Staff Officer and 
Propaganda Administrator from N. H. Q., Clement Bruning. Topics covered included the life story 
of Mosley, the meaning and significance of the fasces and other fascist symbols, BUF policies, 
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and the iniquities of the ‘Old Gang’ of British politicians64. The atmosphere of militarism common 
to BUF branches was heightened by a bugler sounding the ‘retreat’ at the close of each night of 
the week as the Union Jack was ceremonially lowered65. On ‘Club Night’ the same bugler would 
sound the ‘fall-in’ to signal that lectures were poised to begin66.   
According to the fascists sales of the Blackshirt were steadily rising and soon reached the 
2000 a week mark67. In September a special ‘Birmingham edition’ was reportedly published to 
cope with the demand; only the cities of Liverpool and Manchester could boast comparable sales 
figures68. In addition to the opportunities provided by mingling with the crowd at meetings held in 
the Bull Ring69 and various council schools buildings70, blackshirts were expected to devote two 
of their nights a week and Saturday to selling BUF literature and favourite spots were the city’s 
bustling high streets and thoroughfares71. 
Demonstrating that the Mosley movement successfully enlisted females for the fascist 
cause, a Women’s Section had been organised by Miss G. E. Moss and soon became an active 
factor in Birmingham. In an assessment of BUF attitude to gender Lewis stresses what he 
identifies as a profound current of anti-feminism, misogyny and repression of women72. This 
convention has been successfully challenged by Durham and Gottlieb who have shown that the 
BUF, in the words of Durham, made a ‘conscious attempt…not to position itself as a bulwark 
against feminism, but remarkably, as perfectly compatible with it’73. The BUF self-consciously 
distanced itself from the gender ideology of continental fascism and among its policies were 
equality within the Mosley movement and the British state, woman’s right to work, and equal 
pay74. Another representative of the ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class category in Table 3, 
schoolteacher Louise Fisher was a member of the ‘academic professionals’ occupational sub-
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group who officially joined the BUF in 1936 aged 21. Soon after joining she became very active 
and rose rapidly through the ranks. While the Security Service assessed her as ‘easily 
influenced’75, the Birmingham BUF regarded her as ‘one of the best women…members in the 
country’76, but both agreed she was ‘an intelligent, studious girl’77. ‘She was more keen on this 
party…than anything else in her life,’ the headmistress of the school where Fisher taught between 
1937 and 1939 told MI5. Fisher herself admitted that the BUF was the principal interest in her life, 
apart from her job78. She recalled that branch life for active female members in Birmingham 
entailed performing a range of functions: ‘The BUF’s policy of sex equality meant that in many 
ways the women were not treated as a separate section, being encouraged and expected to take 
part in any and every activity79. There was, Fisher felt, a feeling of freedom about life as a woman 
in the BUF, remarking: ‘…they (women) felt that they were doing something a bit different, a bit 
more…’80. 
Gottlieb found that there was no ‘typical’ Mosleyite woman. Women joined the BUF for a 
variety of motives differing little from the men81. In Louise Fisher’s case motivation came in the 
form of an impatient altruistic demand to see an improvement in Britain’s economic and social 
welfare. She arrived in Birmingham from Crewe in 1935 to take up her first teaching appointment 
after completing her training. Both her parents were dead and she had been raised ‘in a fairly 
genteel fashion’ by two ‘maiden aunts’82. Birmingham was her first experience of a big industrial 
city, and she was horrified at the reality of slum conditions and social injustice she perceived all 
around83. Fisher recalled: ‘I was appalled by the economic conditions that I found in Birmingham. 
I had never seen anything like the back-to-back slum houses…Action was needed now…’. 
Feeling that the Conservative party was uninterested in the poor and the Labour Party more 
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interested in foreign affairs than in Britain’s domestic problems, she was impressed by Mosley’s 
policy of social reconstruction and, above all, his insistence that something needed to be done as 
a matter of urgency84. It was the fascist movement’s stress on action, Fisher believed, that 
attracted women to the Birmingham BUF. Women joined, she said: ‘…because they wanted to 
see something done…in a short space of time’85.  
Gender relations in the Birmingham branches also confirm another of Gottlieb’s findings: 
‘The intensity of fascism’s spiritual appeal, coupled with the aestheticization of politics through the 
BUF’s uniform and regalia, inevitably led to a sexually charged atmosphere…Fortifying the ideal 
of male-female co-operation, marriages and love affairs frequently occurred within the 
movement’86. On at least two occasions the Birmingham BUF acted as an impromptu marriage 
bureau87. Fisher recalled: ‘I am afraid that sex and human nature being what they are…romances 
sometimes bloomed!’88  
 The move to Stratford Road coincided with the opening of a new branch in the city. 
Sufficient numbers had been recruited in Harborne to acquire full branch status and D. G. 
Reynolds89, who claimed to have studied the Corporate State on the spot in Italy90, was 
appointed leader. Reynolds swiftly established a reputation and was later promoted to a position 
as Political Officer in Lancashire91. The new branch remained under the administrative control of 
the pioneer branch which now assumed the designation Birmingham Central. Other subsidiary full 
branches were Stourbridge, Coventry, Leamington and Nuneaton. The winter months of 1933 
heralded further enlargement. Many new members were reportedly being signed on throughout 
the area92.  
Birmingham was now the premier BUF locality in the Midlands and one of the leading 
Mosleyite regions in the country. By the final month of 1933 active membership had risen to just 
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under 20093. Applying Webber’s ratio, endorsed by Thurlow, of one-and-a-half non-active 
members to every one active member suggests total Birmingham BUF membership was around 
500 as the Birmingham branches entered the New Year94.  
The years 1932 and 1933 were ones of steady progress for the BUF in Birmingham but 
the development of the local fascist branches took place outside the gaze of the city’s political 
establishment. Only the Communist Party had regarded the blackshirts as a threat to the 
established order. The inaugural BUF meeting in the Bull Ring was greeted by the opening 
expression of a Communist ‘physical force’ campaign in the city that was to continue into the 
following year as the ‘Reds’ sought to strangle the fascist movement in Birmingham at birth. BUF 
meetings were routinely disrupted by violent organised Communist opposition; platforms were 
attacked, posters torn down, and fascist speakers and stewards assaulted95. However, the ‘Red’ 
aggression against the Mosleyites in Birmingham tailed off during the second half of 1933. The 
fascist press claimed that the far-left disruption rather than harming the Mosleyite cause in the 
city had actually assisted it considerably by inducing many sympathisers to join the local 
branches96. 
Both the Conservative and Labour parties in Birmingham failed to notice or refused to 
take seriously the determined programme of fascist activity proceeding on the city’s streets and 
the growing receptivity with which it was being greeted. Indeed, each saw the danger to 
democracy as more likely to come from the other. Prominent voices in the Birmingham 
Conservative party contended blithely ‘there is no threat here of a Fascist movement on Hitler or 
Mussolini lines’ and insisted the people of the city direct their attentions instead towards ‘Extreme 
Socialist Leaders’ like Labour MP Stafford Cripps97. The Birmingham Labour Party in turn feared 
‘that a Fascist Spirit will seize the Conservative Party.’98
Two high-profile fascist events that occurred in quick succession during the first two 
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months of 1934 would explode the entrenched complacency of the city political establishment, 
awakening the local elite to the scope of BUF growth in Birmingham and rousing fears of the 
success of fascism in the area. The catalyst for this change in attitude was ‘the triumph at Bingley 
Hall’99. 
On the evening of Sunday 21 January 1934, 8,000 people made their way to Bingley Hall 
to listen to Mosley address them on the aims of the BUF100. The rally was stewarded by 2,000 
fascists drawn from branches in the Midlands and from London, Manchester, Liverpool and 
Chepstow101. The event was an all ticket affair with prices of tickets ranging from 7/6 to 1/-, but 
this had proved no deterrent, all places being quickly filled. The address lasted for nearly an hour 
and three-quarters; dividing neatly into a presentation of fascism as a patriotic revolutionary creed 
which had been subjected to gross misrepresentation and a detailed exposition of the Corporate 
State. After this Mosley answered a sheaf of written questions, and dealt with a number of others 
shouted from the body of the hall, and he was thus occupied altogether for two and a half hours.    
Mosley’s first public meeting in Birmingham since the Rag Market debacle of 1931 
passed as an unmitigated success. Bingley Hall was the largest indoor BUF meeting in the 
movement’s history so far. The capacity audience had listened ‘with rapt attention’ as Mosley 
expounded his brand of fascism and its response was enthusiastic. Press reports commented on 
the diverse sensibilities of the Birmingham men and women drawn to hear the fascist leader 
speak. The local journalists observed that a sizeable Conservative presence mingled freely with a 
substantial and receptive left-leaning element. Approval of Mosley’s message was displayed by 
‘loud applause at frequent intervals’ and many points raised the crowd to sustained cheering. 
Very little heckling took place, interrupters being skillfully handled by ‘plain clothes’ stewards who 
were posted among the two distinct groups of Communists known to be present. Persistent 
interrupters were quickly silenced without resorting to force, and every attempt at mass 
interruption was at once nipped in the bud. At the end of the meeting a ‘steady stream’ of recruits 
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moved forward to the enrolment table, and at the conclusion it was estimated that ‘several 
hundred people had joined up on the spot’102. Potential conflict outside the hall was dealt with 
effectively by the Birmingham police103. 
The reaction of the national BUF to the Bingley Hall rally was one of unconcealed 
euphoria, although Brewer does not mention this response in his study. It appears the gathering 
was organised as a showcase test of BUF maturity and had been long awaited with extreme 
anticipation by the national leadership for two reasons. ‘Firstly because it was regarded as a fair 
index to the attitude of the country towards Fascism, and secondly because it would decide 
whether we had finally conquered the ‘Red Terror’ in its attempts to break up our meetings’104. 
Despite having forecast a ‘tremendous gathering’105 the result exceeded even fascist 
expectations. A gleeful, almost disbelieving, fascist press crowed: ‘The reception accorded to the 
Leader by an enthusiastic audience of more than 8,000 people and their appreciative applause at 
the explanation of our policy, justifies the belief that a large proportion of Britain is now Fascist 
minded’. At the conclusion of the event Mosley boasted to the blackshirt stewards: ‘You have 
proved that the ‘Red Terror’ is finally broken’. The Blackshirt could barely restrain its sense of 
triumph. A jubilant report on Bingley Hall filled its front-page accompanied by a cartoon depicting 
Birmingham as the fascist New Man personified triumphantly deflecting puny Communist attacks 
off his barrel chest. The gathering was celebrated as a seminal moment in the short history of the 
BUF; a rite of political passage the movement had triumphantly navigated to come of age and the 
benchmark by which all future major meetings would be judged106. 
The triumph of Bingley Hall was followed in early February by the Birmingham section of 
the Fascist Union of British Workers (hereafter FUBW) officially launching a legal action against 
the Corporation of Birmingham for alleged contravention of the Road Traffic Act. The FUBW was 
founded in early 1933 and organized nationally by Charles J. Bradford from his home in 
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Battersea, London107. It aimed to establish a BUF alternative to traditional labour organizations, 
seeking to attract the unemployed and members of what according to Table 3 would be identified 
as every ‘lower’ class occupational type in the country by protecting the interests of ‘unskilled and 
skilled’ workers by fighting wage cuts, reductions in the standard of living and means tests; and 
by compiling a register of unemployed which firms could consult when searching for prospective 
new employees108. In addition, information was to be collected on the structure of British industry 
for use by the future fascist Corporate State109. While the FUBW proved largely unsuccessful 
nationally and was later discarded110, the Birmingham action was acclaimed by the BUF as one 
of the high points in FUBW history, and represented the offshoot’s most prominent action up to 
that date111. The Birmingham FUBW was headed by Jesse George Redvers Hill, of Sparkbrook. 
Hill joined the Birmingham branch of the BUF in August 1933112, and was promoted to the 
position of Officer-in-Charge FUBW Birmingham Area113. Prior to his promotion the FUBW in 
Birmingham had restricted its activities to modest attempts to act as advocates at Courts of 
Referees in means test appeals, to miniscule effect114. He wasted no time in making his mark on 
industrial relations, diverting the local FUBW focus from the poor and unemployed and onto the 
city’s industrial ‘lower’ class. Given his occupational background as a member of the sub-group 2 
listed in Table 3 it was natural he would primarily target Birmingham transport workers. A bus 
driver for six years with the Birmingham Corporation, Hill used his influence to form a fascist bus 
drivers’ union in the city that operated under the title the Birmingham Municipal Bus Drivers 
Association, an action that led to him being discharged by the Corporation in early 1934115. Hill 
operated as the Secretary of the fascist union, while two other drivers, ex-members of the 
Transport and General Workers Union who had been expelled for membership of the BUF, were 
appointed President and Vice-President. Linehan has noted the appeal BUF industrial 
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propaganda seems to have exerted among many transport workers, particularly busmen116. In 
early February 1934 Hill, under the auspices of the new fascist union financed by the FUBW, 
brought a summons at Birmingham Stipendiary against the Birmingham Corporation Tramways 
and Omnibus department for contravention of section 19 of the 1930 Road Traffic Act117. This 
stipulated the department’s drivers were prohibited from driving for more than five and a half 
hours without a rest and for no longer than an aggregate eleven hours a day. The Stipendiary at 
Birmingham Police Court found in Hill’s favour and fined the Corporation £40118. Befitting its 
status as the most prominent action up to that time in FUBW history, Hill was assisted in his suit 
by Captain Lewis, legal advisor to the FUBW, and substantial FUBW funds were released to 
engage the services of eminent London solicitor Sir George Jones119. The national BUF made 
great play of the FUBW Birmingham court victory, hailing it as evidence of a section burgeoning 
in efficacy120. The Mosleyites claimed in Birmingham the case impressed many industrial 
‘workers’ and resulted in a number of enlistments from these representatives of the ‘lower’ social 
class121. 
Confronted with incontrovertible public evidence of mushrooming Mosleyite potency in 
Birmingham, a shaken political establishment hastily implemented strategies designed to 
counteract the now recognised rapid growth of the BUF in the second city. The Birmingham 
Labour and Conservative parties made appeals to their supporters for solidarity in the face of the 
fascist challenge. While both saw in the BUF a political ‘gangsterism’ dedicated to the violent 
destruction of political liberty and individual freedom, as Brewer notes, ‘the respective appeals 
differed based on the contrasting views of politics held by the parties’122. The Birmingham 
Conservative leadership, while recognizing the impatience many people felt at the difficulties of 
the National Government, urged its supporters to stay loyal to the party123. Fascism was 
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condemned as an alien import contradictory to the heritage and traditions of Britain124. This was 
an appeal, Brewer recognizes, to ‘the innate common sense of the steady ‘Englishmen’ of 
Birmingham, to their traditions of conservative gradualism. It was an appeal to…the community 
that was Britain, owing an allegiance not to a class culture but a general culture which endowed 
the correct political practice.’ The Labour appeal would differ radically from that of the Tories. 
‘Solidarity in this instance was reinforced by appeals to the emotionalism of their class, to their 
forefathers fighting poverty to win for them their socialist movement and all the benefits they 
possessed. It was an appeal to their sense of belonging to the working class community’125.  
 While the Conservatives were content to make appeals through the medium of the local 
Tory press, the Birmingham Labour party settled on a more active stance. Supporters were urged 
to get on to the street corners and preach the doctrine of socialism126. Anti-BUF literature was to 
be distributed to the public. Fascism, it was argued, could only succeed by seducing the workers 
from their loyalty to the working-class movement, and the best method of defeating it was by 
educating the people on what fascism really meant, expose its ‘real aims’ and show what 
atrocities had been committed in its name in fascist countries127. Confrontation was disavowed 
however, as was collaboration with the Communists. The Communists, not Lord Rothermere, 
were perceived as the most effective ally of the Mosleyites, their violent methods enabling the 
fascists to ‘pose as martyrs’ of free speech128. Even peaceful counter-demonstrations were 
prohibited for fear of being exploited by either the far-left or far-right to trigger disorder129.   
 These anti-fascist strategies were maintained without amendment for the entire life-span 
of the Birmingham BUF130 and did little to impede the rise of the BUF in the city between late 
January and mid-1934. In the immediate aftermath of the Bingley Hall meeting the buoyant 
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Birmingham branches industriously set about making full use of the publicity generated from the 
successful gathering and the new respectability conferred on the movement by the national 
Rothermere press. Recruiting drives and canvassing schemes were stepped up and Birmingham 
fascist diligence reaped its reward with a tremendous influx of enrolments. New members at the 
Birmingham Central branch, according to the Blackshirt, averaged fifty a day and the 
administrative staff found themselves working ‘at full pressure’131.     
Demand to enlist in the branches continued throughout February at a figure ‘very much 
above normal’132. At the end of February 1934 membership stood at around 2,000133. Whether 
this figure constituted total membership or only active membership is unclear. If it is the latter then 
Webber’s ratio would produce a new total membership figure of 5,000. Either figure would 
validate N.H.Q.’s belief that Birmingham had earned itself a ranking ‘high among the strongholds 
of Fascism in Britain’134.   
A growing sense of potency was underlined when on Sunday 25 February the 
Birmingham Central branch enjoyed its first official propaganda parade, an event that climaxed in 
the ‘most successful outdoor meeting ever’. Uniformed members, including a full company of the 
branch Defence Force, marched from the Area Headquarters in Sparkbrook along a three mile 
route through the main streets of Birmingham to the Bull Ring where blackshirt speakers 
addressed a well-behaved audience numbering over a thousand135. 
A change in leadership in March 1934 failed to disadvantage the fascist cause in 
Birmingham. The rapid progress of the Mosley movement in Birmingham had deeply impressed 
the BUF national leadership and the man judged most responsible for the achievements was duly 
transferred onto the staff at National Headquarters in London136. Despite the loss of Arthur W. 
Ward the Birmingham branches maintained momentum under the temporary leadership of 
Propaganda Officers Miles and Seaborn137. A replacement for Ward arrived as part of the re-
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organisation of provincial branches undertaken by the BUF during April and early May 1934138. 
Warwickshire and Staffordshire were organized into a Midlands administrative unit covering 
Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Stoke, and Coventry139; and A. K. Chesterton was appointed 
Officer-in-Charge Midlands Area140, with his headquarters at Stratford Road141. 
Mandle offers a portrait of the mid-1930s ‘typical’ charismatic national Mosleyite leader. 
He suggests a restless, well-travelled, privately educated, ex-army officer in his late thirties142 
who would have belonged had he been assessed according to the categories listed in Table 3 to 
the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ or ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class. Whilst Linehan has 
dissected the numerous problems with this representation143, in the individual case of Chesterton 
the composite fascist leader in Mandle’s survey proves accurate. At the time of his arrival in 
Birmingham, 34 year old A. K. Chesterton was a rising star of the Mosley movement. He had 
enlisted as a private in the British Army at the age of 16 and rapidly rose through the ranks to the 
position of Company Commander. Serving in German East, and Central Africa, and later in 
France and Flanders during the First World War he was awarded the Military Cross for gallant 
conduct. After the war he went digging for diamonds, and also worked on a gold-mine in South 
Africa before entering journalism first as a reporter and later as sub-editor on an important 
newspaper in Johannesburg. Since returning to Britain he had worked successfully for four years 
as the Managing Editor of a series of newspapers in South Devon, and then for several years as 
the theatre critic of the Stratford Herald. Baker believed the close personal ties formed to the 
south Midlands were a decisive factor in Chesterton’s appointment as Midlands Area Organiser. 
Chesterton had been a member of the BUF for only six months but had worked unselfishly for the 
movement both as speaker and writer; his articles in Fascist Week gained him great popularity 
among Mosleyites, and as a speaker he was in constant demand144.  
                                                 
138 NA: HO144/20140, p118. 
139 Blackshirt 1 June 1934, p8. 
140 NA: HO144/20140, p106. 
141 Blackshirt 6 – 12 April 1934, p3. 
142 W. Mandle, ‘The Leadership of the British Union of Fascists’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol.12, No.4 (1966), pp360-383. 
143 Linehan, British fascism, pp162-163. 
144 D. Baker, Ideology of Obsession: A. K. Chesterton and British Fascism (London, I. B. Tauris, 1996), 
pp125-126. 
 45
Chesterton’s role encompassed the dual function of organizing the Midlands Area and 
leading the Birmingham region, and two local fascists were instantly promoted to assist him in his 
responsibilities; Sub-Company Officer Orton was appointed to the newly created position of 
Officer-in-Charge Staffordshire and Warwickshire Area Defence Force, and Sub-Branch Officer 
Pinner became the Area Accountant145. Miss Bessie C. Loxton became Women’s Area Organiser 
for Birmingham146.  
The transition in leadership from Ward to the new man passed seamlessly and in 
Birmingham Chesterton further enhanced his growing status within the movement. ‘Here he 
established a reputation for efficient organisation and hard work, driving his blackshirt 
subordinates very hard in the process. At the same time he contributed regular articles to the 
national fascist press’147. Under Chesterton’s guidance great strides were made in consolidating 
the impetus of fascism in the Birmingham area. Campaigns of rallies, meetings, canvassing and 
sales drives were sustained on an intensive scale148. Gratifying numbers of fresh recruits 
continued to stream into the fascist ranks. Sub-branches began sprouting in the city suburbs149; 
the existence of which Cross rightly claims as evidence of wide-scale support150. Five new Units 
formed in Birmingham Central151 during the first half of May 1934 stand as testament not only to 
the escalating appeal of fascism in Birmingham but also to the increased willingness of many 
members to assume active status and publicly associate themselves with Mosley’s movement on 
the streets of the second city. Among those local fascists who remained unwilling or unable to 
reveal their political beliefs to the general community of Birmingham were participants of the 
recently opened businessman’s branch at headquarters whose members preferred to wear 
neither the blackshirt uniform nor BUF badges152. The major regional studies demonstrate that 
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such reticence was common. Businessmen who supported the BUF in northern England, east 
London and East Anglia often preferred for commercial and social reasons not to advertise their 
attachment to Mosley in too open a manner153. The businessmen in the Birmingham BUF ranged 
from small independent traders in occupational sub-group 7 of the ‘lower-middle and middle-
middle’ social class to well-known and highly successful local entrepreneurs whose occupational 
grouping afforded ‘elite or upper-middle’ status in the city154. 
The majority of the fresh recruits flooding into the Birmingham branches were previously 
un-politicized young people, alongside older disaffected ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ class 
Tories impressed by the seeming BUF ability to ensure a hearing for its speakers, which as one 
‘well-known city man’ member of the local branch informed the Birmingham Mail, ‘is more than 
the Conservatives can do in certain Birmingham constituencies’155. For the disillusioned Tories 
the BUF was a more virile and activist form of the traditional Conservative party: a movement of 
the Right devoted to order, stability, authority, and the defeat of Communism156. These men and 
women were commercial travellers and clerical workers of varying types allocated to the 
‘lower/intermediate (petty) employees’ occupational sub-group listed in Table 3157.  
Superficially these new recruits conform to profiles of the so-called ‘Rothermere fascists’, 
men and women drawn into the BUF during the period of sponsorship by the influential Daily Mail 
proprietor that stretched from early to mid-1934: youngsters, anti-socialists, and in the words of 
Tory leader Baldwin ‘Ultramontane Conservatives’158. Like the ‘typical Rothermere fascist’ the 
majority of recruits attracted to the BUF in Birmingham during the first half of 1934 left the Mosley 
movement in the aftermath of Olympia. However, their motivations for departure were, as we will 
see, unrelated to the disorderly event in London and the whims of press barons. If it is indeed 
accurate to describe these men and women as ‘Rothermere fascists’ then they did not constitute 
the image firmly entrenched in the historiography: ‘milk and water [fascists] who could not stand 
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the pace and fell away when the going got tough’159.    
Chesterton and a substantial contingent of his Birmingham Mosleyites were present at 
the Olympia rally of 7 June 1934. In the frenzy of media and political opinion engulfing Mosley in 
the wake of the Olympia scandal, the fascist leader recognized the benefit of having a man of 
Chesterton’s abilities at his side at headquarters working as a journalist and propagandist. 
Chesterton was duly transferred to national headquarters at the end of June 1934 where he was 
appointed a full member of the Policy Directorate160. His final public action in his role as 
Birmingham leader and Midlands Organiser was to be principal speaker at the first Mosleyite 
meeting of importance in Leicester161. 
 
2. 1934 – 1940. 
 
The Birmingham BUF enjoyed a sustained and rapid growth during the period from its founding to 
the mass brawl at Olympia. Under Ward’s stewardship the fascist cause had flourished in the city 
and this success had been both maintained and enhanced under Chesterton’s tenure. During the 
second half of 1934 starting in July the Mosley movement in the city would swiftly lose 
momentum and fall into chronic decay. However, the Birmingham BUF was able to stabilize its 
membership and persisted in functioning, albeit in a battered state, until a minor recovery began 
in the later years of the decade that witnessed an influx of pro-appeasement enlistments and 
which continued until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
 The Birmingham press response to the events at Olympia was unremittingly indignant. 
Blame for the violence unleashed was placed firmly at the feet of the BUF. In the Birmingham 
newspapers’ unanimous account of the disorder perfectly ordinary and respectable folk, whose 
only offence was a reasonable interruption, were set upon by gangs of blackshirt thugs. Editorials 
presented the Olympia story as incontrovertible proof that the Mosley movement was an 
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unacceptable alien creed that invited disorder and introduced a provocative element into British 
politics162.      
Brewer attributed the decline of the Birmingham BUF during the second half of 1934 to 
public revulsion inspired by this hostile press publicity. While he is correct to identify the period 
immediately preceding the furore at the London rally as representing the watershed of BUF hopes 
in the city there exists no evidence to indicate that either the local or national publicity generated 
by the events that unfolded at Olympia impacted detrimentally on the membership, activities or 
appeal of Mosleyite fascism in Birmingham.  
Security Service documents unavailable to Brewer explain the sudden deterioration of 
Mosleyite strength in the city during the second half of 1934 as the product of bitter discord 
between the two most senior officers in the Birmingham BUF. Internal divisions were not 
uncommon within the BUF. Thurlow has provided a detailed account of how conflicting rivalries in 
the Mosley movement within branches and between Districts and N.H.Q. often militated against 
its success163. The major regional studies completed by Rawnsley, Linehan and Mitchell reveal 
that sporadic outbreaks of personal animosities disrupted the progress of branches in Hackney, 
Shoreditch, Manchester, and Norfolk respectively164.   
Upon his departure from Birmingham, National Headquarters divided Chesterton’s former 
responsibilities between two fascists with solid knowledge of the city. Deputy Branch Officer 
Jesse Hill was appointed Birmingham Organiser and Deputy Branch Officer/Propaganda Officer 
D. N. Revett became temporary Officer-in-Charge Staffordshire and Warwickshire. Below the two 
promotions the hierarchy of command remained ostensibly constant with that in place during the 
tail end of Chesterton’s incumbency. The propaganda department was run by Area Propaganda 
Officer Fletcher assisted by Speakers Gilmore, Ashcroft and Mosley. The sales department was 
overseen by Area Propaganda Officer Ibberson with the assistance of Sub-Branch Officers 
Startin and Twist. The Defence Force was trained by Company Officer Orton and Section Leader 
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Preston and judged ‘a credit to the branch’165. 
The appointment of Revett and Hill proved disastrous when a personal feud developed 
between the two men that crippled the BUF organisation and plunged fascism in Birmingham into 
crisis. Culpability for the conflict rests firmly on the shoulders of Jesse Hill. An undoubtedly 
capable man, the responsibility of leading the entire Birmingham BUF was too great a challenge 
and Hill buckled under the pressure.  
Hill’s tenure began encouragingly enough. The Birmingham BUF responded to adverse 
city press reports covering the Olympia rally by mobilizing onto the streets and conducting an 
intensive propaganda campaign that lasted throughout July166. Early in the month former Labour 
MP turned fascist John Beckett arrived in the city to add his weight to the launch of the publicity 
drive. An audience of 126 attended an address he delivered at a quiet and orderly meeting in 
Stratford Road Council Schools167.  
But while a united front was presented to Lady Mosley when she visited the Birmingham 
headquarters during the final weekend of July to make a swift tour of the branches in the area 
and inspect the Women’s Section168, divisions were beginning to open between Hill and his 
immediate superior. The MI5 report on developments in the fascist movement for August and 
September commented: ‘Sir Oswald Mosley’s movement has lost momentum…It has shown 
signs of receding…particularly in [among other places] Birmingham.’ Decline was attributed to 
internal decay. ‘In part as a result of financial stringency and in part as a result of various 
personal questions and administrative ineptitudes, dissensions have broken out’169. In 
Birmingham the ‘personal questions’ highlighted are a reference to a growing paranoia that was 
increasingly guiding Hill’s decisions and leading to the above mentioned ‘administrative 
ineptitudes’. Hill had convinced himself that Revett, a talented public speaker who had reputedly 
spoken at over 100 meetings throughout the region since arriving in the Midlands in May170, was 
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secretly sending to N.H.Q. adverse reports on his work and in response refused to leave the 
branch headquarters in order to carry out development work in the city because of an imagined 
lack of trustworthy subordinates171. New financial restraints imposed on branches throughout the 
country heightened Hill’s sense of injustice. Special Branch reported: ‘trouble was brewing…it is 
being fomented by J. R. Hill….Hill receives £3-6-0 per week – the amount he received as a 
busman – and wants an increase. This cannot be granted’. As Hill’s angst deepened so did his 
erratic behaviour and potential for rash action. ‘Hill is to come to London to put his demand before 
headquarters, and if it is not granted, it is said he and his followers will seize the branch’172.  
At the beginning of December N.H.Q. took the decision to intervene and dispatched two 
high-ranking officials to Birmingham to investigate173. The assessment reached was unequivocal. 
The Birmingham branches of the BUF had fallen into a deplorable state. Hill was judged an 
unsuitable man to be leading the Birmingham branches and it was recommended he be removed 
as Organiser. However, finding an appropriate replacement would present new difficulties, it was 
concluded, because of a lack of both time and local candidates: ‘There is unfortunately, no one in 
the Birmingham Branch suitable for carrying on in place of Hill and unless Hill is given an 
increase in salary, he will resign’174. 
Special Branch reports show Hill was still Birmingham Organiser in mid-January 1935 
when he again threatened to resign175. An abrupt disappearance from all the material discovered 
relating to the BUF in Birmingham after this point, coupled with the absence of a new leader for 
several months into the New Year, suggests National Headquarters finally lost patience with the 
former bus driver and acted, either by accepting his resignation or forcing him out. 
Unsurprisingly the fraught situation at headquarters under Hill’s leadership disillusioned 
many of the city fascists, the movement in Birmingham developed ‘a bad name’ and local 
branches haemorrhaged members176. The atmosphere of corrosion was compounded when 
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Birmingham University Fascist Association disbanded at the end of the summer vacation 1934 
and was not revived177. The Harborne branch closed because of a collapse in interest. 
Concurrent to the slump in membership was a chronic reduction in activism. However, while 
street propaganda was non-existent and meetings in the Bull Ring were a rarity subjected to 
peaceful Communist opposition whenever they were staged178, a small measure of publicity work 
was maintained that saw female members playing an increasingly prominent role galvanised by 
the emergence of Miss Harris, the first woman speaker in the area179. During indoor meetings 
Miss Harris shared equal billing with established senior speakers Miles and Revett and 
overshadowed the two men by cultivating the greater interest among the audiences. The 
Birmingham Central branch was proud of its new star speaker and predicted she ‘should prove 
invaluable to the cause of Fascism’. When the ‘Winter Campaign’ opened at a meeting held in the 
Stratford Road Schools building the ‘chief item of interest’ a speech by Miss Harris and her 
appeal to the women among the audience to come forward and ‘help to the best of their ability’180. 
However, while Miss Harris and her fellow women fascists displayed a valuable capacity for 
rousing curiosity towards the movement they were ultimately unable to succeed where in recent 
times the men had failed. Interest refused to convert into support and at the end of November the 
Birmingham BUF abandoned active recruitment and turned its beleaguered attention exclusively 
towards keeping in touch with non-active members. A series of private meetings were especially 
arranged to which these members were invited181. Respite outside the city was also denied: a 
Birmingham contingent attended the disappointing Hyde Park rally that misfired embarrassingly in 
the presence of a huge anti-fascist rival gathering182. At the end of December 1934 there were 
300 members on the books of the Birmingham Central branch, but only 68 paid their dues, of 
which about 35 were active183.  
As the Birmingham BUF limped towards 1935 fascism in the city languished in a 
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distressed state. Hill’s period in charge of the BUF in Birmingham was a ruinous affair. The 
momentum gathered over the course of the previous two years had evaporated, membership was 
small and demoralised, and organisation had been allowed to crumble. However, the Birmingham 
BUF proved able to halt its decline and, though it remained mired in a generally moribund state, 
maintained a stable membership between the years 1935 and 1937.   
The responsibility for salvaging the BUF in Birmingham was temporarily entrusted to 
Revett while National Headquarters deliberated on a permanent replacement for Hill. Revett 
sought to prevent a terminal decline of the Mosley movement in Birmingham by focusing attention 
on retaining and re-energising current membership. Indoor meetings and dances were preferred 
to gatherings in the Bull Ring. Organisation work replaced that of propaganda. Prominence was 
sacrificed in the interest of stability although sales drives of fascist literature continued on 
weekends184. Revett’s reforms coincided with the re-organisation of the BUF nationally aimed at 
removing fascists from comfortable branch facilities and out onto the streets. The social aspect of 
BUF life was to be downgraded and emphasis placed upon active work. Blackshirt clubs and bars 
were closed all around the country and in many places headquarters were abandoned in favour 
of small inexpensive administrative offices and rooms. While the Birmingham BUF retained its 
opulent headquarters the building had never been equipped with a bar. Instead local Mosleyites 
would gather to socialise at the Old Stone Cross public house on the corner of Coleshill Street 
and Stratford Road near headquarters. Relaxing in this manner was now discouraged185. 
A MI5 report covering developments in the movement to the end of February 1935 
reported that Revett’s reforms were successfully decelerating the decline of Mosleyite fascism in 
Birmingham, although membership remained ‘small’186. The transition to the new system of 
organisation was overseen by a squad of Inspectors from N.H.Q. A. K. Chesterton was 
dispatched to supervise the transition in the Midlands, and this former Birmingham leader’s tour 
has passed into notoriety in the historiography. As will be discussed in depth in the respective 
case-studies, Chesterton’s response to the branch life he discovered in Stoke-on-Trent and 
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Coventry was to close the branches on the spot. The improvement experienced in Birmingham in 
early 1935 undoubtedly contributed to the Birmingham BUF managing to pass Chesterton’s 
inspection while the other two Midlands branches failed.                
 In March 1935 Revett was moved to a Staff Speaker position in Manchester187 and 
replaced by Arthur Mills, who was transferred from a position at N.H.Q.188. Mills would build upon 
the work accomplished by Revett and halt the chronic decline of the BUF in the city. Abandoning 
the tactic of retrenchment, activism would now refocus on outdoor meetings designed to publicise 
the movement and disseminate propaganda. The contraction in membership meant there was a 
shortage of members to conduct propaganda work so the responsibility to propagandise fell upon 
the shoulders of a small but dedicated corps of officers. Throughout March and April meetings 
regularly attracted large audiences. The gatherings also attracted occasional attempts at 
interference by Communist agitators that remained strictly peaceful. In addition to his participation 
at outdoor meetings, Propaganda Officer Shelville also held speakers’ classes every Tuesday 
and Friday at the Central branch. Sales drives remained a staple of fascist activism in 
Birmingham189. 
 In early May membership was small, numbering under 50. At the end of the month the 
Birmingham BUF was re-organised in compliance with another round of national reforms. 
Birmingham was realigned as a ‘District’ with six branches within it corresponding to the 
geographical boundaries of Lozells, Handsworth, Ladywood, Sparkhill, Moseley and Selly Oak 
parliamentary constituencies. The old Central branch became District Headquarters with Mills as 
district leader. An emphasis on self-finance introduced a bookshop in the Stratford Road building 
selling BUF literature to the public and a shop was opened at Coleshill Street run independently 
of movement funds by selling tea, coffee, sweets, sandwiches, and cigarettes190. A ‘Contact 
Officer’ was appointed whose task it was to get in touch with influential persons and enlist their 
financial support of the movement. This man was one of the Birmingham BUF’s ‘elite or upper-
middle’ class members. A senior executive at a nationally famous brewery based in the city, he 
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belonged to occupational sub-group 9 listed in Table 3191. The Birmingham branches had been 
stabilised and could now direct attention exclusively towards rebuilding membership and raising 
the fascist organisation from its lowly condition in the second city.   
 Where it has been possible to determine the social class of people attracted into the 
Birmingham BUF between 1932 and 1934 only the busmen recruited by Hill can be allocated to 
the category ‘lower’ class in Table 3. Every other member has been employed in an occupational 
sub-group which categories them as ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ or ‘elite and upper-middle’ 
in social class. However, the BUF membership in early 1935 is revealed to be diverse in terms of 
social class. When recalling the social composition of the Birmingham BUF at this time, Louise 
Fisher described a broad range of occupational ‘types’ which included a notable ‘lower class’ 
element. These ‘unskilled workers’ and ‘skilled workers’ of sub-groups 1 and 2 were factory 
workers, railway workers, busmen, waitresses and domestic workers. She recalled: 
What kind of people belonged to the Birmingham Branch? A wide cross-section  
of the community. One member was a son of one of the oldest and largest  
brewers in Birmingham while another was a well-known independent brewer; a  
well-to-do coal merchant belonged to our Branch, while we also had solicitors,  
teachers like myself, doctors, bank clerks, newspapermen (both reporters and  
technical staff), large and small restaurant owners, many small factory owners  
(these small metal works abounded at the time in Birmingham), office workers,  
skilled and unskilled factory workers, railway workers (their pay was abominable  
in the 1930s), shop keepers and shop assistants and busmen…The women 
members were equally diverse: teachers, secretaries, nurses, waitresses,  
domestic workers, housewives, etc192. 
 
This shifting social class profile of the BUF membership in Birmingham corresponds to a 
suggestion by Linehan that while between 1932 and mid-1934 the fascist movement’s main 
appeal was to people of ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ and ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class, 
after Olympia and continuing through to 1938 increasing numbers of ‘lower’ class types entered 
the Mosleyite ranks193. As we shall see later, fascist propaganda campaigns in the city would 
reportedly in 1937 attract a fresh wave of ‘unskilled workers’ and ‘skilled workers’ into the local 
BUF. 
During the second half of the 1930s the focus of the propaganda disseminated by the 
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Birmingham BUF shifted away from promoting the theme of the Corporate State. Apart from a 
brief period at the end of May 1937 when the local BUF campaigned against Jews, the fascist 
propaganda message in Birmingham from 1935 onwards concentrated on advocating the theme 
of non-intervention in foreign disputes. In Birmingham these ‘patriotic mobilisations around 
emotive contemporary issues’194 played a vital role in maintaining a degree of public interest in 
the BUF, boosting morale among the rank and file, and restoring a common sense of purpose 
and urgency to its activists.  
Birmingham BUF fortunes began to improve in August 1935 with the advent of the ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’ propaganda campaign aimed at keeping the country from being dragged into 
war over Abyssinia. Led by Mills and Administrative Officer Dent195, the ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ 
campaign galvanised the Birmingham BUF and the branches launched a ‘gigantic push’ in 
support of Mosley’s position of non-intervention in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and soon attracted 
large crowds among a receptive public196. Around this time Speaker Probyn was despatched 
from N.H.Q. to assist the Birmingham Mosleyites and wrote a series of propaganda letters to the 
Birmingham press outlining the BUF attitude to the international crisis197. In late August 
Birmingham citizens woke to discover local fascists had chalked peace campaign slogans on 
walls throughout the city198.  
The frequency of BUF meetings devoted to promoting the message of isolationism 
increased as the Abyssinian Crisis deepened and were an almost daily occurrence throughout 
the first half of September. Often two or three meetings were held in a single day. On the 
afternoon of Sunday 8 September a fascist peace demonstration was held in Handsworth Park, 
which attracted an enthusiastic audience of over a thousand. In the evening in the Bull Ring a 
crowd of 2,000 listened to Section Leader Mosley, Administrative Officer Dent and Speaker 
Probyn199. While the number of BUF propaganda meetings staged in Birmingham fell to one 
every other day as the international crisis eased, audiences reportedly remained sizeable and 
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sympathetic to the movement’s position200. By October active membership remained stable at 
around 30201.  
 The ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ propaganda campaign touched a nerve with a sizeable 
proportion of Birmingham people and through it the local BUF regained a slight measure of 
appeal. It was claimed sales of fascist literature had increased by three hundred percent over the 
course of the previous two months202. The Birmingham fascists began receiving invitations to 
guest at respectable debates. In early November Probyn addressed the Harborne branch of Toc 
H. The address was reportedly received with enthusiasm and Probyn warmly congratulated. An 
invitation to address another branch of Toc H was extended and accepted203. Over the last few 
months Birmingham, recognised Special Branch, whilst not making marked headway had 
‘managed to hold its own’204.      
 The peace campaign was followed in the final two months of 1935 by a new co-ordination 
plan instituted in November wherein Birmingham was divided into four districts: North, East, 
South, and West; each containing three Parliamentary Divisions. Steps were put into action to 
establish headquarters in each of these districts at the earliest possible moment. The Birmingham 
North H.Q. was opened at 382 Tyburn Road, Erdington; the Birmingham East H.Q. was founded 
at 111 Coleshill Street, Duddeston; the Birmingham South H.Q. was located at 261 Stratford 
Road, Sparkhill; and the Birmingham West district headquarters was situated at 76 City Road, 
Edgbaston. A central control office in Room 86, 174 Corporation Street directed the propaganda 
activities of Birmingham and Coventry205.     
The objective of the co-ordination was to build an electoral and propaganda machine 
capable of contesting Birmingham constituencies at some unspecified point in the future. The 
man assigned responsibility for creating a fascist electoral machine in Birmingham was Captain 
Charles Henry Bentinck-Budd, who replaced Mills as Organiser Birmingham area at the 
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beginning of 1936206. Another leader of the Birmingham Mosleyites to conform to Mandle’s 
stereotype Bentinck-Budd was 39 years of age. Educated at St. Edward’s, Oxford, he left school 
at 16 to enlist in the Fifth Dragoon Guards in 1914207 and served in France during the Great War. 
In 1915 he received a commission to the Second Battalion of Buffs, and was severely wounded in 
the battle of Loos. After the war he travelled extensively and served for two years in the South of 
Ireland with the Royal Irish Constabulary Auxiliary Force. In 1930 he was elected to Worthing 
Borough Council as a Conservative councillor, and a year later was elected to West Sussex 
County Council. His defection to the BUF in 1933 gave him the distinction of being the first 
blackshirt councillor in the country208. He resigned from these positions shortly before his move to 
Birmingham; and it has been suggested he did so unnecessarily early just before elections to 
avoid embarrassing defeat209.  
    Bentinck-Budd affirmed it was ‘useless’ to hold public meetings, especially open-air, and 
preferred to confine the local BUF activism to the establishing of discreet contact with potential 
supporters in private210. This entailed a dramatic scaling back in propaganda campaigning on the 
streets of the second city, and as a consequence the publicity profile of the Birmingham BUF for 
the average local citizen fell to its lowest ever level. Fascist visibility dipped further in July when 
the expensive Stratford Road headquarters was abandoned in favour of modest premises at 81 
Stafford Street211, a building described in the local press as a ‘house-shop’212. At the beginning of 
August Bentinck-Budd’s strategy of withdrawing fascist speakers from the streets of Birmingham 
was overturned when the national BUF implemented an isolationist propaganda campaign 
mobilised around the escalating Spanish Civil War213. Weekly outdoor meetings attracted large 
crowds throughout the month214. ‘Steady progress’ was reported, with an increase in sales of 
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Action and the Blackshirt, and the formation of a new Unit in the Birmingham North district215. 
Protest letters written by Probyn appeared in the local press216. The outdoor speaking to 
audiences of hundreds continued as the propaganda campaign advanced into September. Sales 
drives featured debut appearances by local grey shirted BUF cadets217. On this activity, an ex-
Cadet recounted years later: ‘Selling Action in New Street on Saturday nights, spread about forty 
or fifty yards apart, we were frequently…insulted. Selling the paper was an initiation rite’218.  
Nine of these cadets, boys aged between 14 and 16, went on to form a drum corps that 
marched at the head of fascist parades in the city.219 The establishment of the drum corps was 
part of the ‘art of seduction’ consciously practised by the BUF. Linehan writes: ‘Fascism 
aestheticised politics through carefully choreographed marches and mass gatherings, secular 
rituals and display of paramilitary paraphernalia. Fascist political theatre generated a highly 
charged atmosphere that appealed to the emotions, mesmerising and ensnaring the unwary.’220 
This statement may, however, do a disservice to a number of these juvenile fascists. While the 
irrational appeal of what Pussard describes as ‘the use of performative techniques by the BUF’221 
undoubtedly exerted a powerful pull over many of the Birmingham cadets, for some the appeal of 
the BUF operated on more diverse levels. Brewer found that alongside ‘the appeal to the young 
of any uniformed movement’ of adventure, excitement and fellowship ran ‘a rational appeal to 
youth’s desire for change, the provision of a channel to express youth’s protest’. For one 14 year 
old schoolboy fascist cadet the Birmingham BUF offered a solution to rational impatience at the 
traditional parties’ responses to the economic, social and political position of Britain, explaining: ‘I 
was very interested in politics…coming from an intensely political family who had passionate 
support for the Labour Party’. Interestingly, his political allegiance was deeply informed by his 
Catholic upbringing. Rawnsley noted that BUF membership in northern England contained a high 
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percentage of Catholics222. The fascist press claimed twelve per cent of leading BUF officials 
were Catholics, a proportion significantly higher than the Catholic percentage in the country223. 
Durham has suggested that it was in recognition of Catholic support that the BUF never widely 
advocated eugenics. On issues of social engineering Mosley attempted ‘in part to steer a path 
that minimized criticism from Catholic circles which he hoped would be sympathetic to 
fascism’224. The question of what motivated Catholics to join the BUF is a contentious one. 
Rawnsley partly suggested an enduring Irish-Anglo appreciation of Mosley’s stand in his early 
political career as a Conservative MP against the British Government’s deployment of ‘Black and 
Tan’ paramilitaries in Ireland. Religious writers in the fascist press admired fascism’s stance on 
the ‘Red Threat’225. More controversially, Skidelsky suggested that Catholicism, unlike 
Anglicanism, had developed a social and economic theory requiring action on the political plane, 
and ‘many Catholics saw in Fascism the movement that corresponded closest to their social 
ideals’226. The individual case of the Birmingham schoolboy fascist cadet corroborates 
Skidelsky’s position. When questioned on his allegiance to the BUF he explained his opinion that 
fascism was an organic political extension of the teachings of his childhood religion, stating: ‘I had 
a good Catholic upbringing which turned my ideas towards authoritarian solutions to problems, 
since Catholicism is very authoritarian. The anti-Communism of Catholicism was instilled in my 
upbringing’227.      
 While the local BUF took great pride in the debut of their cadets on the streets of 
Birmingham, less welcome among the Mosleyites was the attention Communist opposition 
displayed towards the local fascist mobilisation. Organised peaceful interruption had been an 
occasional occurrence at BUF meetings in Birmingham during the months of August and 
September. As tension in the East End of London between Mosleyites and anti-fascists 
escalated, Communist opposition in Birmingham hardened in attitude and tactics. In late 
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September and early October attempts were made to physically attack blackshirt activists228. In 
the days immediately following ‘The Battle of Cable Street’ the Birmingham BUF took the decision 
to impose a cooling off period and all street activism ceased for the duration of October. While 
this did not mean the local blackshirts were afraid of clashes with anti-fascists, the BUF believed 
such confrontations if they should manifest would serve no useful benefit at a time when the local 
press was filling its pages daily with damning features on the chaotic events plaguing the East 
End and the repercussions felt around the country. A handful of letters to the press outlining the 
general BUF position of non-intervention in foreign disputes represent the only visible local 
propaganda campaigning undertaken during this period of confinement229. Outdoor meetings 
recommenced during the final week of October 1936230. On 9 November Mosley attended a 
luncheon of businessmen in the city where he received an enthusiastic welcome231. Street-based 
campaigning attracting not inconsiderable crowds would continue unmolested throughout 
Birmingham for the remainder of the year232.  
While the various propaganda campaigns urging the Birmingham public to reject 
interventionism in foreign disputes during 1936 successfully generated a noteworthy degree of 
interest and sympathy in the cause of the fascist movement in the city, the local Mosleyites failed 
to convert this sentiment into membership. At the close of the year the Birmingham area could 
boast around 100 members; a minor improvement on the figures for 1935. This illustrates the 
relative stability of Birmingham BUF membership, in total numbers at least, between 1935 and 
late 1936233. 
This consistency in membership numbers was achieved despite during 1935 and 1936 
the Birmingham BUF becoming associated in the public mind with political violence leading to the 
local movement being denied the use of civic halls to hold fascist meetings. The leadership of the 
Birmingham BUF hoped a scheduled appearance by Mosley at a mass meeting in Birmingham 
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Town Hall on Sunday evening 19 May 1935 would greatly assist the resuscitation of fascism in 
the second city. Mosley’s last appearance in the city, at Bingley Hall in January 1934, had 
energised fascism in Birmingham: a similar effect was expected again. The local fascists were to 
be gravely disappointed.  
 In keeping with the importance the BUF placed on the meeting a large expensive advert 
was placed in the ‘public notices’ section on the front page of the Tuesday 14 May edition of the 
Birmingham Post234. A capacity 3,000 strong audience gathered to hear the blackshirt leader. 
The dominant reaction among the audience to his speech was that of modest approval235. While 
there had been a number of minor interruptions throughout the meeting it was during the verbal 
question section at the conclusion of the meeting that the serious disorder occurred. A man asked 
Mosley a question; evidently believing Mosley’s reply evasive the man stood up whilst Mosley 
was speaking, in order to protest either that Mosley was not answering the question properly, or 
alternately, that he had not heard the question aright. A number of blackshirts immediately 
attempted to restrain the man and within minutes violent free fights were erupting over the whole 
back half of the ground floor236. For ten minutes pandemonium reigned and eventually 100 
constables were sent in to restore order. In the course of the fracas 30 people had been ejected, 
and two men had been badly beaten. One was a member of the audience and the other was 
Birmingham Organiser Arthur Mills, who had been knocked unconscious237. Mills was later taken 
to hospital where he was treated for a broken rib238.  
In the days following the Town Hall meeting Mosley’s exposition was paid little notice. 
Attention focused firmly on the violent clashes witnessed between fascist stewards and members 
of the audience. Mosley stated that the disturbance was the most serious he had experienced at 
a BUF meeting for two years. Like a localized version of the Olympia controversy the 
correspondence columns of the Birmingham Post began to fill with letters written of eye-witness 
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testimonies seeking to apportion blame for the shocking disorder. Immediately after walking off 
stage Mosley gave an interview to a local journalist, declaring his stewards had been the innocent 
victims of a vicious coordinated Communist assault and that any violent act performed by his 
members had been lawful self-defence239. While a handful of correspondence corroborated 
Mosley’s explanation for the disorder and praised the ‘exemplary patience’ and ‘admirable 
restraint’ displayed in by the fascists in dealing with their attackers,240 the majority of letters 
carrying testimony denied the presence of organized opposition within the hall and painted a 
picture of unprovoked blackshirt savagery unleashed against innocent law-abiding men and 
women in the audience241. 
While newspaper reports suggest a strong Communist element was indeed present in the 
hall242, in a replica of the infamous rally staged in London in June 1934 the issue of whether or 
not organized opposition interrupted proceedings became inconsequential in the mind of the 
average Birmingham citizen. A consensus emerged among the majority of eye-witnesses 
categorizing the fascist stewards’ actions as hooliganism inexcusable ‘either as self-defence or as 
a means of securing order’243. A general feeling took hold in the city that the response of the 
fascist stewards to opposition had been excessively aggressive. The Birmingham Post believed it 
spoke for the majority of Birmingham men and women when it declared: ‘Whether they were 
justified in beginning ejectments at all does not much matter; the complaint – and it is a serious 
complaint – is that the stewards deliberately set themselves not only to perform ejectment “duty” 
but to give their victims “what for” at the same time. This sort of thing is intolerable’244. 
The Birmingham Town Hall meeting achieved what the Olympia scandal had failed to do: 
the disorder imbued the Birmingham BUF with an aura of physical violence in the minds of the 
general Birmingham public. That is not to say the average man and woman believed the 
Birmingham fascists innately violent, but while it was recognized the vast majority of stewards 
had been imported from outside the Midlands it was widely believed an atmosphere of violence 
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would now inevitably ‘shadow’ the local members however guiltless of provocation the behaviour 
of the local Mosleyites might be245.   
 Among those who shared this view were the Lord Mayor and Birmingham City Council. 
The Town Hall meeting of May 1935 would be the last BUF meeting held in municipal property in 
Birmingham. As a direct consequence of the disorder unleashed at this meeting multiple 
applications for BUF meetings to be staged in public buildings in October 1935, February 1936, 
March 1936, April 1936, and August 1936, were refused by the civic authority. On each occasion 
the Lord Mayor informed the fascists: ‘The meeting organized by the fascists and held in May, 
1935, led to a considerable amount of adverse feeling in the City which existed long after the date 
of the meeting. Disturbance took place at that meeting as to the cause of which various views 
have been expressed. I take no side in the matter; but I do feel that there is considerable danger 
of serious disturbance at a further meeting’246.  
A furious local and national BUF responded to this sequence of rebuffs by accusing the 
Birmingham civic authorities of capitulating to ‘Red violence and terrorism’247. In an indication of 
the priority the fascist movement attached to Birmingham, Mosley himself led the complaints. In a 
series of letters to the Lord Mayor published in both the local Birmingham press and the 
Blackshirt the fascist leader indicted the civic authorities for ‘placing a premium on 
lawlessness’248. The Lord Mayor was attacked as a hypocrite whose obvious bias against the 
Mosley movement was either the product of abject cowardice or a disposition eager to exploit 
‘Communist hooliganism’ as the pretext for the suppression of the fascist right to be heard by 
people in the city249.  
The Birmingham BUF began 1937 with the announcement Bentinck-Budd would stand as 
the fascist movement’s official parliamentary candidate to challenge the incumbent member 
Geoffrey Lloyd, Under-Secretary in the Home Office, for the Ladywood Division at the next 
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general election250. As past president of the British Legion, a member of the Legion of 
Frontiersmen, an ex-member of the Royal Irish Constabulary and a wounded ex-serviceman 
having lost a leg on the Western Front, he was a solid choice for this Tory constituency, the 
Conservatives having ousted a longstanding Labour figure in the 1931 election. Brewer notes: 
‘the choice did not escape interest being the first constituency Mosley fought in the Labour Party 
and one with fond memories for him….This past association with Mosley explains the choice of 
this division’251. 
Ladywood had been selected as one of the first 100 constituencies the BUF intended to 
fight at the next general election. The constituencies were chosen, Blackshirt editor John Beckett 
explained to his readership, on account of ‘proved support and organisational development’ and 
the presence of a person who had completed election agent or assistant election agent training or 
was expected to have done so in the next few months252. 
As the only constituency to be contested in the west Midlands, Ladywood could call upon 
the resources of the whole area253. Propaganda work in the constituency intensified 
immediately.254 ‘Ladywood is a real possibility’, the fascist press crowed, while the local members 
reiterated their determination to ’make it a certainty’255. Canvassing and fund-raising was 
interrupted only to organise a warm welcome for Women’s Organiser Northern Olga Shore during 
her tour of northern branches in late February256. Assiduous effort propelled Ladywood to the top 
of the ‘northern zone’ sales league for literature sales. At the monthly General Meeting of 
Birmingham and Districts held on Sunday 28 February Bentinck-Budd outlined his plans for future 
campaigning and rallied his followers. Over 50 members attended with their friends257.  
These plans were thrown into disarray by the crisis that was to hit the BUF in early March 
1937. Precipitated by a chronic lack of funds and massive cuts in expenditure, on 11 March 1937 
a comprehensive reduction in paid party personnel occupying positions throughout the movement 
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was announced258. Captain Bentinck-Budd found himself one of a long list of staff discharged. 
Also dismissed from the movement was William Joyce, who along with John Beckett immediately 
formed the National Socialist League259. Probyn was among the sixty BUF members nationwide 
who quit the BUF to join this splinter group260.   
The March retrenchment left the Birmingham BUF floundering. Branches sank into 
inactivity. Special Branch reported in late May that there was no longer any effective organisation 
in the area261. Having withdrawn from the streets while awaiting a replacement for Bentinck-Budd, 
senior officers occupied their time writing propaganda articles for the fascist press262. The 
depression that had engulfed the Birmingham BUF lifted with the appointment at the end of May 
of Samuel Lawrence Irvine as Bentinck-Budd’s successor. Born in Bromley in Kent, 23 year old 
Irvine was educated at the Polytechnic, Regent Street, London, but left at the age of 14. He 
joined the BUF early in 1934 at the Maidenhead branch and by 1936 was Assistant District 
Leader at Canterbury where he was employed as assistant manager in a firm of amusement 
caterers at Herne Bay263. In November 1936 he moved to Birmingham and became a branch 
leader in the city while earning a living as a lorry driver with various firms264. As an ‘unskilled 
worker’ from occupational sub-group 1 during his time in Birmingham Irvine is classified as 
belonging to the ‘lower’ social class in Table 3. In an interview with Brewer, one ex-Mosleyite 
remembered Irvine as ‘very superior’ and ‘a splendid type’ whose ‘whole life was dedicated to the 
movement’265. In Special Observation Forms compiled on him as an ex-internee serving in the 
British Army during the Second World War, the question ‘What type of man is Irvine?’ was 
answered by a commanding officer: ‘More intelligent than the average. He does appear to be a 
leader’266. Roger Corbet was appointed Irvine’s deputy. Corbet had joined the BUF in 1936267 
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and is described by Brewer as being at this time ‘a particularly staunch fascist’ and one of the few 
‘lower class’ leaders which the branch produced during its existence268. A skilled propagandist, 
Corbet regularly contributed articles to the fascist press. Irvine was the Birmingham BUF’s final 
leader and under his tenure membership again began to rise.  
Irvine’s arrival as leader signalled a brief attempted change to the focus of BUF 
propaganda campaigning in Birmingham. Brewer claims there was in the propaganda 
disseminated by the Birmingham BUF from its inception until its dissolution a neglect of the theme 
of anti-Semitism. According to his research a campaign against Jews was not at any time 
undertaken269. For Brewer the lack of hostility towards Jews in the fascist message when the 
local BUF was communicating Mosley’s ideas to the Birmingham public was explained by the 
absence in the city of Holmes’ ‘specific social milieu’ discussed in the previous chapter270. 
In Birmingham the total numbers of the Jewish population was low. In 1938 6,000 of the 
city’s inhabitants were Jews, approximately one in every 200271. According to Andreski anti-
Semitic animosity is activated when the ratio of Jews to Gentiles reaches 10%272. The Jewish 
community in Birmingham was comprised mainly of assimilated Jews who ‘were not 
geographically located in any one residential area but were dispersed in line with the patterns of 
geographical and social mobility’273. Academic studies of the Jewish anti-fascist response in 
major British cities to BUF local and national anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns have found that 
Jewish communities were often divided along class lines on how to deal with the threat of 
Mosleyite racial hatred. While the men and women of the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ and 
‘elite or upper-middle’ social classes listed in Table 3 who comprised the ‘Jewish Establishment’ 
were uniformly in favour of acting through formal channels, many ‘lower’ class men and women of 
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Jewish descent preferred physical confrontation, often in connection with the Communist party274. 
This divide was absent in Birmingham where the Jewish community was unified in its 
determination to counter fascist anti-Semitism without resorting to confrontational methods. To 
counter claims of being ‘alien’ a campaign was initiated showing the history of Jews in 
Birmingham stretched back to the thirteenth century without major outbreaks of anti-Semitic 
feeling. The Birmingham Jewish community became extremely aware of its own conduct, seeking 
to control what the national Jewish organisation Board of Deputies of British Jews termed ‘the 
internal causes of anti-Semitism’. A ‘Representative Council’ was established to ‘check the anti-
social behaviour of the Jewish community by making it conscious of the effects of its own 
individual malpractices, to obtain the co-operation of all elements in their elimination and to 
investigate individual cases of such malpractice’275. A ‘Manifesto for Birmingham Jewry’ was 
published arguing for responsible behaviour to prevent fault finding on the part of Gentile 
neighbours. Birmingham’s charismatic Head Rabbi Rev Dr A. Cohen proved tireless in efforts to 
engage Gentile audiences. ‘His links with the general community were good. He had contact with 
the Rotary Club, local church groups, women’s organisations, WEA students and the local 
university. He had the support of the local Church of England in combating fascist claims…This 
was reflected in inter-denominational meetings of both a religious and social character’276. In a 
‘striking address’ delivered at Birmingham Synagogue during a Jewish festival in mid-December 
1936, a passionate Dr Cohen commended the tolerant nature of the average Birmingham Gentile 
man and women, saying: ‘…civic testimony meant very much to the Jewish community just now, 
when other cities had been disgraced by anti-Jewish outbreaks from which Birmingham had been 
happily free. It is an eloquent indication…that in this city a community could have its distinctive 
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creed and still be recognised as an integral part of the civic body’277.  
Police records unavailable to Brewer, however, demonstrate that an abusive and 
aggressive anti-Semitic campaign was launched by the new leader of the local fascists almost 
immediately upon his arrival in the city. Propaganda meetings were held in the Bull Ring where 
fascist speaker Norman Gough dehumanized Jews as ‘filthy mongrels’ as a prelude to the 
intended targeting of Jewish residents in the residential area surrounding the junction of Sutton 
Street and Holloway Head near Birmingham city centre278. Although no area of the city was 
identifiable as ‘a Jewish locality’ as the Jewish community was ‘scattered across the city’279 this 
section of central Birmingham did possess a slightly higher than average number of Jewish 
residents and this fact was sufficient for the city BUF to hold open-air gatherings there whose 
speakers Jebb, Gough, and Irvine himself before audiences numbering hundreds were ‘very frank 
in their open admission of the denunciation of the Jews’280. Gough, like Irvine, belonged to the 
‘lower’ social class in Table 3. A labourer, he was among the ‘unskilled workers’ who form 
occupational sub-group 1281.  
Although documented occasional anti-Jewish comments made by Birmingham BUF 
activists reveal that hostility towards Jews was present in the local fascist branches under former 
leaders Hill, Mills and Bentinck-Budd282, the police records suggest the theme of anti-Semitism 
had been absent from the propaganda disseminated by the Mosleyites in the city until Irvine’s 
appointment in May 1937283.   
The promotion of anti-Semitism in BUF propaganda in Birmingham lasted only a handful 
of meetings. Appointed in 1935 to the most senior position in the Birmingham police284, Chief 
Constable C.C.H. Moriarty was an anti-fascist who upon being informed by his officers of the 
theme of the fascist message being disseminated at the events in Sutton Street immediately 
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prohibited the BUF from holding any further gatherings in this district. Determined to prevent anti-
Semitism becoming a feature of Birmingham politics Moriarty ordered officers to take notes at all 
fascist meetings in the city and sought at every opportunity to accumulate enough available 
evidence to justify prosecutions under the Public Order Act that had come into force in January 
1937285. This tactic bore fruit when the successful prosecution of speaker Gough for ‘using 
insulting words in a public place whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be caused’ in mid-
June under Section 5 of the new public order legislation, accompanied by the warning to his 
colleagues that other proceedings were under consideration, compelled Irvine to cease 
permanently all anti-Semitic campaigning in Birmingham286. From mid-1937 onwards the sole 
outlet for anti-Jewish feeling present in local BUF branches was the pages of the Blackshirt. 
Articles written by Birmingham officers Corbet and Luckin were published in late 1937 employing 
crude anti-Semitic stereotypes to suggest a conspiratorial link between Communism and 
Jewry287. In 1936 the Board of Deputies established ‘vigilance committees’ around the country for 
the purpose of charting anti-Semitic fascist campaigns and monitoring ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
within Jewish communities. The ‘vigilance committee’ reports pertaining to Birmingham found that 
from summer 1937 to the outbreak of war there was no anti-Semitism in the city of any 
consequence288.  
Having curtailed the attempt to introduce anti-Jewish campaigning onto the streets of 
Birmingham, the Chief Constable retained a close watch on the local BUF and seized eagerly 
upon any opportunity to prosecute fascist activity. Irvine’s insistence to his rank and file of the 
importance of assertive street-based activism translated into numerous prosecutions. While he 
had abandoned inciting hostility towards Jews as a theme of Birmingham BUF propaganda, 
Irvine’s retention of a confrontational attitude to both the authorities and opponents ensured that 
he himself between June 1937 and January 1939 accumulated no fewer than five convictions in 
the course of his propaganda work289. In late June 1937 he was summoned under the recently 
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introduced Public Order Act Section 1 for wearing a political uniform at two meetings; found guilty 
of wearing a garment that constituted a uniform he was bound over and ordered to pay costs. The 
prosecution was the first of this nature in Birmingham and only the third in the country290. 
 Skidelsky writes that the banning of the BUF uniform under the Public Order Act dealt a 
‘severe blow’ to the Mosley movement as it estranged the ‘younger elements’, citing as evidence 
the mass exodus of younger members in the ranks that caused membership at the Leeds branch 
to fall from two thousand in late 1936 to five hundred by mid-1937291. In a challenge to this 
interpretation the banning of the uniform in Birmingham had no negative impact on the younger 
members of the local BUF. For most the change was minor. One young member believed he 
spoke for the majority of his peers when he said: ‘the uniform was illegal but we still wore a black 
shirt under a black pullover, we still saluted and we still marched’292. In addition, while Irvine’s 
robust brand of activism energised the Birmingham BUF in general, it appealed in particular to the 
younger members in the ranks. He swiftly gathered around himself an enthusiastic cadre of 15 - 
20 young men to work alongside on the streets. Indeed, youth appears to have been a common 
feature of Birmingham BUF street activists during the period of Irvine’s leadership. Of the number 
of BUF activists to appear in court in the years following the introduction of the Public Order Act 
the average age was 23 years293. One of these young men, 19 year old Sidney Arrowsmith, was 
the youngest member of an entire family of Mosleyites. As Linehan has pointed out, such family 
affiliations were common: ‘wives joined husbands in the ranks, and vice versa, as did father and 
son and brother and sister’294. 
Stripped of the option of exploiting the theme of anti-Semitism, Birmingham BUF 
propaganda during the second half of 1937 concentrated on campaigning against events and 
actions in the city which the local fascists interpreted as representing support for pro-Republican 
forces in Spain. From 1938 until the BUF’s proscription in June 1940 the fascist propaganda 
disseminated in Birmingham focused on promoting Mosley’s pro-appeasement attitude towards 
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Nazi Germany, and these ‘Peace Campaigns’ proved instrumental in reviving fascist fortunes in 
the city.  
  Irvine decided to maximise the limited resources at his disposal by concentrating BUF 
interest on the municipal wards of Ladywood and Erdington for the duration of his tenure as 
leader of the Birmingham BUF295. Sales drives in New Street every Friday and Saturday were 
retained as a regular feature of local Mosleyite activism, as was the long established Sunday 
meeting in the Bull Ring. As the focus of extensive previous organisational work Ladywood was a 
natural choice. The selection of Erdington is somewhat surprising, apparently made on the basis 
of an amenable response to a series of meetings held by Officer Gilmore on Erdington Village 
Green on Saturday evenings in late April and early May296. Good crowds had been attracted, 
particularly among the younger generation; and BUF literature had sold well. The fascists had 
great hopes of progress in this locality297.  
Linehan writes on the subject of the BUF and the Spanish Civil War: ‘The BUF did not 
involve itself overtly in [the conflict], although it undoubtedly sympathised with [Franco’s] rebels 
against the Republican government’298. While recognising that the Spanish fascist movement 
constituted only a small section of the armed opposition to the Republican forces, the BUF 
wished the ‘insurgents’ well in their fight against ‘the common enemy of mankind’299. Among the 
majority of BUF branches around the country involvement in the Spanish conflict was limited to 
national ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ mobilisations demanding British non-intervention. For a handful 
of branches, however, an additional opportunity was presented by the government’s acceptance 
into Britain in early June 1937 of 4,000 child refugees from the pro-Republican Basque region300. 
Mosley immediately launched a propaganda campaign in the BUF press denouncing the 
humanitarian gesture as an act of partisan bias that both contravened the government’s pledge of 
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neutrality and discriminated against underprivileged British children301. As more Basque child 
refugees arrived in the country over the course of the following three months BUF propaganda 
persistently depicted them as ungrateful and violent: ‘thorough little pests’302.    
The majority of the Basque child refugees were housed on the South Coast303 but 
Birmingham City Council agreed to accept 100 youngsters into its protection304. ‘The Lord Mayor 
of Birmingham set up his own Spanish Refugee Children’s Fund which organised flag days and 
house to house collections. The contributions from this went to supporting the children’s colonies 
which had been set up in Spain and to supporting the homes for the Basque children which had 
been established in and around Birmingham’305. In protest the Birmingham fascists initiated a 
propaganda campaign under the slogan ‘Britons before Basques’ that lasted throughout the 
second half of 1937. Anti-refugee meetings staged in the Bull Ring in August attracted some of 
the largest crowds to ever gather for an outdoor meeting of the local BUF and reportedly aroused 
considerable sympathy and approval. Newspaper sales rose306. The Mosleyites claimed that 
during the final full week of August approximately two thousand people around the city heard the 
fascist case307. In September the established speakers were joined by William C. Luckin, a BUF 
member temporarily settled in Birmingham. Newspaper sales in New Street reached the highest 
figure for some time308. Pro-Nationalist Spain correspondence was sent to the local press309. In 
October all the main thoroughfares and outlying suburbs were heavily chalked with ‘Britons 
before Basques’310.  
The ‘Briton before Basques’ mobilisation reportedly met with a good amount of approval 
from people in Birmingham and the district BUF branches benefited from pushing forward 
Mosley’s position of ‘Britain First’. During the months of the campaign a slow but steady 
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membership growth was maintained311. Special Branch recorded that by mid-November the 
active strength of the Birmingham BUF had risen to 70312. The fascist press claimed record 
numbers of members for recent years were attending the monthly General Meeting held at the 
Temple Bar313 and described propaganda classes at the district headquarters taken by Luckin as 
being attended by excited members anxious to become speakers314. Local Mosleyites reported 
that the ‘Britain First’ message enjoyed a particular resonance among unskilled and skilled 
workers in the city315. If the majority of the new enlistments were indeed drawn from occupational 
sub-groups 1 and 2 listed in Table 3, Birmingham would conform to a suggestion by Linehan that 
the Mosley movement nationally during 1937 attracted more recruits of ‘lower’ social class 
status316. 
From 1938 until summer 1940 the Birmingham BUF would maintain a steady growth in 
membership. New enlistments, although remaining relatively moderate in numbers, would 
accelerate from mid-1938 onwards as the local branches’ passionate promotion of Mosley’s 
peace agenda appealed to anti-war sensibilities. 
During the opening months of 1938 the Birmingham BUF held meetings regularly in 
Ladywood and Erdington. According to the local fascists these events attracted good audiences 
and the average crowd size at regular gatherings in the Bull Ring was 200 - 300 people. 
Hundreds of leaflets and large numbers of back copies of newspapers were handed out. In 
Erdington special attention was given to distributing fascist literature to shops in accordance with 
N.H.Q. hopes to attract to the movement more private traders and small businessmen. Speaking 
at lunch-hour on a week day in the Bull Ring was tried and positive audience response ensured 
mid-day meetings became a regular feature317. The movement reported sales of literature at 
these meetings as very good318. 
Self-belief was rising and the Birmingham BUF refused to lose its impetus when the 
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Birmingham Baths Committee abruptly rejected William Luckin’s application to hire one of the 
several halls controlled by the City Corporation for a meeting. The reason given was ‘a strong 
possibility of disturbances and consequent damage to the building’319. Furious, the fascists 
resolved to press ahead with the planned event. Despite the refusal by Birmingham Council of 
Victoria Road Baths, the scheduled meeting went ahead on an open-air site near the banned 
hall320. According to the local press the decision to ban the use of a public hall to the Birmingham 
BUF was not popular with all non-fascists in the city. It was reported many believed the 
Mosleyites were being unfairly treated as the hall was frequently let to other political groups 
including the Communists321. The local fascists attempted to exploit such feeling among the 
public and claimed that at meetings in the Bull Ring much sympathy would be gained from the 
crowd when the speakers criticised the local council for its ‘flagrant discrimination’322.         
The pace of activism quickened further with the appointment to Birmingham of Tommy 
Moran as part of a new National Inspectorate system323. Another fascist leader who conforms to 
Mandle’s portrait, the 37 year old working engineer was one of the earliest members of the BUF 
and a principal lieutenant of Oswald Mosley. He was educated at a Roman Catholic School in 
Newcastle, apprenticed to a prestigious engineering company, and served in the Navy during the 
Great War and after as an engine-room artificer. During his service at sea he won the cruiser-
weight boxing championship of the combined fleets. Before joining the Mosley movement he had 
been an officer of the Newcastle West Labour Party324. During his time as a BUF Organiser in 
South Wales325 and Northampton326 he had developed a reputation as a highly effective 
organiser and a redoubtable speaker. However, it was his fearless, sometimes reckless, attitude 
to opponents and readiness to place his body in harm’s way that had secured him folk-hero 
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status in the movement327. Irvine and Moran quickly formed an excellent professional relationship 
and became close friends328.    
The response of the Birmingham BUF to German troops marching across the Austrian 
border on 12 March 1938 was to increase the rate of street meetings held for the remainder of the 
month to five a week and lead to a march from the Stafford Street headquarters to the Barton 
Arms, Ladywood, where Corbet spoke to an audience of several hundred329. The militant streak 
of Irvine’s regime resurfaced in this month when a cadre of fascists attempted to disrupt an anti-
appeasement rally organised by the Left Book Club. A free fight seemed imminent between the 
Mosleyites and the anti-fascists until a large contingent of police intervened330. The actions of the 
Birmingham BUF enraged the local Communists and it was only tactful handling by the police and 
astute implementation of the Public Order Act that prevented the Birmingham far-left from re-
implementing a ‘physical force’ campaign331. In April over a thousand people heard Irvine and 
Gough speak at the Bull Ring332.  
‘The Munich Crisis, the Czechoslovakian affair and the question of the Polish corridor all 
intensified local branch activity’333. On the evening of 30 October Mosley propounded his position 
on the vexed international situation at a meeting staged in the ‘Tower Ballroom’, Edgbaston, after 
the lessee, Mr Alfred Hall, had resisted pressure from Birmingham Council to induce him to 
cancel the letting of the hall to the BUF. Comments he made at the close of the gathering suggest 
Hall was a supporter of the Birmingham BUF334. The meeting, which was preceded by a march of 
300 - 800 Mosleyites imported from London, Manchester and the Midlands335, was quite orderly 
and there was practically no heckling336. Mindful of the disastrous end to his previous appearance 
in the city, Mosley insisted no known Communist be admitted. Irvine took care of the 
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arrangements at the door337. On the invitation of Mosley a police presence undertook a search for 
weapons among the audience. ‘He wanted no disorder on this occasion because of the nature of 
his speech. Since his last visit to the city his speech had changed considerably. International 
events gave this meeting a special significance for which Mosley wanted to portray a serious 
image’338. Mosley spoke for nearly three hours, his speech urging the audience to be on its guard 
against being dragged into a war which would destroy every idea and dream any one of them 
might have held. The fascist leader exhorted all Englishmen not to be swayed by the like or 
dislike of any foreign country and not to take sides in foreign quarrels, but to see what was in the 
interest of their own land and peace. ‘The best foreign policy is to be strong and mind our own 
business’339.  
Mosley’s speech elicited an enthusiastic response from the 5,000 people present340. The 
fascist press claimed that less than one-tenth of those in the hall were actual BUF members341. 
While it is unclear what proportion of the audience could be defined as fascists or held sympathy 
for the movement, the BUF position warning against British intervention in international affairs 
held a potent appeal for sizeable numbers of a Birmingham population frightened during the 
Munich crisis by the council’s public preparations for German air raids, particularly the decision 
that it was necessary to commence the task of distributing 957,700 gas masks, with fitting teams 
conducting house to house visits342. 
Birmingham BUF members would hear Mosley speak again on Sunday 16th July 1939 
when a local contingent attended the huge BUF ‘peace rally’ at Earl’s Court, London. Moran led 
the communal singing at the commencement of the event343. The Birmingham fascists had set 
out on the journey south from outside the newly acquired district headquarters at 30 Coleshill 
Street344. 
The months just prior to the outbreak in September of World War II witnessed the 
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Birmingham BUF undertaking the most urgent and vital propaganda mobilisation in its seven year 
history. During this final ‘Peace Campaign’ ‘activity was as pronounced as it was in the years of 
relative progress up to 1934’. The district branches grew rapidly in membership numbers. 
Publicity work increased accordingly. The Bull Ring became the centre of sizeable fascist anti-war 
meetings345. Leaflets including ‘No War for Warsaw’ and ‘Mosley’s Four Point Policy for Peace’, 
were distributed346. Irvine recalled: ‘At the outbreak of war we were holding our biggest meetings, 
getting new members and selling more papers’347. 
Gottlieb found in her study of women and fascism that female participation in the Mosley 
movement nationally grew significantly in importance from 1938 to 1940 when the BUF 
increasingly became an anti-war organisation. ‘Women members came into their own both [in 
some branches] taking over from men and by establishing a virtually all-female pressure group.’ 
The tone of much of the fascist women’s propaganda became ‘decidedly more revolutionary’ 
culminating in the ‘Women’s Peace Campaign’ in February 1940. While the intention was that this 
campaign would spread outside its London base, Gottlieb found ‘these smaller campaigns did not 
seem to materialize’348. Louise Fisher became Birmingham Women’s District Leader in summer 
1938349, taking over the position from a Mrs. Hays, a married woman who held ‘very strong 
political views’ but was forced to give up active membership through ill health though she 
encouraged her two sons to remain active in the branch350. Fisher recalled: ‘In Birmingham we 
did not have a separate women’s organisation for peace, but worked generally together [with the 
men]. We had a series of lunch-time meetings in the Bull Ring while we were still pushing for a 
negotiated peace, and women members could attend these, selling literature. We got quite a lot 
of support at these meetings’351. 
 On the outbreak of war, newly promoted to District Inspector352, Irvine persisted with the 
peace campaign. Audience sizes continued to grow. Some of the biggest fascist outdoor 
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meetings ever held in the city were staged just after the outbreak of war. ‘The war galvanised 
members and was an issue which was upper-most in the minds of the whole population – 
something which gained their interest…Impromptu street meetings could be held and interest 
among passers-by was assured. Almost daily members mingled with the crowds which were 
assured’. New enlistments mushroomed as activity rose. Brewer states that the number of active 
fascists engaged in propaganda work swelled to 100, which using Webber’s ratio would produce 
a total membership of 250. Many of the new members were pacifists, drawn from organisations 
the BUF were working in concert with, including the Peace Pledge Union, Peace Society, Peace 
and Liberty Movement and the Quakers353. Not all veteran fascists were impressed by Mosley’s 
opposition to the war however; as soon as war broke out the movement lost its patriotic glamour 
to some and a small number walked away from the Birmingham branch354. Such people were in 
the minority and the majority of Birmingham fascists disavowed the movement only when the 
detentions began in May 1940355.  
 An extensive series of outdoor BUF meetings was maintained in Birmingham during the 
first five months of 1940. The fascists were encouraged to be innovative in their political activities 
on the condition that they did nothing illegal. In April the leader of Yardley district, Frederick Head, 
began sending memorandums to Yardley parliamentary constituents, inviting membership of the 
BUF, enclosed with a copy of the fascist newspaper Action. Activism intensified in May356. A 
routine of two successful meetings a day was established in the Bull Ring. Audiences of 400-500 
attended to hear Moran and Irvine speak. Copies of Action sold well among the audience. 
Pamphlets advocating negotiated peace were also popular. Violent opposition manifested on only 
one occasion. During a gathering on Saturday 13 May Irvine was attacked and stoned by 
Communists and his platform smashed357.  
 On 25 May an unknown assailant smashed the window of the district headquarters in 
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Coleshill Street358 but at this stage in the life of the BUF in the city an isolated assault by anti-
fascists was shrugged aside. Local fascist concern was directed towards the prospective actions 
of the State. When news broke in Birmingham on the 24 May 1940 that on the previous day 
Mosley and eight of his closest lieutenants had been interned359, Moran and Irvine decided to 
continue actively pushing Mosley’s policy until Special Branch arrived to inflict upon them the 
same fate as their leader. The final BUF meeting in the Bull Ring occurred on Sunday 28 May 
1940 when 500 people heard Moran speak360. 
 On 3 June 1940 the Chief Constable of Birmingham received from the Home Office 
notification that the Secretary of State had made orders under Regulation 18b (1a) of the Defence 
(General) Regulations, 1939, directing the arrest of Birmingham BUF members Samuel Lawrence 
Irvine, age 25, Thomas Patrick Moran, age 39, and Joseph Benjamin Monk, age 45, and ordering 
their conveyance to Liverpool Prison361. When Birmingham CID executed the order the following 
day all three men were located and arrested without resistance362. That same evening they were 
transported north and lodged in Walton Gaol363. The arrest and incarceration of these men 
signified the extinction of the BUF in Birmingham. 
The two academics to have assessed BUF fortunes in Birmingham both concluded that 
fascist efforts in the city were fatally undermined by a strong recovery in the local economy that 
began in 1934. In a cursory assessment of BUF performance outside of London, Skidelsky 
asserted ‘He [Mosley] …made little headway in his old stamping-ground of…Birmingham where 
heavy industry started booming once home-market recovery got under way’364. Brewer believed 
that at the beginning of 1935 an economic recovery was ‘well at hand’ rendering fascist policy ‘no 
longer relevant’ as improving employment figures calmed any radical potential in Birmingham 
politics365. By November 1934 Birmingham’s unemployment figure was 6.8%, against a national 
average of 16.6%. By 1936 the number of unemployed was 15,742; the lowest ever recorded in 
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the city up to then, and a labour shortage was being reported366. At this time the suburbs of south 
Birmingham were among the most prosperous areas in the entire country367. In September 1937 
the percentage of Birmingham workers unemployed was 3%, the figure Beveridge would later 
consider to represent full employment368. ‘Although there was a trade recession in Birmingham as 
in other parts of the country in 1938,…there was a revival in 1939 in which the rearmament 
programme played a large part’369. 
However, both Skidelsky and Brewer underplay the strength of the Birmingham economy 
prior to the general national recovery of the second half of the 1930s. On the whole the inter-war 
years were a period of mild prosperity in Birmingham. Unemployment in Birmingham in the 1920s 
was not much above the pre-First World War figure of around 20,000370. When the shock-waves 
of the Wall Street Crash reached Britain triggering the economic crisis of 1929 – 1931 certain 
regions and industries were hit harder than others. ‘The highest rates of unemployment were 
concentrated in areas of heavy industry, including coal mining, heavy engineering, ship building, 
textiles, and iron and steel manufacture. On the other hand London, the South East and parts of 
the Midlands were relatively protected, and some districts experienced comparatively boom 
conditions’371. Birmingham had the good fortune not to have the basic staple industries where 
downturn had been most marked at the basis of its economy. Its industrial diversity insulated 
Birmingham against the storm of the Depression, particularly the presence of the new growth 
industries of the time: electrics, plastics, and motor vehicle manufacture372. The completion of 
longstanding developments of a municipal airport at Eldom increased Birmingham’s 
attractiveness to industry373 and helped bring foreign firms to the city374. The bottom of the slump 
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in Birmingham came in August 1931 when there were 76,000 people out of work. Even at this 
nadir in the city the average unemployment rate for the year was 17.7% of the workforce, as 
compared with the national figure for England of 20.7%375. While unemployment became more 
serious in England as a whole between 1931 and the BUF founding in 1932, the position 
improved steadily in Birmingham from September 1931 onwards376. Thereafter unemployment 
figures in Birmingham tumbled as a strong recovery began that continued to grow throughout the 
remaining years of the national depression and the rest of the decade. Birmingham, several 
historians have suggested, may be said to have led the national revival in employment after 
1931377. Overtime was being worked again in the motor industry by September 1932378. ‘In the 
Spring of 1933, when the Birmingham tyre firms were working to capacity, Birmingham touched 
its lowest unemployment figures since July 1930: 2.25 % of the population were receiving poor 
relief as against 7.38 % in Manchester, 8.72 per cent in Liverpool and 10.38 % in Glasgow’379. 
The figure in Birmingham of 6.4 % of insured persons unemployed in mid-1934 stood in stark 
contrast to that of the areas hardest impacted by the slump, with Gateshead recording 44.2 % 
unemployed, Merthyr Tydfil 61.9 %, and Jarrow 67.8 %380. 20,000 people were receiving poor law 
relief in Birmingham, or 2.22 % of the total population, against figures for the comparable cities of 
Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow, of 7.38 %, 8.7 %, and 10.38 % respectively381. 
The Birmingham economy was, therefore, comparatively strong throughout the 1930s. 
And yet despite an economic backdrop of relative prosperity the Birmingham BUF during the 
period from the founding in October 1932 until its peak in mid-1934 enjoyed substantial growth 
and exerted a strong appeal over a significant number of local people. The Mosley movement in 
the second city was already in decline before the period identified as being the city’s economic 
turning point by Skidelsky and Brewer. 
The experience of a member of the local BUF who migrated to Birmingham from the 
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north of England in search of employment provides a possible explanation for the success of 
Mosleyite fascism in the city between October 1932 and mid-1934. That there was a marked 
movement of population into Birmingham in the first half of the 1930s is a testimony to the 
strength of the city economy382. One of these incomers was an unemployed steel worker from 
Sheffield. Steel, the dominant industry in Sheffield, was one of the staple industries severely 
damaged by the national economic slump, resulting in considerable unemployment. Many men 
left the city in search of work, including this man who walked to one major northern industrial city 
after another looking for employment without success. Attracted by tales of relative prosperity he 
headed south, finding work in Birmingham. Because the crisis of unemployment had featured 
greatly in his life before he arrived in ‘prosperous’ Birmingham, the fear of possible future 
unemployment dominated his social and political attitude. Disillusioned with mainstream parties 
who had proven themselves unable either to protect Britain from economic slump or capable of 
even alleviating, if not remedying, the mass unemployment afflicting huge swathes of the nation, 
a radical alternative exercised powerful attraction. In Birmingham the Sheffield man came to see 
fascism as, in his own words, ‘salvation’. Explaining his motivation for joining the Birmingham 
BUF he stressed his fear of unemployment: ‘Unemployment is the most degrading thing you can 
ever have. It’s horrible to be unemployed. The collection of the dole is the most degrading act’. 
Mosley, the new recruit believed, understood the crisis of unemployment and had placed its 
eradication in rapid time at the heart of BUF ideology, recalling: ‘Hope, this was my main aim – to 
help men by Mosley’s policy of Britain First…Mosley knew there was a crisis and gave us 
hope…[Fascism] provided for the future, hope for a good life’383. Rawnsley found that a 
significant proportion of the early membership of the BUF in northern England was motivated to 
enlist by a personal dread of unemployment384. 
 A desire to avoid becoming unemployed, rather than discontent at the actual experience 
of being out of work, provides a cogent explanation for why large numbers of Birmingham people 
found the BUF appealing at a time when the second city was enjoying relative economic security. 
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While Birmingham experienced comparative protection from the depression many of its people 
never felt secure during the first half of the 1930s. A high proportion of the men and women in 
Birmingham had numerous and diverse ties with the neighboring Black Country towns and during 
the first nineteen months of the Mosley movement’s existence observed with apprehension the 
severe unemployment afflicting these locations385. The Black Country was an area constituting 
the boroughs of Wolverhampton, Walsall, Dudley and Sandwell. Birmingham and the adjacent 
Black Country were often confused in the popular mind and widely regarded as together 
comprising the west Midlands region386. While only thirteen miles distant there is a marked 
contrast to be drawn between what happened in Birmingham and the experience of the Black 
Country during the period of the slump. While Birmingham was cushioned from the impact the 
Black Country felt its full force. In the Black Country the staple iron and coal industries had been 
in long-term decline even before 1914, and this decline continued throughout the 1920s, 
accelerated by the depression at the end of the decade. In 1931, when the unemployment 
average for the year in Birmingham was 17.7%, Dudley’s figure was more than double this at 
38.8%. Of the fifteen Black Country towns in 1931 only Smethwick had unemployment figures 
below the national average of 20.7%, at 18.9%387. The percentage of unemployment in the Black 
Country remained substantially above the national average until late 1934 and over 40% higher 
than the average in Birmingham. After this point the Black Country began to recover388. Brewer 
mentions evocatively many Birmingham people bearing witness to the severe economic problems 
plaguing the west Midlands towns located on Birmingham’s very own ‘doorstep’ during the period 
of the depression: ‘Scanning the face of the British menfolk once soiled by the grime of daily toil, 
people viewed hopelessness born of despair. The fears it could arouse, the hopes it could 
shatter, made it tragically suited to generate an atmosphere of crisis’389. In the opinion of many 
local people, like the Sheffield migrant mentioned above, the mainstream political parties had 
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failed in their duties to protect Britain’s economic welfare. Disillusionment with established 
politicians, horror at the social conditions caused by mass unemployment on display within close 
proximity, fear that the same fate that had befallen the Black Country towns could spread across 
the borough borders into Birmingham, pushed large numbers of Birmingham men and women to 
seriously consider radical political alternatives between October 1932 and mid-1934. The 
Sheffield-born fascist in Birmingham provides a solution as to why, when both offered radical 
alternatives in the city, he preferred the BUF to the Communist party. This man was deeply 
patriotic and believed communism was unpatriotic. Being haunted by the spectre of 
unemployment yet devoted to the country that placed him in that situation caused a dilemma: how 
to fight to improve conditions while remaining a patriot. ‘The revolutionary patriotism of the BUF 
was the solution…Protest and patriotism coexisted in the BUF’390. 
 A resilient or recovering economy was not the reason the Mosley movement was 
ultimately a failure in Birmingham. The long-term failure of the Birmingham BUF rests upon the 
local branches losing and then being unable to regain credibility as a valid political alternative in 
the eyes of the Birmingham public. This loss of credibility was triggered initially by inadequate 
leadership pertaining to the Birmingham branches at both the local and national level. Cullen 
believes ‘the real key’ to building and maintaining a successful BUF branch was a high calibre 
branch leader, stating: ‘The guarantee of the activity and strength of a branch was dependent 
more upon who led it than by the more passive attractions of policy and programme. With such a 
new organisation the local leaders had an importance out of proportion to their nominal position, 
even in such a leader orientated movement like the BUF’391. According to Cullen the BUF in the 
provinces often found itself sorely lacking good local leadership and branches were often 
hampered by having ‘the wrong leader who failed to keep the branch’s support, or a bad leader 
who created internal strife and made little attempt to increase membership’392. Cullen cites two 
major industrial cities as good examples of this. In Liverpool and Leeds there existed a high level 
of latent support for the fascist programme, yet the local BUF branches were undermined by bad 
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leadership. Successful branches enjoying sizeable membership were allowed to spiral into 
stagnation because the problem of a lack of leadership in the person of a new branch leader was 
not remedied393. The Birmingham BUF conforms to this paradigm, flourishing under the effective 
leadership it enjoyed in the period from its founding to mid-1934 until the incompetent leadership 
of Hill squandered the successful work completed by Ward and Chesterton and left the Mosley 
movement in Birmingham languishing in a parlous condition. Clearly BUF N.H.Q. were far from 
fully aware of the crisis afflicting the Mosley cause in Birmingham during the bulk of Hill’s tenure 
or corrective measures would surely have been implemented much earlier. It appears that with 
regards to Birmingham there was a lack of attention paid to organizing and maintaining good 
leadership in the local branches. Cullen suggests neglect of this type was one of the main failures 
of the BUF as a political movement394. N.H.Q.’s failure to recognize the inadequacy of Hill’s 
leadership when danger signs first began to emerge and its protracted delay in finding a 
resolution to the problem indicates the Birmingham branches operated with independence from 
the movement’s political centre. The corollary of this, as Brewer recognized, is that the political 
centre failed to impose itself upon the Birmingham BUF395. This independence may have 
benefited the branches when guided by effective leadership, but combined with bad stewardship 
it accelerated the onset of decline and compounded stagnation.   
 The decision to promote Hill to the most senior position in the Birmingham BUF 
represented a devastating error of judgment by N.H.Q. Unable to consolidate the advances 
achieved by his predecessors, Hill’s failure to maintain organizational legitimacy consigned the 
BUF to the periphery of Birmingham social, cultural, and political life. Most critically for the future 
prospects of the Birmingham BUF its local branches had accrued unsavoury reputations. The 
failure to shake off this acquired discreditable status and restore a public image of respectability 
among large numbers of Birmingham people accounts for the Mosley movement’s limited impact 
in the region post-1934.  
The enduring problem of poor reputation established under Hill was exacerbated by the 
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blackshirt response to the disruptive tactics of militant anti-fascists at the May 1935 Town Hall 
meeting. Unlike many localities around the country, anti-fascist activities among Birmingham men 
and women other than in the first year of the fascist presence was rarely militant, and even when 
it did become disruptive in ethos barely registered in terms of containing the BUF on the streets in 
Birmingham. The exception came at the Town Hall meeting where, significantly, the vast majority 
of fascist stewards had been imported from outside the region. On this occasion organized 
Communist opposition brought out the violence of the BUF stewards and saddled the local 
Mosleyites with the public blame for the disorder that inevitably ensued. Researchers on anti-
fascist activity have shown that the militant Left frequently managed to impede effectively the 
BUF in this way elsewhere in the country396. The Town Hall meeting represented a catastrophe 
for the Birmingham BUF: it both undermined whatever morsel remained of its mainstream 
credibility by associating the local branches with violence in the minds of the Birmingham public 
and, most damagingly, induced what proved to be an insurmountable constraint to the 
Birmingham Mosleyites’ pursuit of political legitimacy. 
The Birmingham BUF at the time of the Town Hall meeting represented in no way a 
serious threat to the political establishment of Birmingham, but nonetheless, the overwhelming 
opposition inside Birmingham Council to the BUF impelled by the disorderly scenes at the Town 
Hall meeting terminated any hopes the local Mosley movement may have harboured of re-
establishing itself in peacetime as a significant presence in the second city. The prohibiting of the 
Birmingham BUF from holding meetings in public buildings denied the local Mosleyites the means 
of exploiting to their full potential a series of issues upon which the local BUF position proved 
popular and thereby forced the Birmingham fascists to rely upon less respectable and effective 
street propaganda methods. 
The inability to overcome powerful barriers to credibility during the second half of the 
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1930s meant that the space necessary for the Birmingham BUF to re-emerge as a successful 
mass movement was effectively closed down. While the sizeable approving crowds and high 
newspaper sales the Birmingham BUF were able to generate during this period in response to 
various propaganda mobilizations illustrates, as Webber suggests397, a considerable reservoir of 
sympathy for fascist policy even in the days when the movement itself was in dire straits, the 
irretrievable loss of political credibility translated into a refusal by the vast majority, even when the 
local branches operated under efficient leadership, to formally associate themselves with the 
Mosley movement. For those who preferred to remain outside the movement, to enlist was to 
embrace an unacceptable level of disrepute, or a sympathy towards BUF ideas failed to extend to 
approval of the Mosleyites and their movement, which was beyond the pale. A revival in official 
membership did occur before the war but it was, as Brewer correctly points out, minor and itself a 
product of the war398. It is possible to say Brewer was guilty of understatement when he 
concluded that ‘given no war, fascist activity, planning, organisation and support in 
Birmingham…did not bode well for parliamentary success in the 1940 general election’399.   
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Chapter Three: The BUF in Stoke-on-Trent, 1932 – 1940. 
 
1. 1932 – 1934. 
 
At the beginning of the 1930s, the city of Stoke-on-Trent in the county of Staffordshire was the 
largest and most populous municipality in the north Midlands1. Stoke-on-Trent came into being 
first as a borough in 1910 with the amalgamation of the six clustered towns of Tunstall, Burslem, 
Hanley, Stoke, Longton, and Fenton2, and it was granted the status of a city in 1925 as a belated 
recognition of its size and economic importance3. The 1931 decennial Census reveals Stoke-on-
Trent encompassed 21,209 acres4 and its population was enumerated at 276,6395. The city was 
divided into three parliamentary constituencies: Burslem, encompassing the towns of Burslem 
and Tunstall; Hanley, encompassing only the town of the same name; and Stoke, the largest of 
the three Divisions, encompassing Stoke, Fenton, and Longton6. Described as ‘one of the notable 
products of the Industrial Revolution’7, Stoke-on-Trent had been one of the main industrial areas 
in Britain and the centre of the country’s great earthenware and porcelain industry since the 
eighteenth century8. By the early 1930s there were hundreds of pottery works and porcelain 
factories operating in the city9. The production of ceramics dominated economic life in each of the 
six towns10 and the quality of Stoke-on-Trent pottery and porcelain had earned and retained a 
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worldwide reputation11. A prominent local historian writes: ‘The story of Stoke[-on-Trent] is 
basically that of a community of potters, whose skill and business acumen have in the course of 
two centuries made Stoke[-on-Trent] the twelfth largest city in the United Kingdom and extended 
its reputation in the field of ceramics far beyond the shores of Britain’12. In recognition of the 
dominant livelihood in the area locals often referred to the six towns as ‘the Potteries’, and this 
colloquial designation had become interchangeable with the official title of Stoke-on-Trent13.  
Although Oswald Mosley was in line to be the heir to a Staffordshire baronetcy and estate, 
and spent much of his childhood at his grandfather’s house Rollaston Hall in the county14, the 
close personal and political ties he enjoyed with Stoke-on-Trent prior to the BUF came through 
the political career of his first wife, Cynthia, better known as ‘Cimmie’. During 1925 Cynthia 
Mosley accepted an offer from the Stoke-on-Trent Labour party to stand for parliament in the 
Stoke Division in the city. Cynthia Mosley possessed great courage and considerable powers of 
oratory. During the three years in which she nursed the city in preparation for the 1929 General 
Election she became extremely popular in the local Labour party and among the people of Stoke-
on-Trent, especially the poor. Her personality assisted her acceptance. de Courcy writes: ‘All her 
life she had had the ability to get on with all sorts and kinds of people, and to make herself loved 
by anyone who knew her well. When she knocked at the poorest doors she evoked not 
resentment at her obvious wealth and her title but admiration and liking’15. Cynthia Mosley’s 
popularity in Stoke-on-Trent was confirmed in the 1929 General Election when she ‘romped’16 to 
victory against an incumbent Tory who had enjoyed a strong 4,500 majority and had allegedly 
employed the tactic of spreading false rumours about wealth and duplicity. She won a 7,800 
majority, and in doubling the Labour vote from 13,000 to 26,000 recorded one of the biggest 
swings to Labour in the country17. The Mosleys instantly accepted the mantle of being the 
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Potteries’ pre-eminent political and society couple. Busy as he was conducting his own 
successful election campaign in Birmingham, Oswald Mosley contributed little to Cynthia’s efforts 
in Stoke-on-Trent, but in the afterglow of victory swiftly acquired affection and admiration among 
swathes of the city’s population to rival, though never quite equal, the esteem in which his wife 
was held. Skidelsky relates how vital a role Cynthia played in this process: ‘Whereas ‘Tom’ 
[Oswald Mosley] tended to be remote and deficient in warmth, often giving people the impression 
of using them for his own ends, Cynthia was emotional, warm, transparently sincere. She 
disarmed suspicion, added the human touch, smoothed personal relations and…came to stand 
as a guarantor for Mosley’s own sincerity’18. When Mosley formed the New Party, Stoke-on-Trent 
quickly became its heartland. A choir from the city regularly performed at New Party meetings 
around the country19, and Stoke-on-Trent is notable, along with Birmingham for being home to 
one of the few New Party youth clubs opened in the Provinces20. 3,000 people, with queues 
outside the door, heard Cynthia Mosley speak in place of her husband, who was unwell and 
unable to attend, at the inaugural New Party meeting in the city staged on the evening of 9 March 
1931 at the King’s Hall21. The organised left-wing disruption that pursued New Party speakers 
around the country22 soon made itself known in the audience but Cynthia’s furious defence of 
herself against indignant heckling won much acclaim from the peaceful majority23. The results of 
the 1931 General Election reveal the strength of support the Mosleys and the party had achieved 
in the city. Cynthia was due to defend her seat as the New Party candidate in the Stoke Division 
but three months pregnant and debilitated by nervous exhaustion, the product of spearheading 
the New Party national campaign during her husband’s ongoing illness, she was ordered by her 
doctors to take a complete rest. Skidelsky writes of her withdrawal: ‘Cynthia was the one New 
Party candidate (apart from Mosley himself) who might have got elected, since her following was 
                                                 
18 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, p84. 
19 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, p248. 
20 Cross, The Fascists in Britain, p49. 
21 de Courcy, The Viceroy’s Daughters, p162. 
22 Cross, pp47-49; de Courcy, The Viceroy’s Daughters, pp163-176; Mosley, My Life, pp284-303; 
Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, pp274-276. 
23 de Courcy, The Viceroy’s Daughters, p163. 
 91
very strong in Stoke’24. The New Party stood in 24 constituencies but results nationally were 
disastrous. The New Party retained its deposit in only two contests: Merthyr and Stoke-on-Trent. 
Mosley had stood in Stoke-on-Trent in place of his wife but shouldering virtually the whole burden 
of public speaking for the New Party around the country could commit only five days of 
campaigning to the city. Despite this handicap, coupled with the national and local press 
supporting the National Government, the smother tactics of the Left, and facing a three way 
contest involving strong Labour and National Conservative candidates, support for the fledgling 
party and its leader turned out in force. Large enthusiastic crowds attended his public meetings 
and although he finished bottom of the pile his candidacy won 10,534 votes, or a 24% share of 
the total vote. Labour came second with 13,264 votes. The National Government candidate Mrs 
Ronald Copeland was elected with 19,91825. While the Merthyr candidate attracted 300 more 
votes than his leader he had enjoyed the considerable benefit of local Tory support26. 
 In contrast to his failure in Birmingham to engender personal support which endured 
irrespective of the ideas he promoted, the popularity of his wife in Stoke-on-Trent had aided the 
formation of a deep seam of mass loyalty to Sir Oswald Mosley during the late 1920s that 
survived his departure from mainstream politics and provided the foundation of sizeable early 
BUF membership in the Potteries. 
It is the contention of the little research conducted on the New Party at the local studies 
level that whilst Mosley was touring Italy in search of fresh ideas following the terrible showing at 
the General Election the organisation of the party collapsed. Skidelsky writes: ‘Following its 
electoral debacle the New Party virtually ceased to exist as a political party. The central office in 
Great George Street was closed down; the regional organisations were disbanded and their 
officers retired’27. If local organisation survived Mosley’s sojourn in Mussolini’s State then it 
deteriorated drastically or ceased to exist in the wake of the decision to wind up the ailing party 
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on 5 April 193228. Cullen has written that at the time of the founding of the BUF all that remained 
of the New Party days were some of the members and key officers who had joined in 1930 and 
193129. These are certainly not accurate descriptions of events in Stoke-on-Trent. The branch 
was disbanded in public only. Privately the Stoke-on-Trent New Party continued to exist: 
maintaining the bulk of both its membership and infrastructure, and disseminating its ideas. Mr H. 
Miles, regional organiser of the New Party, had remained active in the district30. As Pugh has 
written, ‘though depressed, Mosley recognised that the New Party had simply been a victim of the 
turn of events; it had not had time to capitalise properly on the crisis following the breakdown of 
the Labour government. His mind soon focused on the next stage’31. The intact Stoke-on-Trent 
New Party patiently awaited the conclusion of his deliberations. Loyalty was to the man. For a 
sizeable number of the members Mosley would be followed regardless of what form his new 
vehicle assumed. Upon its formation the BUF was effortlessly grafted onto the pre-existing New 
Party structures in the district. A Deputy Branch Officer admitted when questioned by the local 
press: ‘The branch was formed originally as a branch of the New Party, and there has been no 
break in its existence’32. Political work began in earnest. Miles, the former New Party organiser, 
boasted: ‘His [Mosley’s] following in the Stoke Division is as keen as ever…We have enthusiastic 
officials in every ward who have been working quietly and effectively’33. 
 Mosley acknowledged the loyalty of his supporters in Stoke-on-Trent by deciding upon 
the city as the location in which to address the first indoor meeting under the auspices of his new 
organisation. Permission was acquired to let the King’s Hall, Stoke, for a public meeting to be 
held on Sunday evening 23 October 193234. Expensive advertisements of a size usually reserved 
for football matches were placed in the premier local newspaper the Evening Sentinel35. A 
circular letter advertising the meeting was sent to all members of the New Party in the district. 
Prior to the meeting the chairman and secretaries of the various ward committees of the former 
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party took tea with Sir Oswald and Lady Cynthia Mosley at the North Stafford Hotel, after which 
they engaged in an informal talk36. On the night of the meeting a packed hall listened intently as 
Mosley explained the objects of the BUF. His new movement, he stressed to the audience, was 
the New Party ‘developed and carried further – improved’. At the last election he laid before the 
country a set of ideas to meet an emergency but the country would not accept them. These ideas 
‘had now been developed into a permanent programme, and a political system and philosophy of 
life which he believed could save the future of this country’37. Mosley insisted his watchword 
remained the old New Party slogan ‘Britain buys from those who buy from Britain’38.  
 The period from the founding of the national movement until mid-1934 was one of 
progress for the Stoke-on-Trent BUF. During what Skidelsky has described as ‘this phase of 
“respectable” fascism’39 the prospects for the Mosley movement in the Potteries looked bright: the 
Stoke-on-Trent branches enjoyed a sustained growth in membership. The first BUF branch 
headquarters in Stoke-on-Trent was ‘a large building’ at 84 Normacot Road, Longton, opened in 
October 1933. The Organiser in charge of the fascist movement in the city was local man 
Spanton Reid. His deputy was W. E. Bailey40. Not long afterwards a second branch was opened 
with appropriate fascist ceremony at 14 Glebe Street, Stoke41. 
Local BUF propaganda campaigning in Stoke-on-Trent from October 1932 until the end 
of 1934 focused on explaining how the fascist corporate economic system was designed to solve 
all problems afflicting the pottery industry and thus satisfy demands for a higher standard of living. 
In speeches at outdoor and indoor meetings, lectures at the branch headquarters, letters to the 
local press and literature disseminated to the local public, this propaganda theme was outlined. A 
corporation, it was argued, was to be established for the pottery industry consisting of the 
following: representatives of the pottery manufacturers; representatives of the pottery workers, 
who would be elected directly from the industry; and representatives of the consuming interests. It 
would be the duty of the corporation to grade all manufacturers and agree on a price for the 
                                                 
36 BG 18 October 1932, p1. 
37 ES 24 October 1932, p5. 
38 ES 24 October 1932, p5. 
39 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, pp322-323. 
40 ES 15 February 1934, p7. 
41 Blackshirt 5 – 11 January 1934, p3. 
 94
various products. It would then be a criminal offence to buy or sell below the fixed price. ‘Thus 
competition would be based on quality and design, and not on undercutting, as at present’. The 
corporation would decide whether it was necessary to continue to import foreign pottery, and if 
they arrived at a negative decision, all such goods would be excluded from British shores. The 
Stoke BUF affirmed that the fascist aim of increasing wages over the whole field of industry would 
enable the people of Britain to pay a price for their pottery that would ensure: ‘(a) A fair wage for 
the worker. (b) A fair price to the consumer. (c) A fair profit for the manufacturer’42.   
Stoke-on-Trent would be one of the first areas in the country to establish a section of the 
FUBW. Its mandate in the city was to deal with problems of unemployment in the pottery industry. 
The administrative machinery was implemented in early January 1934 by a Propaganda Officer 
Tynan, who also arranged meetings and political classes43. At the end of the same month Deputy 
Branch Officer A. V. Edwards was appointed FUBW Area Organiser44. 
The Stoke-on-Trent BUF preferred to organise quietly during 1932 and 1933 and enjoyed 
a cautious respectability among the social and political elites in the district that would endure until 
the Olympia scandal. Formal fascist participation was accepted at popular local traditional events 
such as church parades, where representatives of diverse but mainstream interest groups 
ranging from the political to the religious and social, marched in a carnival-style procession 
alongside costume-wearing schoolchildren. On Sunday 24 December 1933 detachments from the 
Longton and Stoke branches marched together in a local Stoke church parade. After the church 
service the fascists marched to the Stoke Cenotaph, where Fascist Young, with an escort of 
Fascists Murray and Starkey, placed a wreath on the Memorial. On Christmas Day a detachment 
from Stoke proceeded to Longton and participated in a similar church parade there45. At least one 
‘fascist baptism’ was arranged in the district. E. Hulme, leader of a Unit at the Longton branch, 
and his wife, also a member, christened their baby boy ‘Oswald’ at St. John’s Church, Longton, in 
honour of the fascist leader. A large number of members of the Longton branch attended the 
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service and afterwards lined up outside and gave the fascist salute when the party left the church. 
In his study of fascism as a sub-culture, Spurr identifies the aesthetic politicisation of such 
conventionally apolitical social rituals as baptisms as playing an important role in the establishing 
of a sense of fascist identity and community46. The Stoke-on-Trent fascist baptism was reported 
in a respectful tone alongside other worthy district occasions of note in the diary section of the 
local press: an indication of the established image of propriety surrounding the branch47. 
Mosley personally remained respected, if not necessarily admired or liked, in Stoke. The 
Tory-supporting Evening Sentinel praised his intellect: the local newspaper reviewed neutrally 
The Greater Britain but remarked ‘every point in this remarkable plan for national reconstruction is 
closely reasoned’. Parallels were drawn between BUF ideas and those of the New Party 
espoused during Mosley’s Stoke election campaign: ‘Throughout Sir Oswald’s statement of the 
system of government as visualised by the British Union of Fascists runs the “workshop instead 
of talkshop” which he made so prominent a feature of his election campaign in Stoke’48. The 
Mosleys were a subject of interest to local people. Without fail the fascist leader was referred to in 
the familiar ‘Sir Oswald’. The diary section of the press reported bouts of ill health49. 
 An association with Cynthia Mosley was an undoubted benefit to the movement in the 
area. The popularity of the ex-local MP endured undiminished. Her presence at her husband’s 
side at the King’s Hall meeting, in spite of ill health, had prompted genuinely warm appreciation. 
Cynthia Mosley was struggling to come to terms with her husband’s new political trajectory50 and 
very rarely publicly shared any sympathy with fascism, but true to his description of her as ‘my 
steadfast, ever loyal and able colleague in the tough existence of politics’51 she summoned up a 
brief endorsement, although more in praise of her husband as a man than of his new venture, 
that conceivably persuaded some of the uncertain minds in the hall to align themselves with the 
fascist cause. She stated that in his political career, Sir Oswald had stuck to his convictions, and 
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had had the courage to state them and the intelligence to do so in a form understandable to the 
people. Such a combination of courage and intelligence was what was needed52. Cynthia 
Mosley’s death in London on 16 May 1933 following an operation for acute appendicitis and 
peritonitis triggered an outpouring of sympathy for Mosley in Stoke that softened the attitude of 
some critics towards the fascist leader. The Evening Sentinel produced a long obituary fulsome in 
its praise of the deceased53. Sincere condolences were offered to ‘devoted’ husband Sir Oswald 
who it was believed was seldom away from his wife’s bedside during her final illness. Political 
opponents who regarded Cynthia Mosley with affectionate esteem but held her husband in 
contempt wrote of their sincere sympathy with Sir Oswald: ‘Our hearts go out…in this his hour of 
sadness and sorrow. Stoke-on-Trent is a typically English community, and I am sure, will 
share…in this expression of deep regret and sympathy.’ Others paid tribute to the late Lady, 
before adding: ‘We would like Sir Oswald Mosley to know that every man and woman in this 
district sincerely sympathises with him’ 54.  
 In her study of women’s participation in British fascist movements Gottlieb found that 
while there was no typical BUF woman member, many of the female recruits’ prior political 
experience lay in the Conservative party55. Little mention is made of previous connections to the 
New Party. A legacy of the Cynthia Mosley-headed New Party in Stoke-on-Trent to the local BUF 
was a significant female following. The participation of women in the activities of the Stoke-on-
Trent branches corresponds to the findings of Durham and Gottlieb that stress the important 
activist role played by women in the BUF and the Mosley movement’s radicalism on women’s 
issues56. The Stoke-on-Trent branches vigorously pursued the recruitment of women, asserting 
‘we have as many intelligent, good women in our district as anywhere else’57. In a contradiction of 
Lewis’ assertion that the BUF espoused ‘a doctrine of profound anti-feminism’ seeking to consign 
females to ‘the nether regions of domesticity’58, fascist speakers at weekly meetings advocated a 
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woman’s right to work and equal pay in the pottery industry59. Female Mosleyites wrote letters 
published in the local press. The people of Stoke-on-Trent were informed: ‘Fascism stands for 
emancipation of women. We are against the exploitation of their services in industry. Women are 
to be recognised, not pushed into the background as hitherto…Therefore it is the duty of all 
women to join their local organisation at once, before it is too late’60. A Women’s Section was 
organised at the Longton headquarters by Miss E. Allcock. Meetings were held every Monday at 
7:30. The women had their own room in which they received lectures on BUF ideology. Female 
members marched in a separate ‘ladies parade’ at St. John’s Church61.  
 Until early 1934 organised opposition to the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent came exclusively from 
the tiny local Communist party. Mosleyite propaganda campaigning was diligently ignored by 
Stoke-on-Trent Labour and Conservative parties, both hoping in the words of Skidelsky to ‘kill 
fascism by ignoring it’62. The local Communists, by contrast, immediately announced upon the 
initiation of weekly BUF outdoor meetings coinciding with the opening of the respective branch 
buildings in October 1933 that they were ‘going to prepare themselves’ to challenge the fascists 
and threatened ‘there will be trouble’. True to their word the Communists began disrupting BUF 
meetings and physically assaulting individual fascists. The Stoke-on-Trent Mosleyites did not 
respond in kind to this ‘physical force’ campaign and this one-sided confrontation established a 
pattern that would be repeated throughout the existence of a BUF presence in the city. Eager to 
maintain a respectable image, local fascist leader Reid responded to Communist charges that the 
Stoke-on-Trent BUF employed weapon-wielding ‘trained fighters’ in its ranks by declaring in the 
local press: ‘Physical fitness is one of the ideals of Fascism, and every member is expected to 
keep himself fit; with this objective a certain amount of boxing is indulged in. Every Britisher 
should be capable of defending himself if attacked. The defence the Fascist relies upon is his 
own fists. No Fascist is allowed to carry a “kosh” of any description….Fascism aims to build up 
character and nothing is more degenerating than to carry a coward’s weapon’63. Violent 
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Communist disruption at a BUF meeting in Hanley Market Square on a Saturday night in early 
December 1933 induced the Watch Committee to investigate the question of whether to permit 
future meetings to be held. After consultation with the Stoke police, the Committee concluded ‘the 
Fascists ought to be as free as anyone else to hold their meetings’ and granted permission for 
BUF meetings to continue on the condition the police supervised the location64. Police 
supervision proved unnecessary however as the local Communists soon thereafter ceased 
disrupting local fascist meetings and would not return to the use of direct physical action until the 
transformed political atmosphere of the second half of the decade. The local press suggested that 
the violent strategy had induced sympathy among many Stoke-on-Trent residents for the fascist 
movement, with anti-Communists, believers in free speech, and the apolitical apparently 
expressing disgust at the far-Left’s tactics and voicing respect for a movement that was in their 
opinion willing to stand its ground within the law in the face of rowdy provocation65.     
At the beginning of 1934 the Stoke-on-Trent BUF radiates an impression of energetic yet 
genteel fascism. Inside the Longton headquarters the most important part of fascist activities was 
speakers’ classes, where speakers were trained in fascism, with The Greater Britain as the main 
text-book. Lectures were given practically every day. Physical training was directed by the head 
of the Defence Force, Mr H. Downward. One room of the building was especially assigned for 
members to play games such as skittles. There were concerts on Saturdays and Sundays and a 
library in one room where Fascist Week and the Blackshirt were available. The branch officers 
gave orders from the orderly room. Every member immediately he or she set foot on the doorstep 
was under orders and had to take turn in cleaning the windows. The headquarters was open from 
11am to 11pm and different men cleaned the place voluntarily from 9am to 11am. Every member 
saluted when entering the building. Members saluted when they entered the orderly room, and 
every member had to put in a book the time of entering and leaving, whether he or she was in 
uniform or mufti, rank, and to which branch he or she belonged. An orderly officer was appointed 
for duty each day and he had a guard. Only the officers of the branch and members of the 
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Defence Force wore uniforms. The branch was entirely self-supporting and no salaries whatever 
were paid. Football matches were played against the other branch in Stoke. The Longton branch 
also had plans to run a cricket team and hold week-end camps at nearby scenic Dovedale66. A 
Ramblers Club had been formed within the branch whose members distributed BUF literature on 
their walks67. Outdoor meetings were held two or three times a week and a contingent of 
blackshirts were regulars at the monthly parade at St. John’s Church, Longton68. 
Membership in Stoke-on-Trent at this time numbered at the minimum more than 509 
active members, and at least 500 non-active members. Quite a number of schoolboys from the 
local state schools had joined the Youth Section69. The local branches expressed delight at the 
interest displayed during public meetings and the enthusiasm shown by the audiences. A number 
of ‘prominent business people’ in the city from occupational sub-group 7 allocated to the ‘lower-
middle and middle-middle’ social class and occupational sub-group 14 from the ‘elite or upper-
middle’ category listed in Table 3 were reportedly inquiring about BUF policies and examining 
closely the economic system of the Corporate State70. The number of activists propagandising on 
the streets rose steadily. Six new blackshirt Units were formed at the end of January in the Stoke 
branch71 and another five formed during February in Longton72. Many of these men assisted in 
weekly sales drives that the BUF claimed were being held with much success. An expanding rank 
and file necessitated promotions at the officer level. At Stoke: Fascists G. Starkey and G. 
Harrison were made Section Leaders, Fascist A. J. Austin became a Sub-Branch Officer, and 
Fascist K. Molina ascended to Assistant Propaganda Officer. A Miss Heath was appointed 
Branch Organiser of the Women’s Section. At Longton Fascist J. Holmes was made a Section 
Leader, and Fascists N. B. Swann and A. Smith became Assistant Propaganda Officers73. 
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The fascist movement in Stoke-on-Trent was flourishing. Having established a substantial 
footing in Stoke-on-Trent plans were drawn up for expansion into neighbouring Rough Close, 
Meir, Barlaston, and Stone. Progress in the FUBW fortified confidence. While only a small 
number of unemployment cases had been tackled by the section’s activists they had won every 
one74. The BUF believed it had arrived as a significant force in Stoke-on-Trent, declaring proudly: 
‘Fascism is undoubtedly a subject of paramount importance in this district’. Optimism was 
transforming into expectancy. It was predicted solemnly: ‘the Potteries will soon go over 
enthusiastically to Fascism’ 75.  
An increasing public profile prompted belated concerns among the local Labour and 
Conservative parties about the attraction of Mosley’s brand of fascism in Stoke-on-Trent. The two 
parties identified different solutions to the challenge posed by the BUF in early 1934. The 
Conservatives took a more relaxed attitude than their left-wing rivals and fell into the camp 
described by Northern Organiser Reynell Bellamy: staunch Conservatives who were heard to say 
that while not wanting Mosley in power they hoped his rise would startle the lethargic national 
party leader Stanley Baldwin toward more radical Tory ideas76. The leadership of the local 
Conservatives attributed the growth of fascism nationally to the Mosleyites ‘playing upon the fears 
of many Conservatives with some success’. These fears were that Socialism was encroaching 
within the leadership ranks of all the major Parliamentary parties. The Stoke-on-Trent Tories’ 
solution was to pay the BUF little regard and instead concentrate on moving their own party 
towards ‘a greater Conservative Party’ shorn of its ‘timid, apathetic and semi-Socialist members’77. 
The Stoke-on-Trent Labour party and affiliated socialist organisations by contrast believed the 
local BUF should be criticised through the medium of the local press. J. F. Price, President of the 
Staffordshire Federation of Labour Parties, assumed a lead role. Anti-BUF criticism manifested 
primarily in two distinct lines of argument. Firstly, fascism was an un-British concept that had 
                                                 
74 ES 15 February 1934, p7. 
75 Blackshirt 12 – 18 January 1934, p3. 
76 R. Bellamy, We Marched with Mosley (Unpublished manuscript), p105.  
77 ES 20 February 1934, p5. 
 101
brought economic misery to Germany and Italy78. Secondly, Mosley’s ambition was to install 
himself as all-powerful dictator by force79. Initially the tone of the anti-fascist position was 
measured and polite. The response of the Stoke-on-Trent BUF was to seek the moral high-
ground, declaring that it would not by contrast attempt to deride other political parties: ‘It is for the 
people themselves to judge the parties for whom they have previously voted. Nowadays, I think 
we are all sufficiently intellectual to do this’80.  
The Labour party criticism of fascism and the BUF seems to have had no detrimental 
effect on the growth of the Mosley movement in Stoke-on-Trent and an air of insecurity began to 
appear among the local labour movement leadership. In early March 1934 Price invited prominent 
local fascist S. T. Dunn to arrange a public debate in Longton between a representative of the 
local BUF and a well-known Stoke-on-Trent socialist but included a condition to which he was 
surely aware the Mosleyites would never agree: all proceeds raised at the event should be sent 
as aid to Austrian socialist workers injured during recent violent clashes with Austrian fascists81. 
Confident of their debating abilities the Stoke-on-Trent fascists proved eager to pursue the 
opportunity of getting the better of their Socialist rivals. A compromise was suggested wherein the 
Stoke-on-Trent BUF would agree to participate in a public debate if the proceeds were channelled 
‘to one of the many deserving institutions that cater for the needs of British workers’82. Price, 
however, insisted on his stipulation83. After much thought the Stoke-on-Trent BUF declined, as 
Price obviously hoped it would, citing in the words of Area Propaganda Officer Swann, a 
reluctance to ‘help swell the funds of foreign socialists’84. An official statement released by the 
local BUF explained: ‘[we] refuse to let the insistence of Mr J. F. Price lead [us] to support a move 
in favour of international Socialism, when the policy of [our] movement is a national one. His 
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insistence, however, compels me to wonder to what extent this country would have been involved 
with the Austrian situation, if the Labour Party had been the Government of the day’85.            
A buoyant Stoke-on-Trent BUF was further boosted by two highly successful public 
meetings addressed by Mosley and Director of Research William Joyce respectively and held 
within a fortnight of each other. Both events were previewed in the diary sections of the Evening 
Sentinel and for the Joyce meeting the local fascist branches invested in expensive large 
advertisements in the newspapers’ public notices columns86.     
   As Cullen has noted a personal appearance by the charismatic Mosley consistently 
guaranteed a packed audience, if not an enthusiastic reception87, but a clamour to hear the less 
well-known Joyce indicates the scale of interest in fascism in the Potteries. On 25 March 1934 a 
capacity audience of several thousands of local men and women packed Longton Town Hall to 
grant William Joyce an uninterrupted and enthusiastic hearing as he delivered an address that 
explained at length the fascist corporate economic system88. The Stoke-on-Trent fascists had 
eagerly anticipated the visit of Mosley and happily voiced expectations ‘that there will be a large 
crowd.’89 The excited local fascists were not disappointed when on the evening of 25 March a 
‘great gathering’ of a 4,000-strong capacity audience filled the King’s Hall, Stoke, to listen to 
Mosley deliver his speech. According to the journalist covering the event for the Evening Sentinel 
a larger venue would have been filled without difficulty. Stoke-on-Trent men and women flocked 
to hear the fascist leader. The hall was filled long before the meeting was due to start, there being 
a large queue waiting early in the evening. Mosley was given an enthusiastic reception. The 
meeting passed orderly and uninterrupted throughout. In a comprehensive review of the 
Corporate State that lasted over two hours it was Mosley’s stressing of the importance of 
developing and protecting the pottery home market that roused the loudest round of applause 
heard during the address90. The success of the two meetings delighted the fascists. The Stoke-
on-Trent BUF believed the gathering illustrated the trend of public opinion in the city. It asserted 
                                                 
85 ES 9 March 1934, p6. 
86 ES 22 March 1934, p9; ES 23 March 1934, p2; ES 24 March 1934, p2. 
87 Cullen, ‘Another Nationalism’, p110. 
88 ES 26 March 1934, p7. 
89 ES 14 February 1934, p1. 
90 ES 9 April 1934, p5, 6. 
 103
proudly: ‘Bitterness was entirely absent, and no doubts exist in the minds of those who know the 
political tendencies of the Potteries, that the area is ripe for Fascism’91.  
 Rattled Stoke-on-Trent Socialists responded to Mosley’s visit by hardening the tone of 
their anti-fascist rhetoric during April 1934. In an attempt to stir up religious opinion against the 
BUF it was claimed fascism sought to deny freedom of thought as preparation to replace 
Christianity with a martial paganism92. And in an act revealing of deepening frustration and 
anxiety within its senior ranks, the Chairman of the Stoke-on-Trent Labour Party took to publicly 
praising the contemporary parliamentary and economic situation in Britain93. His glowing 
descriptions both delighted and flabbergasted local supporters of the National Government but 
undermined the propaganda work of a number of his fellow Stoke-on-Trent socialists who were 
forcefully presenting the Mosleyites as agents of a capitalist system in crisis94.  
According to the public pronouncements of these socialists the Stoke-on-Trent BUF was 
at this time recruiting primarily among the ‘public schoolboy’ and ‘university student’ sons of 
affluent Conservatives in the area95. Belonging to occupational sub-groups 11 and 12 
respectively listed in Table 3, these young men are classified as being ‘elite or upper-middle’ in 
social status. Whether this suggestion from the local socialists was the product of empirical 
observation or merely an assumption based on the contemporary Marxist view of fascism as the 
reactionary arm of capitalism’s social elite seeking to prevent the historical ascent of socialism is 
unclear96.  
While the Stoke-on-Trent BUF had consistently insisted it was enlisting people from 
across the social spectrum97 the evidence suggests that up until mid-January of 1934 the 
membership of the local branches appears to have been drawn from the occupational sub-groups 
which comprise the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ and ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class 
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categories respectively in Table 3. Core support for the Stoke-on-Trent BUF during the first year 
or so of its existence came from members of the old New Party which the historiography suggests 
would have been youthful former Conservatives, a sizeable proportion of whom were university 
students98. As the local fascist branches established a higher profile the rate of recruitment had 
‘gone up by leaps and bounds’, with growth sufficiently rapid that by early January 1934 
membership had reached nearly 1,00099. The local press reported that the bulk of non-active 
members were businessmen who, as has often found to be the case in the existing major 
regional studies100, felt unable for commercial reasons to profess their new political allegiance 
publicly101.  
However, with the advent of Rothermere’s sponsorship came a substantial flow of recruits 
that can be allocated to the ‘lower’ social class category in Table 3102. At the end of May 1934 the 
Security Service reported that during the prior few months membership of the Stoke-on-Trent 
BUF had swelled further and the majority of these new recruits were ‘working men’103. These 
members from occupational sub-groups 1 and 2 were employed as unskilled and skilled manual 
labour in the works and factories of the pottery industry. Unemployed former pottery workers were 
also being attracted into the ranks of the local BUF104. The major regional studies produced by 
Rawnsley and Linehan reveal a significant ‘lower’ social class intake among the BUF membership 
in northern England and east London respectively and suggest the majority of these fascists were 
drawn from non-unionised sections of the labour market105. In the Stoke-on-Trent pottery industry 
relations between the employers and employees were heralded by the National Society of Pottery 
Workers as a model to which the rest of the country should aspire106. Co-operation was 
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sufficiently friendly for the employers in the city in the form of the Pottery Manufacturers’ 
Federation to actively encourage workers to join the local trade union107. This cordial relationship 
was a source of concern for many Conservatives in Stoke-on-Trent108 and the subsequent 
reaction of large swathes of the local BUF membership to the Olympia scandal suggests many of 
the unskilled and skilled workers attracted to the Mosley movement in the city were drawn from 
the ‘lower’ class Conservative tradition common to areas of industrial England109. Rawnsley found 
that ‘lower’ class Mosleyites came from a Conservative background as often as from a Labour 
one110. If indeed a sizeable number of ‘lower’ social status recruits in Stoke-on-Trent were drawn 
from a Conservative heritage deeply suspicious of trade unionism, the BUF acted in the Potteries, 
as Linehan has demonstrated it did in the East End of London, as ‘a rival focus of allegiance for 
high numbers of local workers who, for various reasons, rejected the traditional organisations of 
the Labour movement’111.  
Nearly 900 Stoke-on-Trent members of the BUF attended the mass Olympia rally staged 
in London on the evening of 7 June 1934112. If it is assumed that this figure relates only to active 
members, as defined by a willingness to be publicly associated with the Mosley movement, then 
utilizing Webber’s advocated ratio of one active member to one-and-a-half non-active members 
would number the total membership of the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent at this time at a minimum of 
2,250.   
 
2. 1934 – 1940.      
    
The period immediately preceding the Olympia meeting represents the high watermark of fascist 
hopes in Stoke-on-Trent. BUF membership in the city in the wake of the violent events in London 
dropped dramatically by at least two thirds. By the end of June the Stoke-on-Trent Labour party 
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reported local BUF membership had plummeted to around 300113. Although it is unclear whether 
this figure represents whole membership or simply active, either would suggest a rapid exodus. 
The almost instantaneous haemorrhaging of membership cannot be explained solely by 
adverse press coverage. The mass departure was not noticeably encouraged by the local press. 
The Evening Sentinel reported neutrally on the Olympia disorder and refrained from officially 
apportioning blame to any side. Unlike many provincial newspapers it failed to produce an 
editorial on the event. Subsequent repercussions such as Mosley speeches, Labour deputations, 
and Parliamentary debates on the subject were covered but always as press association stories 
without commentary114. While national press coverage is impossible to discount as a factor in the 
deterioration of the Stoke-on-Trent branches, Pugh has effectively challenged ‘the received 
opinion’ that posited the vast bulk of national press coverage was hostile and its influence 
debilitating to BUF fortunes115.  
An explanation for the exodus can be found in the Stoke-on-Trent members’ experiences 
of the Olympia meeting. The 900 members who attended the London gathering travelled in about 
60 buses to the capital on the afternoon of the rally. They arrived in London at five o’clock and 
went to the BUF headquarters in Sloan Square to march in parade to Olympia. At headquarters 
the Stoke-on-Trent fascists were informed that Communists from different parts of the country 
had organised a party of 4,000 – 5,000 protestors. This was confirmed by some Metropolitan 
police officers who met the Stoke-on-Trent Mosleyites half way to the Olympia hall and warned 
them what was happening outside the building. Concerned at the news the Stoke-on-Trent 
fascists decided that the parade should split up, and they made their way to the hall in groups of 
three and four. Many of the Stoke branch members acted as stewards and found themselves at 
the heart of the violent disorder for which the rally would become infamous. One of them, Albert 
John Buckley, aged 17 of 64 New Street, Hanley, sustained serious internal injuries when struck 
across the stomach with a flag pole by an assailant while assisting another man in carrying a 
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woman to first aid who had fainted in the crush116 The force of the blow sent him tumbling down 
about nine stairs and he may also have been kicked. Buckley was transported by ambulance to 
West London Hospital and was detained until 9 June117. His father, John Albert Buckley, was also 
a member of the Stoke branch and serving as a steward. Five minutes after rushing to his son’s 
rescue Buckley was making his way back towards the platform when a man struck at him with a 
walking stick, but warned in time by a woman he ducked out of the way. Another disturbance was 
going on at the time involving Stoke-on-Trent fascists. One man climbed up to the roof and a 
searchlight was brought in use to locate him. A member of the Stoke branch, Boot Harrison, 
started climbing up stanchions towards the roof and was followed by another Stoke Mosleyite, 
Reg Glover. Between them they managed to get the man down and put him outside. The Stoke-
on-Trent party reached home about 8:30 the next morning118.   
The events of the Olympia meeting appear to have come as a jarring culture shock to the 
majority of the Stoke-on-Trent Mosleyites. That is not to say fascist opinion in the city, as 
conventional interpretation would have it, ‘suddenly woke up to the real nature of fascism and 
recoiled from its brutality’119. The Stoke-on-Trent fascists insisted stewards had been the victims, 
not the perpetrators, of violence. In an interview with the local press it was declared: ‘When our 
leader commenced to speak there was a disturbance and our stewards, acting on instructions 
previously given, gave two warnings to each person responsible for the interruptions before 
putting them outside. Several of the people who were causing the trouble struck out at our 
stewards who, of course, defended themselves.…Not one of our lads did anything to start the 
disturbance. All the trouble was caused by the other men’. There would have been no sympathy 
for the anti-fascist cause that had put the teenage Buckley into hospital; one of the more serious 
cases of the 63 blackshirts Mosley claimed required medical treatment for injuries120. The almost 
immediate plummet in membership suggests the majority who departed were ‘Rothermere 
fascists’; those recruits identified in the historiography as disaffected ex-Conservatives, patriotic 
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anti-socialists and politically inexperienced youngsters121. Indeed, Stoke-on-Trent BUF active 
membership had effectively doubled during the period of the press baron’s sponsorship of Mosley. 
Skidelsky wrote of the impact the disorder at Olympia had on the average Rothermere fascist in 
the audience: ‘First there is no doubt that many violent acts took place which were deeply 
shocking to those who witnessed them. Secondly, although political violence on the scale of 
Olympia had occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it had virtually disappeared 
by the 1920s. People relatively new to politics or those unconnected with politics were shocked at 
this echo from half-forgotten times’122. The clashes may have had a greater effect on Stoke-on-
Trent Mosleyites than on many of their comrades based in other parts of the country. A good six 
months had passed since the Communists in the city had last agitated against the local BUF, and 
in that time the level of fascist recruitment had enjoyed its most concentrated period of growth. 
Accustomed to peaceful debate and grudging respect from opponents, physical confrontation was 
something a minority of Stoke-on-Trent Mosleyites would have encountered during their time in 
the movement, especially of a violent nature. It seems that in common with the majority of 
‘Rothermere fascists’ who had flocked to the movement around the country, many of whom 
believed that in the BUF they would find a more virile form of Conservatism, the Stoke-on-Trent 
variety realised the Mosley movement had abruptly become too exciting for their taste123. 
The membership of the Stoke-on-Trent BUF remained constant at around 300 until 
January 1935. As few fresh members enlisted, it is assumed these 300 people were the hardcore 
of ex-New Party supporters attracted to the Mosley movement prior to the period of Rothermere’s 
endorsement; men and women whose loyalty to the fascist leader stretched back over more than 
three years and had survived the trials and tribulations, sometimes violent, encountered during 
his previous party’s existence. For many of these supporters the events at Olympia would have 
seemed reminiscent of the storm of organised left-wing hostility unleashed against the New Party 
during the solitary by-election and single General Election it contested. These men and women 
had refused to allow their political allegiance to be, as Mosley put it in his autobiography, ‘mobbed 
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out of existence’124 in 1931 and remained resolutely faithful to him in the six months that followed 
Olympia. A possible reason for the lack of new recruits in this period can be located in answers 
given in response to the ‘Questionnaire on Local Fascist Activities’ distributed by the Labour Party 
on 12 June 1934. Labour N.H.Q. was informed that the Stoke-on-Trent branches were a hot-bed 
of sexual licentiousness with loose women in plentiful supply. “It only wants a red light on the 
door!”125 Gottlieb interprets these breathless comments to mean it was the fascist women who 
were engaged in sexual impropriety, writing of Stoke-on-Trent and a case in the Brixton branch 
where four female Mosleyites were expelled from the movement because of their ‘immoral 
conduct’: ‘With these incidents in mind, the common taunt to women members selling literature 
on the streets as ‘Mosley’s whores’ can be seen in context’126. Whether the person who 
answered the questionnaire was indeed writing of female members or some other category of 
woman visitor to the Stoke-on-Trent branches is largely irrelevant: the description is highly 
dubious. There exists no mention of sexual misconduct involving Stoke-on-Trent fascists of either 
gender in the local press and if the story was with foundation it is inconceivable local journalists 
would have chosen not to report on it. In addition it is extremely unlikely a dissolute atmosphere 
would have been permitted to develop, indeed the Labour Questionnaire suggests the behaviour 
was overt, under the administration of A. K. Chesterton. A man whose every action was governed 
by an absolute commitment to ideological concepts the underlying essence of which Griffin 
diagnoses as the ‘palingenetic myth’127, Chesterton believed sexual impropriety one of a variety 
of modern cultural forms symptomatic of a post-war decadence which reflected the spreading 
sickness of non-fascist Western civilisation and culture. A recurring theme in many of his articles 
contributed to the BUF press, Chesterton regularly denounced the ‘lunatic obsession with sex’, 
the ‘sex-obsessed individual’, and the ‘sex pervert’ he believed heralded British decline and 
undermined the fascist quest for national regeneration128. Appointed Officer-in-Charge Midlands 
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Area in April 1934129 with responsibility for the supervision of all branches within the Staffordshire 
and Warwickshire counties130, Chesterton kept a characteristically diligent eye on the Stoke-on-
Trent Mosleyites from his base in Birmingham131. His authority in the city was reinforced in early 
May when as part of a general re-organisation of the new Midlands Administrative Unit he 
appointed Birmingham Deputy Branch Officer Sutton to the newly established position of Officer-
in-Charge Potteries Sub-Area and promoted Stoke Area Propaganda Officer K. J. Molineaux to 
be Officer-in-Charge Stoke branch132. With these personally handpicked officers as Chesterton’s 
representatives in Stoke it is doubtful the city branches could have adopted characteristics 
unbecoming of BUF morality. If indeed in its campaign against the growth of fascism in the 
Potteries the Stoke-on-Trent Labour Party had resorted to spreading malicious stories it says 
much about the public perception of the BUF in the wake of the Olympia scandal that these 
damaging claims were believed wholeheartedly by many local people. Among average citizens 
the era of respectability for fascism in the area had been broken under the blows inflicted at 
Olympia. The Stoke-on-Trent fascist clubs swiftly acquired a ‘sinister’ reputation locally for being 
‘part thieves’ kitchen and part bawdy house’133. While this air of ill repute may have deterred 
respectable citizens from joining, the branch appears to have maintained high standards of entry 
that barred any disreputable elements from enlisting. While there is no evidence to suggest the 
Stoke-on-Trent BUF was ever home to violent men seduced by the allure of ‘cosh and castor oil’ 
as described by Brewer134, the likely unfounded stories of fascist iniquity in Stoke-on-Trent 
proved sufficiently potent to persist long enough into the post-war years to be picked up by Cross 
and subsequently repeated by Brewer135.    
 The Stoke-on-Trent BUF response to hostile publicity in the wake of Olympia and the 
decision of the Rothermere press group to sever its links with Mosley was to retreat from the 
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streets and lick its wounds. A self-imposed cooling off period saw the local fascists confine 
themselves to the comforting routine of internal branch life. This move proved initially beneficial, 
enhancing further a longstanding sense of solidarity forged in an atmosphere of political 
dissidence subjected from inception to abuse and attack. Heightened camaraderie insulated the 
remaining Stoke-on-Trent fascists from the kind of discord erupting in other BUF branches around 
the country136. Internal decay in the form of quarrels, damaging personal rivalries and 
administrative ineptitudes was conspicuous by its absence. When financial stringency forced the 
closing of the Longton headquarters and a merging of the branches under the roof of the Glebe 
Street building, dissension was studiously avoided. However, in this enclosed environment the 
‘genteel’ fascism prevalent in Stoke-on-Trent since the movement’s founding gradually shifted by 
degrees into full-blown ‘social club’ fascism. This development presents a paradox: in many parts 
of the country the flood of recruits drawn to the Mosley movement during the period it received 
extensive praise in the Rothermere press had engendered a change in ethos whereby many 
branches began to resemble mainstream political party clubs, particularly of the Conservative 
kind. ‘For such members were only interested in social activities, not taking our message onto the 
streets. Eventually, dozens of branches…had become nothing more than social clubs’, lamented 
a prominent Mosleyite137. Social club fascism took hold in Stoke-on-Trent only after the departure 
of the local Rothermere fascists. Its advent roughly coincides with the arrival of D. N. Revett to 
replace a N.H.Q.-bound Chesterton as temporary Officer-in-Charge Staffordshire and 
Warwickshire138. Revett was reportedly an excellent propaganda officer, and a very genial man to 
work with, but no administrator139. His authority was also distracted by a bitter feud with the 
Organiser of the Birmingham BUF. Under his administration activism collapsed and the BUF 
became an almost invisible presence in Stoke-on-Trent. Anti-fascists believed victory had been 
won. Local BUF propaganda campaigning was reduced to the occasional letter to the local press 
extolling the merits of the economic system of the Corporate State in rejuvenating the pottery 
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industry140. No fascist meetings or cases of disorder arising out of fascist meetings were recorded 
during October and November 1934141. As social club fascism seized a tighter grip on the 
remaining Stoke-on-Trent branch discipline began to break down in isolated cases. The most 
serious incident occurred near the end of the year when a fascist of long membership and 
previous senior rank named Smith disappeared taking the branch funds amounting to £15 with 
him142.  
During January 1935 ‘Mosley carried through an extensive reorganisation, centralizing 
the control of branches through a system of headquarters inspectors, inaugurating strict financial 
controls and turning the bias of the Movement…towards a more conventional plan for winning 
power at a general election’143. In accordance with this new spirit of austerity local branches were 
to be re-organised so as to consist of the barest necessities: a small, administrative office, and a 
room in which political activities could be organised. Members should be on the streets engaging 
in activism144. Inspectors from N.H.Q. were dispatched to supervise the transition. A. K. 
Chesterton was appointed to undertake the tour of the Midlands. Arriving in Stoke-on-Trent, 
Chesterton was horrified to discover, in the words of Cross, ‘the extent to which blackshirts 
passively waited in their clubs for the revolution instead of sallying outside to propagate the 
Fascist cause. The apparition of the tense, eager Chesterton must have been a great shock’145. 
He found a fascist drinking and social club with separate bars marked ‘Officers’ and ‘Blackshirts’. 
Along the counters ran tankards, each bearing the name of its owner146. Political activity had 
fallen to a very low ebb147. From Chesterton’s furious perspective, Baker suggests, clearly the 
Stoke-on-Trent members had come to view fascism as just another kind of British 
Conservatism148. Chesterton closed the club on the spot, dismissed the whole branch leadership 
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and expelled the entire 300 strong membership in one go. It was the largest purge in the Mosley 
movement’s history149.  
This remarkable episode marks the extinction of fascism as a significant presence in the 
Potteries. A series of attempts to revive the movement in Stoke-on-Trent were fated to end in 
dismal failure and what little fascist activity that was undertaken in the city during the second half 
of the 1930s appears to have ceased after mid-April 1938. From January 1935 onwards the 
propaganda pursued by the local Mosleyites in Stoke-on-Trent focused on promoting the theme 
of non-intervention in foreign disputes.        
Within a month BUF N.H.Q. sought to reverse the effects of Chesterton’s onslaught150. 
The man assigned responsibility for re-establishing a BUF branch and restoring the movement’s 
strength in Stoke-on-Trent, was the newly appointed inaugural Midlands National Inspecting 
Officer W. H. Symes151. Symes was unable to make any headway in his mission152. In early May 
1935 he complained to headquarters that he could get no support in Staffordshire and that 
membership in Stoke-on-Trent numbered a meagre four or five153. His task was further 
complicated by a revival of Communist opposition in the city when the importation of hard-worked 
BUF speakers from Birmingham in early July prompted the Communists to reinstate their formerly 
abandoned policy of direct confrontation. The Communists vowed to prevent a resuscitation of 
fascism in the city by driving the Mosleyite interlopers out of Stoke-on-Trent154. This time around 
the anti-fascist policy proved highly effective. The mood of the majority of people in the city 
towards fascism had shifted drastically since Olympia: fascists were pariahs and attacks upon 
them would no longer elicit pro-BUF sympathy. On the first Saturday evening of the month, 
Propaganda Officer Shelville of the Birmingham BUF attempted to address what was planned to 
be the first of a series of outdoor meetings in the city devoted to explaining in light of the 
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emerging crisis surrounding Italy’s intentions towards Abyssinia the fascist belief that Britain 
should remain neutral in foreign disputes. Organised Communist heckling greeted his every word 
before the anti-fascists started an opposition meeting nearby which lasted for about ten minutes, 
at the end of which they returned and broke up the meeting held by Shelville155. While 
propagandists in the fascist press endeavoured to promote the meeting as ‘one of the best ever 
held in Stoke-on-Trent’156, no-one on the ground on either side was fooled. In the face of public 
apathy, if not hostility, scant resources, and aggressively organised anti-fascist opposition, plans 
for further meetings were abandoned. The effort to re-ignite interest in fascism in Stoke-on-Trent 
was further undermined when Symes was summoned to appear before a Board of Inquiry at 
N.H.Q. to answer charges of disloyalty and conduct likely to promote dissatisfaction. It was 
alleged Symes had boasted of flying Mosley by aeroplane to Rome where the latter interviewed 
Mussolini with a view to securing financial assistance; that he himself had been to Rome to obtain 
instructions and funds personally from the Duce, and that Mosley, National Chief of Staff Hope 
Dundas and himself had spent ‘a very gay time in Paris’. It was further alleged that Symes had 
expressed the opinion that Mosley was not the right man to head the movement, that there was 
‘too much Mosleyism and too little Fascism’ in it. A compromised Syme was removed from his 
position and replaced with a P. Whittam157.  
Whittam fared little better than his predecessor. While the old branch building at 14 Glebe 
Street was re-hired, it was only open on evenings from 6.30 pm onwards due to a lack of 
available staff. The tiny membership was unable to devote any spare time to newspaper selling 
so the local headquarters also became the only sales outlet in the area for the Blackshirt158. 
Paltry sales prompted the branch to write a letter to the Chief Librarian of Stoke-on-Trent 
requesting that this periodical be placed in the city libraries’ reading rooms159. This request was 
swiftly forwarded to the relevant council committee responsible for all purchasing and display 
decisions pertaining to the Stoke-on-Trent library system. After two months of prolonged 
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consideration, during which the Chief Librarian was instructed to forward a copy of the fascist 
newspaper to each member for private scrutiny, the Public Libraries, Museums and Gymnasium 
Committee resolved that the request be acceded to, subject to the periodical being provided free 
of charge160.  
 An influential factor in pushing a hesitant committee towards accepting a fascist 
publication in the city’s reading rooms was a violence-free appearance by Mosley at Victoria Hall, 
Hanley, on the evening of Sunday 15 September 1935. A capacity audience turned out to hear 
Mosley deliver an address on the BUF’s isolationist position regarding the Italo-Abyssinia dispute. 
The hall was packed and the audience noisily approved his message of non-intervention which 
occupied well over an hour. Fascists in their blackshirt uniforms acted as stewards but their task 
was not difficult. There were few interruptions. Vocal but peaceful organised opposition failed to 
make an impact at the close of the meeting161. That the Communist opposition on display was 
lacking in fervour stands as testament to the terminal state of fascism in the city. Communist anti-
fascists were cognisant that applause for the fascist leader in public halls was not being 
converted into membership in the branch and the dissemination of propaganda on the streets of 
Stoke-on-Trent. Fascism had become an irrelevancy in the city and since having run the 
Birmingham BUF speakers out of the area the Communists preferred to channel their energies 
into violently breaking up outdoor meetings held in support of National Government candidates 
during the run up to the General Election in November162.       
Anti-fascist opposition was entirely absent during Mosley’s return to the city less than two 
months later. On the Saturday evening of 10 November 1935 the fascist leader addressed yet 
another capacity 4,000 strong audience at the King’s Hall, Stoke. The local press reported that 
during his speech Mosley told the audience that Jews controlled the City of London which in turn 
dictated to whichever party was returned to Westminster and used it ruthlessly and relentlessly 
against Britain’s interest. No government, he continued, dared to stand up to the Jews or to 
oppose their will, or it would be caused to fall within a night through a wrecking of the Stock 
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Exchange or the threat of a panic. ‘It was because fascism had tackled this evil, dared to tear the 
mask from what was called democracy, thereby exposing the features of alien faces, that the 
blackshirt movement was being attacked by all and sundry’163. 
Aside from this segment of Mosley’s speech there is not a single other instance of anti-
Semitic thought or deed recorded in the evidence available on the history of the BUF in Stoke-on-
Trent. The vigilance committees of the Board of Deputies of British Jews reported there was in 
the city a total absence of anti-Semitism164. Jews had been present in Stoke-on-Trent from at 
least as early as 1873, when the first synagogue was founded165, and there was no tradition in 
the Potteries of hostility towards Jews166. In Stoke-on-Trent in the 1930s both the total numbers 
of the Jewish population and its density were tiny. In 1938 there were only 190 Jewish people 
living in the city, a population density of 0.069%167. The local Jewish population was not located 
in any one area of the city and was successfully integrated into the wider Gentile community. A 
literary society and amateur dramatics group regularly raised considerable sums for the local 
hospital168 and it has been suggested that the ‘typically English middle-class nature’ of these 
activities illustrates the depth to which the local Jewish community had been assimilated by this 
time169. 
Mosley concluded his speech at the King’s Hall with advice to the audience that they 
should help ‘build up’ the fascist movement170. The citizens of Stoke-on-Trent chose to decline 
this counsel. In his memoirs ex-BUF speaker John Beckett wrote of Mosley’s public image during 
this period: ‘Several times a month, [Mosley] addressed large audiences, and saw hundreds of 
members and great enthusiasm. He did not realise, and I suppose does not realise now [1938], 
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that a great part of this is a stage army which attends him everywhere’171. This description of 
imported supporters goes some way to explaining how ostensibly successful Mosley meetings in 
Stoke-on-Trent could fail to induce even a minor increase in recruitment. The local fascists’ 
experience at the annual Armistice Day ceremony staged the day after Mosley’s visit provides a 
revealing contrast between the rarefied atmosphere of a grand Mosley gathering and the 
everyday reality for his local activists on the streets of Stoke-on-Trent. On Sunday 11 November 
the small band of Stoke-on-Trent fascists under the command of Whittam marched to the city 
War Memorial and attempted to place a wreath on the cenotaph in the presence of a very large 
crowd of ordinary spectators who had gathered to attend the memorial service172. The fascists 
were booed and pushed, the wreath being torn from their hands173.  
The local BUF crawled into the New Year. In January 1936 the branch moved premises 
to Copeland Chambers, Copeland Street, Stoke-on-Trent174. The change of location did little to 
improve the deathly condition of fascism in the city. Activism was almost non-existent, failing to 
extend beyond requesting permission to present copies of the new weekly fascist newspaper 
Action to the reading rooms of the city libraries175. In late March 1936 N.H.Q. expressed anxiety 
that the branch seemed to be slipping out of contact. It reported: ‘Of…the Potteries little news can 
be obtained’176. The insignificance of the BUF in local affairs is illustrated by the fact that not a 
single mention of the movement, nationally or locally, was made at the annual May Day 
celebration in the Market Square, Hanley. The two speakers, the Chairman of the Stoke-on-Trent 
Labour Party, and the President of the North Staffordshire Trades and Labour Council, focused 
primary on local issues. When talk eventually turned to the subject of fascism, it was the German 
variety under discussion177.   
It was at this point, just as the Stoke-on-Trent BUF was perilously teetering on the brink 
of extinction, that the local fascists enjoyed a remarkable propaganda coup. In late May 1936 the 
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branch enlisted its most prestigious ever member: Major H. Stapeley Read. The new recruit was 
immediately appointed Honorary Secretary of the local movement. As Chairman of the Burslem 
and Tunstall Conservative and Unionist Association for nearly ten years, Read was one of the 
pre-eminent figures in Stoke-on-Trent Conservative politics and a successful entrepreneur whose 
membership of occupational sub-group 14 classifies him as belonging to the ‘elite or upper-
middle’ social class listed in Table 3178. A charismatic Great War veteran whose broad appeal 
among the citizens of the city included a particularly warm rapport with the ‘lower’ class and ex-
servicemen179, Read was a member of an old Staffordshire family with long roots in anti-socialist 
Conservative politics180. His father had held senior positions on the Stoke-on-Trent Council181. 
Well respected by his opponents182, who would grudgingly agree with the general consensus that 
he was ‘a really capable leader’ and ‘the live-wire’ of Stoke-on-Trent Conservatism183, Read falls 
into a category of fascist supporter identified by Webber: ex-Conservatives increasingly 
disillusioned at various stages with the consensus-orientated pragmatic Conservatism of Stanley 
Baldwin, the steady erosion of empire symbolised by the 1935 Government of India Act, and the 
imagined decline of patriotic sentiment in the Conservative Party184. Read was an admirer of 
dissident hard right-wing Tory General Henry Page Croft, who in the 1920s had formed the 
National Party, described by Pugh as representing ‘a halfway stage between the militant ideas of 
the pre-war radical right and the fascist movements of the inter-war years’185. Croft’s organisation 
advocated propriety in high office, a paternalistic attitude to the ‘lower’ classes, a corporate 
doctrine to guarantee industrial harmony, and was fervently anti-Communist186. Read’s defection 
to fascism came as the culminating act of half a decade of festering dissatisfaction with the 
direction taken by the Conservative party at the local and national level, and the policies of the 
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National Government. Read agitated persistently and outspokenly for radical Croft-style ‘real 
Conservatism’ to be introduced in his local organisation and in the wider Government187 in the 
form of pronounced public activism against the perceived growing menace of socialism, 
prohibiting of the importation of foreign pottery and other goods, immediate rearmament, the 
preservation of British rule in India, and the curtailing of the influence of Trade Unions in British 
industry. Read demanded action. The local Association was, in his opinion, ‘dilly-dallying’188 and 
‘deeds not words are required’189. As early as December 1933, the Stoke-on-Trent BUF had 
attempted to attract Read to the Mosley movement. Local fascist leader Spanton Reid wrote to 
him noting that fascism was laying stress upon the points raised in his various writings and 
addresses190. At this stage in his political life Read was uninterested in joining the BUF and 
resisted the fascist’s overtures, proudly declaring: ‘I am a Royalist, Imperialist, and Protectionist – 
consequently, an Anti-Socialist. In other words I am an un-adulterated Conservative, and proud of 
it’191. But by May 1936 his faith in the Conservative Party and patience with the National 
Government had evaporated. Thoroughly exasperated with traditional right-wing politics, he 
believed that despite his best efforts his complaints had not been addressed either in the local 
organisation or at the national level. The country was in terminal decline and the socialists were 
at the gates. The Conservatives were hopeless and the National Government hollow. ‘He 
wondered what was going to happen…unless someone does take the bull by the horns and say 
we are not going to allow these things’192. The BUF welcomed him with open arms. 
The branch immediately sought to capitalise on his new affiliation and arranged a series 
of prominent meetings at which Read was expected to speak beginning in June. The propaganda 
theme of these speeches was to be the need for Britain to retain a strict position of non-
intervention in foreign disputes. A particular sense of urgency was felt owing to the growing threat 
of civil war in Spain193. Apart from a gathering held at the Fair Ground, Longton, on 4 July 1934194, 
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all outdoor meetings were staged at Hanley Market Place. Traditionally the bulk of support for 
Read’s brand of rebel rightist conservatism in his Association had been centred in the Tunstall 
area195; and targeting his former power base as a potentially fruitful recruiting ground, all indoor 
meetings were held at the Assembly Rooms, Tunstall Town Hall196. At a time when many civic 
authorities around the country were refusing to hire buildings to the fascist movement, Stoke-on-
Trent Council remained staunchly libertarian: its cherished belief was that any organisation had 
the right to hold a meeting and as a consequence the BUF never encountered any difficulty in 
engaging the use of a civic hall for an evening197. In turn the Communists respected the Council’s 
tradition and refrained from disrupting indoor meetings. Read was given the opportunity to 
discuss the fascist future with his new leader when Mosley met his valuable new recruit at a BUF 
luncheon arranged for local businessmen held at the North Stafford Hotel, Hanley, on 20 July198.  
While Read’s defection invigorated the tiny cadre of loyal fascists in Stoke-on-Trent, it 
also shocked and alarmed the local Communist movement. In a replication of the actions of May 
1935 a campaign of confrontation was organised to crush any BUF recovery under Read’s 
guidance before it could take root. The Communists’ violent tactics proved highly effective once 
again. An outdoor meeting held at Hanley Market Square on 29 June was the first gathering to be 
targeted and an anti-fascist pattern of disruption was established that would be repeated at every 
other Mosleyite meeting held in Stoke-on-Trent under Read’s leadership199. The Communists 
held an impromptu but well-attended anti-fascist meeting in the location shortly before the BUF 
gathering was scheduled to begin200. The opening speaker was Read, who as chairman made a 
short introductory propaganda speech which was received without interruption. The main speaker 
for the night was a Captain Collins, who planned to deliver an hour-long statement on Mosley’s 
isolationist attitude towards foreign affairs. While he was speaking a section of the crowd 
swarmed towards the lorry on which he was standing causing him to cease his address and 
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prompting the police who were stationed in various parts of the square to intervene. The police 
controlled the crowd in a short space of time and with order restored escorted Collins back to his 
transport. Lack of numbers meant there were few men able to act as stewards and without the 
intervention of the police the situation would have escalated into ‘some serious trouble’201. While 
the Communist opposition focused its attention on disrupting the local BUF branch’s high profile 
public meetings, fascist activists working comparatively quietly on the streets of the city 
disseminating propaganda managed to operate unmolested. A small group of fascists became a 
regular presence at the Labour Exchange202 where BUF leaflets were distributed203.      
 The Stoke-on-Trent mainstream Left was also shocked by Read’s conversion to the 
fascist cause but refused to budge from its established strategy for countering the growth of the 
BUF in the city: peaceful debate and the upholding of the right to freedom of speech. The Labour 
Party affirmed that ‘no useful purpose could be served by action which might incite people to fight. 
If fascism had anything in it, they could examine it with clear reason, and reject it…’ When a 
resolution was ventured at the Staffordshire Trades Council to support a deputation to interview 
the Lord Mayor and request him to see the Chief Constable and invite the prohibition of fascist 
meetings, the resolution attracted only three votes in its favour leading a senior official to state: 
‘The attitude suggested by the resolution was just the attitude with which the Labour movement 
had to contend with in its early days, and, if it were carried, it would be something which the 
fascists could use against them. They had always been advocates of free speech, and he felt 
they should stand by that right’204.       
 Like Syme and Whittam before him, Read failed miserably in his attempts to revive 
fascism in Stoke-on-Trent. While it raised the branch’s public profile, Read’s conversion had a 
negligible effect on increasing membership205. Without new recruits the movement continued to 
languish. The ‘Battle of Cable Street’ passed without impact. In late October active membership 
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numbered a paltry five persons206. Unable to transfer the popular support he enjoyed as a 
Conservative to his new allegiance, Read swiftly became disillusioned with the fascist movement 
and by the end of the year had walked away from both the BUF and Stoke-on-Trent. In late 
August an anti-fascist mole at N.H.Q. was reporting that Read had moved miles away to a new 
home in Shropshire207. His last appearance in Stoke-on-Trent under the fascist banner came in 
mid-November208.  
Read’s successor would be the final fascist leader in Stoke-on-Trent. Dedicated and 
hard-working, S. T. Dunn was a 32 year old born in the village of Mushroom Green, South 
Staffordshire. He had been employed as a bus driver in the Potteries since the age of 21. As a 
‘skilled worker’ from occupational sub-group 2, Dunn is classified as belonging to the ‘lower’ 
social class in Table 3. In addition to being active in the fascist movement he was also a member 
of the Transport and General Workers’ Union and gained the T.U.C. award for recruiting 50 
members209. Rawnsley and Linehan’s investigations into the membership profile of the BUF 
suggest members such as Dunn, a recruit from a highly-unionised section of the ‘lower’ class, 
was a rarity, although the latter did find that when branches possessed ‘unskilled workers’ or 
‘skilled workers’ with trade union affiliations the member concerned tended to be employed in the 
transport industry210. Dunn was a longstanding admirer of Sir Oswald Mosley. He was a member 
of the New Party on its formation, and joined the BUF immediately it was formed211. His wife 
shared his political affiliations. As part of the BUF ‘Fifth Anniversary Honours’ in October 1937 he 
would be awarded the ‘Bronze distinction for magnificent service’212. 
The fortunes of the BUF branch in Stoke-on-Trent under Dunn were indistinguishable 
from that under Read and suffered the same ignominious fate. 1937 began with Dunn persisting 
in attempting to hold a series of outdoor propaganda meetings but at each violent Communist 
opposition ensured the fascist message failed to reach an audience. Events at a meeting held in 
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Hanley Market Square on 22 January exemplifies fascist fortunes in the city when Communist 
disruption succeeded in knocking the BUF speaker off the platform213.  
Olga Shore, a senior national BUF officer wrote to N.H.Q. at the end of January 1937 
lamenting the general condition of the movement in the Northern Zone: ‘…everything there is 
bloody bad, they couldn’t be worse, and if we don’t make dramatic improvements the whole 
movement in the North will be blown up’214. These words could easily have been describing the 
grim state of affairs confronting the Stoke-on-Trent branch. If branch reports are a fair indication, 
however, the local fascists would have refused to accept such a pessimistic assessment. 
Deluded, or willfully engaging in the act of deception, the local fascists preferred to flatter N.H.Q. 
with a stream of untruths. While the local fascists were incapable of attracting sizeable audiences 
or even holding an uninterrupted meeting, N.H.Q. was informed: ‘During the last week a series of 
successful meetings have been held in the Potteries. The message of National Socialism has 
been taken right into the heart of this industrial area. Everywhere good audiences assembled and 
listened eagerly...The meeting was carried through with highly successful results’. While active 
membership remained in single figures, the branch dispatched: ‘Many working people of [Stoke-
on-Trent] are turning to National Socialism as the muddling of the old Democratic parties 
becomes evident. Further propaganda like this and it will not be long before Democracy is played 
out in [Stoke-on-Trent] for good’215. The decision by N.H.Q. to announce Dunn on 9 June 1937 as 
a BUF candidate for a Stoke-on-Trent constituency at the next election should perhaps be placed 
in the context of these misleading communications216.      
Fascism, not Democracy, was ‘played out’ in Stoke-on-Trent. By the time Dunn was 
being unveiled in the fascist press as the man who would sweep into office as the Parliamentary 
representative of a fascist Potteries, lack of finance because of due-paying membership 
numbering single figures, and microscopic public interest had forced the Stoke-on-Trent branch to 
close its office in Copeland Street217. From this point onwards until the movement was eclipsed in 
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the city Dunn’s home at 60 Fletcher Road, Hanley, served as the de facto administrative centre 
for the meagre remains of BUF activity in Stoke-on-Trent218. Active membership had remained 
interminably static since a branch had been re-founded in Stoke-on-Trent but by mid-1937 even 
this hardcore of five or six fascists were running out of steam and beginning to recognize the 
seemingly hopeless situation. While these five or six fascists remained BUF members and 
retained their Mosleyite beliefs, propaganda work began to peter out and by the end of the year 
had been all but abandoned. An ad hoc outdoor meeting addressed by national speaker Clement 
Bruning as part of a brief tour of the provinces that also took in Weymouth, Salisbury and 
Wolverhampton, stands as the solitary recorded meeting held under the auspices of the BUF in 
Stoke-on-Trent during the second half of 1937219.  
The fascists in Stoke-on-Trent stayed anonymous until the growing international crisis 
surrounding Hitler’s intentions towards Austria in February and March 1938 triggered a desperate 
burst of ‘Peace Campaign’ activity. Dunn stood at the heart of this propaganda work, but failed to 
inspire his local sympathizers to stand with him. The tiny circle of doggedly loyal activists had 
finally thrown in the towel. Stripped of local support but determined to persevere with his mission, 
Dunn called upon the assistance of a Mosleyite active as a public speaker in the Wolverhampton 
District by the name of Gee. Together the two men embarked on a frenzied but ineffectual round 
of chalking, sales drives, and writing correspondence to the local press all advocating a position 
of appeasement towards German territorial ambition. An impromptu meeting held in Penkhull 
Square on 27 February passed unnoticed by the people of Stoke-on-Trent. Zeal alone could not 
compensate for lack of numbers and an uninterested public. With the easing of the international 
crisis Gee returned to his area of residence, leaving the Stoke-on-Trent BUF in the ignominious 
position of being a one man band. Dunn wore this mantle with pride, however, insisting that he 
would be happy in his duty ‘keeping the flag flying for Mosley’220.          
The dying breath of fascism in Stoke-on-Trent came in April 1938 when massive 
Communist opposition violently disrupted a Mosley meeting at the King’s Hall. For days in 
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advance the Communist Party in the Potteries had distributed leaflets in the streets asserting they 
were going to organize violence, inside and outside the hall, to prevent Mosley’s speech. Alerted 
to the planned confrontation, the BUF were confident of being able to maintain an uninterrupted 
meeting. Trouble, Mosley glibly asserted, would be dealt with ‘in double quick time’. The 
subsequent rowdy scenes inside and outside the hall exposed the degree to which the BUF had 
misjudged the amount of anti-fascist feeling Mosley’s presence was now capable of inspiring in 
the city221. Several thousand anti-fascists turned out on the evening of the meeting to carry the 
threat of organized interruption into effect222. While suggestions to the civic authorities that the 
meeting should be cancelled were rejected in the interest of freedom of speech, a large number 
of extra police officers had been drafted into Stoke-on-Trent from outlying areas223. The hall was 
patrolled by stewards, who like the majority of the audience, had been imported from Lancashire. 
For the people of Stoke-on-Trent Mosley’s charm had worn thin and Beckett’s ‘stage army’ had 
been mobilised in force to compensate224. The rows filled by the traveling faithful listened 
rapturously while Mosley delivered a speech which focused on his belief that the way to preserve 
British interests and peace in the world was by forging an alliance with Hitler’s Germany225.  
There were numerous incidents during the course of Mosley’s speech as the Communists 
made their presence known throughout. Many scuffles occurred, several free fights broke out, 30 
people were ejected, and two men received facial injuries226. The worst incidents of the night, 
however, occurred after the meeting. A large number of anti-fascists assembled outside and 
waited for Mosley to attempt to leave. When he emerged with a body of escorts, including Dunn, 
a portion of the crowd broke through a police cordon and rushed the fascists. Dunn was struck in 
the face in the ensuing clashes, and fighting continued for quite a while before the police 
succeeded in restoring order227.  
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The available evidence suggests this violence-marred meeting hammered the final nail in 
the coffin of fascism in Stoke-on-Trent. There is no recorded instance of any type of fascist 
activity being undertaken either by an individual or group in the city between this date and the 
proscription of the BUF nationally in summer 1940. 
The Stoke-on-Trent BUF over the course of the second half of the 1930s was the victim 
of A. K. Chesterton’s reaction to the situation he discovered in the branch while touring the 
Midlands in January 1935. Chesterton was a man for whom fascism represented a truly 
revolutionary phenomenon, a ‘legitimate crusade against all the trends of ‘decadence’ that 
afflicted the age’. His sincerity was total and his devotion to the cause selfless. A similar standard 
of commitment was demanded of his subordinates. As Baker acknowledges, ‘to be nominally on 
his side was never sufficient proof of fascist commitment’. A ‘transcendent’ creed, fascism must 
inform every aspect of life. A great fear of Chesterton’s was that the BUF could turn from a radical 
political movement into a conventional political party228: 
Life without integrity is death and in human affairs integrity is served only by 
Ethics. The end does not justify the means unless the means be good, because 
evil means corrupt the end. As far as humanly possible our grasp of this fact 
must be absolute: either we stand remorselessly for truth, with an adamantine 
resolve to have done with shams, or else we are not the movement we believe, 
but part of that which we would destroy – just another political party scrambling 
and wrangling amongst other political parties down the slope of Britain’s fall229. 
 
This ideological anxiety lay at the heart of Chesterton’s rage during his surprise visit to the 
Potteries. His extreme response to the placid state of affairs he found in the Stoke-on-Trent 
branch was absurdly disproportionate to the situation. While it is true to say that the local branch 
had succumbed to the ‘social-club’ approach to politics, the condition was surely not completely 
unsalvageable. Cullen emphasises the importance of good leadership in maintaining a successful 
branch life, and offers the experiences in Hull and Huddersfield as examples of good new leaders 
turning around the fortunes of weak branches230. At the time of Chesterton’s palingenetic over-
reaction the Stoke-on-Trent branch membership had reached a standstill but remained one of the 
largest in the country: the 300 members may have become bewitched by the relative comforts of 
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a conventional political party life but had remained loyal to Mosley. The situation called for reform 
not eradication. The bedrock of a potentially successful branch remained firmly in place. It is 
difficult to imagine an official who was more restrained in character behaving in such an 
excessive and unnecessarily destructive manner, or even indeed Mosley, but doctrinal radicals 
like Chesterton rejected a rational approach to politics and were thus unable to balance fascist 
ideals with the need to see them realised in practice. Chesterton was unprepared to compromise 
with the Stoke-on-Trent BUF, and in taking drastic measures squandered a solid opportunity to 
re-direct the activities of a sizeable membership in an area that had previously revealed a wide 
level of latent support. Whether a ideologically renewed branch would have proved capable of 
restoring the BUF to its former position and reputation in Stoke-on-Trent is, of course, a moot 
point; but less open to question is that without the aid of the hard-core Mosley loyalists who 
constituted the bulk of the membership immediately prior to Chesterton’s reckless purge, it would 
prove next to impossible to restore fascism to any semblance of a popular movement in the city.  
Humiliated, the Mosley loyalists refused to return to the fascist fold. This rejection left the 
tiny handful of members willing to persist with the BUF in the unappetising situation of effectively 
starting all over again. Only this time as an infant movement, without the foundation of the 
sizeable hard-core support so ruinously alienated by Chesterton to build upon, trying to establish 
itself against a hostile political environment in conditions of economic recovery which denied the 
local fascists the opportunity to operate successfully and severely blunted their ability to present 
the BUF as a vitally needed political alternative in the city.  
The violent tactics of local Communist activists made a significant contribution to the 
containment of the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent from 1935 onwards. Unlike in many other places 
around the country231, the Communist Party in Stoke-on-Trent was small in membership232 and 
had previously proved ineffective in combating the rise of fascism in the Potteries. But during the 
second half of the decade, a chronic lack of numbers and public support for the local fascists 
meant the remaining local Mosleyites were unable to overcome the constraints reactivated 
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militant anti-fascist hostility placed on the Stoke-on-Trent BUF. Communist agitation made it 
extremely problematic for the local BUF to organise, spiked the propaganda outlet of platform 
oratory, sapped spirits, and left the fascists floundering in their attempts to present the Mosley 
movement as a dignified and legitimate replacement to the mainstream parties. 
The established MPs in Stoke-on-Trent offered a robust and respectable alternative to 
the fascists for those in the city sympathetic to the theme upon which the local BUF focused what 
little propaganda campaigning it was able to pursue from 1935 onwards. The three National 
Government supporting MPs who represented Stoke-on-Trent constituencies were respected and 
popular among the people of the city233 and were staunchly isolationist in their attitude towards 
foreign disputes. While the local BUF’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ and ‘Peace Campaign’ activity 
faltered in violence and obscurity, to widespread local public support and enthusiastic 
endorsement in the Stoke-on-Trent press the local MPs voiced a similarly unshakeable belief in 
non-intervention and British neutrality in response to the contentious events in Europe around 
which the remaining fascists in the city had sought to mobilise. On the Abyssinian problem the 
MPs firmly insisted that Britain should keep out of the dispute. The introduction of sanctions 
should be entirely ruled out as it would certainly mean war and widespread conflagration. Military 
conflict with Italy, a country for generations had been Britain’s friend in peace and ally in war, was 
‘unthinkable’. The British people, it was declared, were under no obligation to police the world and 
must not be dragged into a quarrel in which they were not interested and which was not their 
business234. The local Parliamentary representatives’ response to the threat and eventual 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War was to adopt a strident non-intervention stance: ‘It is no 
business of ours to interfere or to aid one side or the other, it is our concern only to protect and 
maintain the integrity of British territory and to lend any further help that may be necessary to any 
of our nationals requiring assistance’. Whatever the outcome of the war, it was argued, it was 
essential that the Spanish people settle ‘their tragic quarrel and bitter conflict’ without outside 
intrusion. ‘Otherwise, the alternative to civil war in one country may be the wholesale conflict of 
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other countries’235. The local MPs praised Chamberlain for his ‘realism’ in appeasing Hitler’s 
seizure of Austria236. Austro-German union, it was posited, was natural and inevitable, although 
some regret was expressed at the use of ‘force majeure’237. A Britain which was ‘strong, and 
becomes ever stronger, with a minimum of commitments’, was promoted as the greatest 
influence and guarantee for the preservation of peace and the eventual pacification of Europe238. 
The local BUF branch would most likely have not fared any better in attracting support 
over the second half of the 1930s if, rather than move the focus of its propaganda on to the 
theme of non-intervention in foreign disputes, it had instead continued to concentrate on 
promoting the fascist corporate economic system as the only viable solution to the problems 
afflicting the dominant local industry. A revitalisation of the Stoke-on-Trent pottery industry began 
in 1935 that increasingly made radical ideas for socio-economic recovery appear unnecessary. 
While the pottery industry was enjoying a minor upturn in fortunes during the second half of 1934, 
the government’s introduction of modest trade protection for the sector sparked a ‘great revival’ in 
1935 that drove expansion both of production and employment during the year. In July 1935 
officials were celebrating ‘marching in the right direction’239 and at the end of the year 
unemployment in Stoke-on-Trent had fallen by 13,000240. Exports overseas began to show a 
‘cheering improvement’, while imports were down by a morale-boosting £170,247241. An upbeat 
local press informed its readers: ‘We have not reached prosperity yet, but we are well on the road 
of that name’. Confidence in the industry and among its workers was running high and 
responsibility for the ongoing economic improvement was widely attributed to the National 
Government’s ‘commonsense fiscal protection of the home market’242. The substantial 
improvement in trade and employment in the pottery industry in Stoke-on-Trent was maintained 
throughout 1936243. In October 1936 trade was booming and unemployment in Stoke-on-Trent 
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stood at its lowest since 1929244. The rate of improvement slowed during 1937 but unemployment 
in the city continued to fall, and trade maintained a rise. In February the pottery industry was 
reporting a shortage of skilled labour to meet fresh orders245. By late 1937 the increases in trade 
and employment were levelling out but even while static remained at levels unimaginable only a 
few years before246. Grateful owners rewarded their workforces with improved working conditions 
and the introduction of holiday pay247. At the time of Mosley’s final visit to Stoke-on-Trent as 
fascist leader to address the meeting that marked the last recorded incident of BUF activity in the 
city, local pottery exports from the start of the year had easily turned the million pounds mark, 
totalling nearly £100,000 more than the corresponding period of the previous year248. 
In Stoke-on-Trent from 1935 until the movement’s demise in the city around mid-1938 the 
mainstream socio-economic and political forces in the city adequately catered for the needs and 
wants of most people. This resulted in the local BUF being pushed to the periphery of Stoke-on-
Trent life where it suffocated in permanent marginalisation and lack of legitimacy.     
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Chapter Four: The BUF in Coventry, 1932 – 1940. 
 
1. 1932 – 1934. 
 
The city of Coventry is situated in the north-east of the county of Warwickshire and is the leading 
municipality in the south Midlands1. According to the 1931 decennial Census Coventry covered 
12,827 acres2 and had a population of 167,0833. The city was divided into fifteen wards4 and was 
represented by a solitary seat in Parliament5. The Industrial Revolution was late in arriving in 
Coventry, and until the late-1800s the city’s industry was dominated by the wool and ribbon 
weaving that had been established in the eleventh century. At the end of the nineteenth century 
Coventry was a city of great social and economic change, its geographical position at the heart of 
the country allowing it to take advantage of the country’s new road and railway networks to attract 
talented engineers and entrepreneurs to the area who established fresh sources of wealth and 
employment. In the 1880s Coventry’s industries swiftly diversified to include watchmaking and the 
birth of the cycle trade, to be followed by motorcycles and cars. ‘The expansion of the motor 
industry was paralleled by the growth and development of other metal and engineering industries. 
To the motor industry, for instance, they supplied the necessary component parts such as 
radiators, magnetos, lights, rims, wheels, carburettors and all the other essentials that went into 
the construction of a car. Other firms performed the equally important functions of body pressing 
and drop forging and the making of machine tools, all of which eased the introduction of both 
batch and mass production methods in the car and other industries’6. Acquiring a reputation for 
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adaptability and innovation, Coventry continued to develop new industries into the twentieth 
century at an accelerated pace. By the early 1930s artificial silks, aircraft7, electrics, and 
telecommunications equipment were being produced on a mass scale in Coventry8. 
In contrast to Birmingham and Stoke-on-Trent there existed no major personal or political 
connections between Sir Oswald Mosley and Coventry prior to the establishment of a BUF 
branch in the city9. In February 1933 a paid speaker in the N.H.Q. Propaganda Department, 
Charles Dolan, was despatched to Birmingham tasked with working alongside Birmingham 
Organiser Arthur Ward in building up BUF branches in the Second City and establishing a branch 
in Coventry10. Cross writes of a BUF standard practice for opening a new branch in the Provinces: 
‘The policy…was always to present a show of strength. For a first meeting in new territory the 
speaker would arrive with a coach-load of blackshirts who…would march through the streets to 
advertise the meeting. Afterwards there would be another march, with new recruits encouraged to 
fall in behind. A full-time official from National Headquarters would stay in the town for three or 
four weeks, instruct the new recruits and organize them into a branch. The aim was then to find a 
local leader capable of taking over [as branch leader]’11. Dolan and Ward followed the template 
described, wasting little time in organising the first BUF event in Coventry when a lorry load of 
blackshirts arrived from Birmingham and held a meeting in Coventry Market Square. After this 
meetings were held regularly. A branch was soon established which would operate as a 
subsidiary of Birmingham Central branch until early 1934, and a Mr. Raymond was appointed 
Organiser Coventry and Warwickshire Sub-Area12. In May 1933 a temporary branch 
headquarters was opened in a disused warehouse in Whitefriars Lane. Finding more suitable 
premises was the first task Allan MacDonald set himself upon being appointed the new Organiser 
in August 1933. This proved difficult but by November 1933 premises had been secured at 33 
Stoney Stanton Road13. MacDonald had returned from Canada during the First World War to ‘do 
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his bit’ for the native country he proudly called ‘a glorious land’14. The BUF would make 
undistinguished and ineffectual progress in Coventry during the period from the founding of this 
branch in the city to the outbreak of disorder at the Olympia meeting.  
 From the first BUF meeting held in Coventry in February 1933 until the end of 1934 the 
propaganda message disseminated in the city by the local fascists concentrated on the general 
programme of the Corporate State. This theme was promoted at outdoor meetings and through 
letters to the correspondence columns of the principal local newspaper the Midland Daily 
Telegraph15.  
The common reaction to the local Mosleyites as they tried to maintain and expand a 
fledgling branch in Coventry during 1933 appears to have been general indifference. Coventry 
proved to be predominantly barren ground for fascist recruitment efforts and the BUF failed to 
make an impact of any note in the city16. Coupland suggests a personal appearance by Mosley 
could spark a surge in enrolments into even the most lethargic and struggling of BUF branches17. 
It stands as a testament to Coventry’s seeming immunity to his movement’s appeal that Mosley’s 
first appearance in the city as BUF leader at the Corn Exchange in late 1933 exercised little or no 
discernable effect on the local branch’s levels of recruitment. The disappointed Coventry branch 
had harboured high hopes the meeting, at which Mosley delivered an exposition on the general 
principles of the Corporate State, would kick-start the fascist movement in the city18. In an 
attempt to promote as widely as possible the leader’s visit a large sum of money had been spent 
placing a series of prominent adverts in the public notices section of the Midland Daily 
Telegraph19. When called upon by its Birmingham supervisors to assist with the stewarding at 
inaugural BUF meetings in Wolverhampton and Oxford, the contribution of the Coventry branch 
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numbered in single figures20. By the end of 1933 the Coventry BUF had failed even to raise the 
six active men required to form a blackshirt Unit21.  
Alongside a shortage of numbers the Coventry BUF was also suffering from a lack of 
quality among its membership. These shortcomings were exposed for the Coventry public to see 
when the Honorary Organiser of the Leamington BUF branch appeared in court early in the New 
Year. In November 1933 a decision had been taken to endeavour to form a subsidiary branch of 
the Coventry BUF at nearby Leamington. Casting a critical eye over the tiny Coventry 
membership, N.H.Q. found there were only three potential candidates for the job of organising a 
new branch and Fascist Charles Bowlby was selected. 22 year old Bowlby had attended the 
Royal Naval College until he was 18 but a serious motor accident ended his career in the Navy 
and he became an insurance agent. As an occupational ‘type’ belonging to the 
‘lower/intermediate (petty) employee’ sub-group, Bowlby is allocated to the ‘lower-middle and 
middle-middle’ social class category in Table 3. He had been a member of the BUF for only a 
month before he was asked to organise in Leamington. The selection proved highly embarrassing 
when Bowlby, considered one of the highest calibre members in the Coventry branch, was found 
to have over the course of his three months as Leamington Organiser embezzled the entire £6 
sent to him in weekly 15s sums from N.H.Q. as rent payments on a premises taken as 
Leamington headquarters at 1 Regent Street22. Bowlby’s case is not unusual in the 
historiography. Throughout its existence the BUF attracted an embarrassing number of men and 
women with criminal tendencies and often, as at Leamington, the movement would be the chosen 
victim of such members’ illegal activities, with theft being a particular problem23.  
A problem that the Coventry branch did not have to worry about at this time was 
opposition from the political parties present in the city. Organised opposition to the Coventry BUF 
during the period from the opening of the city branch until mid-1934 was virtually non-existent. On 
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the founding of new BUF branches, Cross writes: ‘The arrival of blackshirts in a town generally 
caused a stir which on many occasions turned to violence’24. This physical opposition most 
commonly appeared in the hostile form of members of the local branch of the Communist Party25 
but the Coventry far-left did not attempt to disrupt the activities of the fascist movement in the city 
until the second half of the decade. A minor fracas occurred at the conclusion of Mosley’s 
meeting in the Corn Exchange when a group of Communists who had assembled to heckle the 
arrival of the fascist leader clashed with members of the departing audience but these far-left anti-
fascists were outsiders who had travelled into Coventry specifically to try and disrupt the 
showcase BUF gathering: the local Communists, who had been holding their own meeting in the 
Market Square without a mention of fascism, took no part in the disturbance26.   
The mainstream political parties in Coventry displayed an unconcerned attitude to the 
presence of Mosleyite fascism in the city. The Conservative and Labour parties in Coventry were 
fully conversant with the activities of the fascist branch but believed the Mosleyite presence did 
not merit opposing because it was failing miserably to establish even a toe-hold in the city. 
Though assessing the Coventry BUF still-born, the city political establishment thought it better to 
err on the side of caution nonetheless and refused to in any way provide the local fascists the 
oxygen of publicity any kind of organised opposition might potentially bring27. The Coventry 
Conservative and Labour parties would maintain this position throughout the entire history of the 
BUF presence in the city. 
The Coventry BUF believed it had secured a great coup in January 1934 with the 
enlistment at the branch of H. E. B. Ludlam. As a newspaper proprietor Ludlam belonged to the 
‘entrepreneur’ occupational sub-group allocated to the ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class in Table 
3 and was prominent both locally and nationally for his promotion of the Douglas Social Credit 
theory28.In the years following World War One retired Army engineer C. H. Douglas wrote a 
series of short articles outlining an economic philosophy that quickly became known as Social 
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Credit. Douglas believed that all social ills were a product of economic problems caused by a 
shortage of purchasing power in society. The Social Credit system would solve this problem by 
ensuring there would always be sufficient money (credits) issued to the public so that the people 
could purchase all the goods that could be produced. This would be achieved through the 
introduction of three core demands: the creation of a ‘National Credit Office’ to calculate on a 
statistical basis the amount of credit required to be circulating in the British economy, a price 
adjustment mechanism that reflected the ‘real cost’ of production, and a ‘National Dividend’ to 
give a basic guaranteed income to all regardless of whether or not they had a job29.  
During the 1920s Coventry became a hotbed of support for the Social Credit theory. A 
group called the Economic Freedom League based itself in the city which focused on spreading 
Douglas’s theory among the ‘lower’ class and the unemployed and central to spreading its 
message was a newspaper the Age of Plenty, a monthly publication owned and edited by 
Ludlam30. In late 1928 the Economic Freedom League allied itself to a movement for Social 
Credit called the Kibbo Kift which was led by its founder John Hargrave. The two organisations 
agreed to set up an intermediate group called the Economic Party, with shop organisations 
established to conduct day to day propaganda work among ‘workers’. The first was established in 
Coventry with a George Hickling, an unemployed mechanic, as secretary. The Economic Party 
was undermined by intrigues and personal feuds and the scheme was soon abandoned. In the 
disorganisation Ludlam’s Age of Plenty suspended publication for two months. Not long after the 
collapse of the Economic Party in 1930 Hickling began to organise the out of work in Coventry 
into a new Social Credit organisation he named the Legion of the Unemployed. The following 
year the ‘inner elite’ of the organisation adopted a quasi-uniform of green shirt and beret, and 
they swiftly became known as the ‘Green Shirts’31. The Legion of the Unemployed proved unable 
to expand beyond a small membership and in 1932 it officially affiliated with the Kibbo Kift. The 
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ambitious Hargrave, whose ‘personality…so outshone Hickling’32, wasted little time in absorbing 
the Legion fully into his organisation. In 1933 the Legion of the Unemployed was broken up and 
the Kibbo Kift renamed the Greenshirt Movement for Social Credit33. 
 The wider Social Credit movement gave such ‘undignified’ groups no support34 and what 
little support had existed in Coventry for the Economic Freedom League and the Legion of the 
Unemployed did not extend to an endorsement of the Green Shirt Movement for Social Credit. 
What measure of popularity Hargrave’s movement did enjoy was concentrated primarily in 
Britain’s northern industrial centres. At its height, Hargrave’s movement, which underwent a final 
name change in 1935 to become the Social Credit Party of Great Britain, boasted a chain of 
sixteen groups across Britain, not one of which was located in Coventry35. 
 In common with nearly all the Social Creditors in Coventry, Ludlam wholly rejected 
Hargrave’s new Greenshirt movement. However, in Ludlam’s case the collapse of the Legion of 
the Unemployed signalled the end of his, and thus the Age of Plenty’s, decade long support for 
Social Credit theory. The newspaper proprietor and editor had decided that ‘the age of plenty’ 
could only be brought in under fascism. Many contemporary observers discerned a ‘fascist streak’ 
to the Green Shirt Movement of Great Britain; and at a superficial level, Findlay argues, this 
identification could be pardoned36. However, the ‘Greenshirts’ saw themselves as firm in their 
rejection of fascism and the BUF were in turn hostile to Hargrave’s movement and in certain parts 
of the county hostility between the rival political groups did on occasion erupt into violent physical 
clashes37. Ludlam discerned the fascism he now believed necessary to cure all the myriad ills of 
the country could be found exclusively in the Mosley movement38.  
Perhaps a crucial factor in Ludlam’s conversion to Mosleyite fascism was that it did not 
involve him abandoning in its entirety the economic philosophy to which he had adhered for the 
previous decade. Thurlow has identified Social Credit as one of the diverse concepts that 
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collectively form what he terms ‘the underground of rejected knowledge’, a reservoir of ideas that 
while incompatible with the conventional wisdom of the establishment provided much intellectual 
stimulus to Oswald Mosley during the 1920s and 1930s. For Thurlow, Douglas’s idea of the 
national dividend to aid consumer spending was ‘the main precursor and perhaps source’ for a 
BUF policy of ‘consumer credits’ scientifically directed by the Corporate State to the less 
advantaged sections of British society to facilitate a ‘consumption boom’39. BUF economists like 
Alexander Raven Thomson rejected Douglas’s key theorem as certain to create chronic inflation, 
but the fascist theorists’ principal objection to Social Credit as a system was ethical not economic: 
whereas Douglas suggested consumer credits should be every citizens’ automatic right, Mosley 
believed consumer credits should be a reward earned for making a significant contribution to the 
Corporate State40. Ludlam retained his belief that the problem of production having been solved, 
Britain was faced with the ‘fact’ that millions of its men and women were going short of the 
necessities, not to say the amenities, of life not because it lacked sufficient food, warmth and 
shelter for everyone, but because they had not the purchasing power to buy the goods modern 
industry could produce in super-abundance. However, he had reached the conclusion that it was 
‘ridiculous’ to believe that the purchasing power of the mass of consumers could be substantially 
increased without national co-ordination and regulation of production and trade, nor could it be 
achieved by monetary reform alone. The British fascism of Sir Oswald Mosley, he believed, 
offered the only plausible remedy to the discrepancy between producing power and consumer 
power41. 
The recruitment of Ludlam prompted a re-organisation and re-launching of the BUF in 
Coventry. His enlistment proved timely. Unable because of personal financial problems to devote 
the amount of time he believed necessary to the position of Organiser Coventry and 
Warwickshire Sub-Area BUF, MacDonald had recently resigned his command at his own 
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request.42 Ludlam was immediately appointed to the vacant leadership position. George S. King 
was appointed his assistant and William Stanley Woods became the Area Administrative Officer 
for Coventry and Warwickshire43. These appointments were swiftly followed by the promotion of 
Fascist W. Watkins to the position of Section Leader, Fascist T. Gorman to the position of Sub-
Branch Officer, and Sub-Branch Officer Roblyn to the position of Deputy Branch Officer44.   
Delighted at acquiring the membership of a well-known local figure, the Coventry branch 
staged a special public meeting on the evening of 16 January 1934 to announce the support of 
Ludlam and his publication45 to which the fascist press would soon take to referring grandly as 
‘the Fascist quarterly, Age of Plenty’46. At the gathering Ludlam delivered his maiden speech as 
the new leader of the Coventry BUF47.     
The conversion of Ludlam to Mosleyite fascism immediately served to raise the profile of 
the BUF in Coventry during the first half of 1934. Ludlam had gathered around him an energetic 
band of propagandists and conducted a steady six month long campaign of public meetings. 
Suddenly considered newsworthy, these meetings were covered neutrally but in detail by the 
previously apathetic Midlands Daily Telegraph48.  
The new-found interest of the local newspaper, however, does not appear to have 
reflected a surge in curiosity about the Mosley movement among the local people. The 
announcement of Ludlam’s membership came only a day after Lord Rothermere published the 
notorious editorial titled ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’ that inaugurated six months in which his Daily 
Mail supported the Mosley movement. The BUF branch in Coventry experienced a trickle rather 
than a flood of new recruits during the period of Rothermere’s sponsorship. The local fascists 
remained unable to build substantially on this and gain any significant momentum. The public 
meetings arranged by Ludlam failed to attract noteworthy attendances. Ambitions announced in 
early February to form subsidiary branches throughout Warwickshire at Warwick, Nuneaton, 
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Rugby, and Hinckley, among other places49, came to nothing. Membership of the Coventry BUF 
increased but remained small and only a minority of members were willing to engage in activities 
that would associate them publicly with the Mosley movement. The Coventry BUF proved 
incapable of raising more than three active Units, two based at the Coventry branch and the other 
based at its subsidiary in Leamington50; and failed miserably to improve on the previous years’ 
paltry contribution when asked to provide stewards to assist at BUF meetings in the wider 
Midlands and around the country51.  
As we have seen in previous chapters, A. K. Chesterton’s arrival in the Midlands had 
foreshadowed a general national re-organisation of provincial branches in April and early May 
193452. As part of organising the Midlands into a single administrative unit, Chesterton initiated a 
series of personnel changes across the region. At the Coventry branch Major James Shearer was 
promoted to an executive position53. A former member of the Intelligence Department of the 
British War Office, Shearer lived in Kenilworth in Warwickshire and earned his living as the 
publicity director at the Coventry works of Courtaulds Limited, the nationwide rayon goods and 
artificial silk textile manufacturers. As an occupational ‘type’ belonging to the ‘managers’ sub-
group he is classified as being of ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class status in Table 3. Major 
Shearer would a few years later be appointed the first National Inspecting Officer of the Mosley 
movement54. His wife Mrs C. A. Shearer had served as the Officer-in-Charge Women’s Section of 
the Coventry BUF since inheriting the position from a Mrs Holl in early March 193455. During the 
summer months of 1934 Mrs Shearer acted as Women’s Area Organiser for Warwickshire and 
Staffordshire56. 
Local press reports on Mosleyite activities corroborate the Chief Constable of 
Warwickshire’s assessment made in late May 1934 that little or no public interest appeared to 
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have been taken in the BUF in the county57. Total membership of the Coventry BUF at this time 
numbered approximately 4558.  
 
2. 1934 – 1940.  
 
Mosleyite fascism in Coventry reached what would prove to be its peak during the period of 
Rothermere’s sponsorship. In the wake of the disorderly events at the infamous Olympia rally the 
Coventry BUF would lose rapidly what little momentum it had struggled to accrue and fall into a 
sharp decline.  
 While a large contingent of Midlands members attended the infamous London meeting it 
is unknown whether any of the Coventry BUF was present. The local fascists’ meagre record on 
attending previous BUF meetings outside the immediate area suggests very few, if any, Coventry 
Mosleyites made the long journey to London. Certainly there were no Coventry blackshirts among 
the 50 stewards drawn exclusively from the Midlands region who travelled to Shropshire to attend 
a BUF public meeting addressed by Mosley at Shrewsbury on 12 June 1934. This peaceful 
gathering of an audience comprised primarily of local farmers was one of the first to host Mosley 
since the violence-marred rally in London and the BUF leader used the opportunity to accuse 
opponents and the press of grossly misrepresenting the blackshirts’ role in the disorderly events 
at Olympia59. Coventry fascists were also absent from the 30 to 40 strong ‘Midlands contingent’ 
of blackshirts who attended the first BUF meeting in Leicester of any significance which was held 
on the evening 14 June 193460.      
 The Midland Daily Telegraph was not among those newspapers indicted by Mosley at 
Shrewsbury of making ‘inaccurate accusations’ about blackshirt actions at Olympia. The local 
Coventry newspaper had refrained from covering events at the controversial rally. Subsequent 
court-cases, deputations and Parliamentary debates arising out of the violent meeting were 
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reported neutrally without editorial observations61. Pugh has challenged the established 
‘conventional’ notion that posited the haemorrhaging of BUF membership in the aftermath of the 
Olympia rally could only be explained by ‘respectable opinion’ suddenly waking up in the sobering 
light of generally hostile media coverage to the ‘real nature of fascism’ and recoiling from its 
innate brutality62. While it must certainly be recognised that nationally the general press and 
popular reaction to the disorder at Olympia was far more complicated then previously accepted, 
the experience of the Coventry BUF suggests the ‘conventional’ argument is not automatically 
without merit. In the case of Coventry the ‘conventional’ position holds true. The sudden 
deterioration of the local branch can be attributed to widespread revulsion evoked by adverse 
press publicity surrounding aggressive fascist stewarding at the controversial London gathering. 
While the Coventry press did not conspicuously dissuade local people from supporting the BUF, 
the coverage of Olympia in sections of the national media had a harmful impact on perceptions of 
Mosleyite fascism in the area. The Coventry BUF had struggled since its founding to make a 
mark on the consciousness of the Warwickshire public and in a short space of time the little 
profile it had achieved in the area became associated in the minds of local men and women with 
violence and cruelty. The Coventry BUF acknowledged the debilitating influence some of the 
national media coverage was exerting on the local public’s impressions of the Mosley 
movement63. Distressed but loyal local Mosleyites insisted the BUF was the defiant victim of an 
extensive conspiracy perpetrated by a media frantic at the Mosley movement’s rapid growth. ‘In 
the farcical outbursts against the so-called ‘brutality’ of Blackshirt stewards in daring to eject 
Communist hooligans from the Olympia,’ the Coventry BUF proclaimed, ‘we witness the ‘last 
throw’ of the liberal Press and the B.B.C. against the growing ascendancy of fascist ideas in 
Britain’. The adverse response to the events at Olympia was the latest transparent attempt by ‘an 
ingenious “stunt” press’ that had by every despicable method striven to ‘drown the voice of 
commonsense in a flood of sentiment and misrepresentation’ and prevent the BUF from being 
understood by the public. Coventry fascist anger was directed in particular at the B.B.C., which, it 
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was felt with deep indignation, was biased against Mosley and his movement: ‘If the B.B.C. desire 
to avoid stormy meetings let them invite the Leader to state his case clearly to the listening 
millions. But no! They dare not do this. They know only too well what the public response would 
be to the voice of true leadership. They will go to any lengths rather than allow our [ideas] to be 
heard’. The conspiracy would not make a difference, it was concluded; for BUF policy had already 
taken a deep hold upon the minds of the people: ‘This is no “stunt” Movement, but a Movement 
invincibly certain of its great destiny’64. 
 Fascist bravado failed to convince not only the public but also the majority of local 
members and in the aftermath of the Olympia scandal membership of the Coventry BUF 
plummeted. Departures from the movement came at a rapid rate and from every rank, including 
the most senior positions. The Leamington sub-branch closed due to declining interest. A sudden 
disappearance from all material covered relating to the BUF in Coventry after delivering an 
address at an outdoor meeting in the city at the end of June 193465 suggests Ludlam severed his 
links with the Mosley movement at the same time as Rothermere. Ludlam’s departure was not 
accompanied by the termination of the Age of Plenty’s support for Mosleyite fascism. It appears 
that the long-standing proprietor sold his rights of ownership of the newspaper to the fascist 
organisation at some point during his membership. The inaugural fascist edition of the journal 
was published in April 1934 and the series continued irregularly until it was discontinued at the 
end of October 193466. The BUF attempted to revive the Age of Plenty in July 1937 with no 
connection to Coventry67. 
A report compiled at the request of MI5 by the Chief Constable of Warwickshire on 
developments in the Mosley movement in the area during August and September 1934 reveals 
that at the beginning of August the membership of the Coventry BUF had fallen by more than half 
on its peak of only two months before. Membership stood at about 20 and the majority of these 
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members were considered ‘young local people of no standing’68. According to the local press 
these young fascists were drawn predominantly from the ranks of unskilled manual workers 
employed in Coventry’s factories, an occupational ‘type’ which is classified as belonging to the 
‘lower’ social class category in Table 3. These ‘lower’ class members reportedly formed the staple 
of branch membership during the second half of 193469. Very little interest was taken in the 
weekly meetings being held by the branch during August and September 1934 and the audiences 
attracted were ‘small and amused’70.  
The sudden decline in membership numbers in the wake of the Olympia scandal 
suggests the bulk of those who left the Coventry BUF were ‘Rothermere fascists’. Certainly the 
Coventry BUF had experienced its biggest growth during the six month period when the 
Rothermere newspapers supported the BUF. It seems that the experience of the Coventry BUF 
provides yet another example of ‘Rothermere fascists’ that accords with the image in the 
historiography of men and women joining the Mosley movement in search of a more virile form of 
a conventional political party only to drop out when the going got a little too tough for their 
sensibilities71. 
The exertion of a powerful appeal to youth has long been established as a generic trait of 
European fascism between the world wars72 and the historiography agrees that the BUF does not 
represent an exception73. Although it is possible that the ‘lower’ class young people who by early 
August 1934 had come to comprise the majority of Coventry BUF membership may well have 
been members of the Mosley movement in Warwickshire prior to the Olympia controversy, an 
alternative explanation for their presence lies in the Special Branch suggestion that while the 
violence unleashed at the London rally alienated many people throughout the country it proved a 
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‘fillip to recruitment’ by bestowing a new allure upon the BUF among a section of young people74. 
If these ‘lower’ class young members had indeed been motivated to join the Coventry BUF post-
Olympia in the hope of participating in political violence then they were to be sorely disappointed 
as all BUF meetings in Coventry during the remaining months of 1934 would pass peacefully 
without interruption of any kind75.  
Allan MacDonald, one of the few senior Coventry members during the second half of 
1934 to remain loyal to the BUF, assumed temporary leadership of the Coventry branch until a 
Branch Officer Hirst was sent by N.H.Q. in September to replace Ludlam on a permanent basis. 
Hirst had served as deputy of the FUBW at Birmingham in early 193476 and in a recognition of 
the condition of the Coventry BUF had been tasked by N.H.Q. with halting the decline of the 
Mosley movement in Warwickshire and consolidating the remaining small number of members 
into ‘a solid branch’77. While Hirst focused on administration, MacDonald was given responsibility 
for communicating the branch’s propaganda message to the Coventry public. Weekly 
propaganda meetings were held in Coventry Market Square during November and December and 
a sales squad was formed to sell fascist literature78.   
The arrival of Hirst failed to in any way improve the fortunes of the Coventry BUF. In late 
December 1934 two high-ranking officials paid a surprise inspection to the branch on their way to 
investigate the personal feuds that had plunged the Birmingham BUF into crisis. They found a 
Coventry branch in disarray. Hirst had proved unable to halt the decline of the branch and 
membership had continued to fall. Only twelve members were now willing to be publicly 
associated with the Mosley movement. The Coventry public had responded to MacDonald’s 
meetings with a stony indifference. The absence of experienced quality personnel had forced 
MacDonald to import guest speakers and general assistance from outside the area and what 
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audiences did turn up to hear what the fascists had to say remained the ‘small and amused’ 
variety. At the branch premises, which the visitors found open but unattended, were piles of 
unsold fascist newspapers and the general impression gained was of an entire lack of method 
and business-like instinct. The report complied by the two officers from London was damning. 
The position of the BUF branch in Coventry, it concluded, was ‘deplorable’79.           
 At the end of December 1934 the Coventry branch announced it had formulated a 
programme of indoor meetings and a canvass campaign which would commence in January 
193580. However, the Coventry BUF would be denied the opportunity to carry out these plans. 
During the first month of 1935 Mosley initiated an extensive nationwide reorganisation to move 
the BUF away from ‘semi-military training, designed to suppress Communist revolution’ towards a 
more conventional British political operation designed to win power through the ballot box at the 
next General Election. The control of branches was to be centralised through a system of 
headquarters inspectors who would purge the unproductive from the membership lists, close all 
fascist social clubs and strip facilities down to a small administrative office from which all political 
activities would be organised. A. K. Chesterton was the inspector dispatched from headquarters 
to supervise the transition in the Midlands and his response to the conditions he discovered in the 
Coventry branch is often recounted in the historiography81. The earliest account is provided by 
Cross in his work The Fascists in Britain, first published in 1961 and enduringly respected as 
representing the beginning of serious contemporary investigation into the BUF82. Cross writes of 
how alarmed Chesterton was to find that the Coventry branch had fallen deeply into the depths of 
the despised ‘social club’ approach to politics. The blackshirts at the branch were passively 
waiting in their club for the revolution ‘instead of sallying outside to propagate the Fascist cause’. 
The overly social nature of the branch which had come to resemble the clubs of conventional 
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political parties resulted in a furious Chesterton closing it on the spot, dismissing the branch 
officers and expelling from the movement the entire membership83.  
 While in the historiography a ‘social club’ ethos is associated with the membership 
attracted during the period of the Rothermere press group’s support84, as we have seen, at the 
Stoke-on-Trent branch ‘social club fascism’ took hold only after the departure of this type of 
member and coincided with the transfer of Chesterton from his position as Officer-in-Charge 
Midlands Area to a post at Mosley’s side at N.H.Q. Chesterton’s temporary replacement D. N. 
Revett was a poor administrator and his authority was weakened by a distracting feud with the 
new Birmingham Organiser85. The development of ‘social club fascism’ in the Coventry branch, it 
seems, mirrors the experience of the Stoke-on-Trent BUF. There is no evidence to suggest that 
the ‘‘social club’ approach’86 to politics was an aspect of the Mosley movement in Warwickshire 
prior to Chesterton’s arrival in the Midlands and during his time as the fascist leader in the region 
he kept a close watch on the branches under his jurisdiction87. As his behaviour during the tour of 
the Midlands branches in January 1935 amply displays, Chesterton was a man profoundly 
committed to the radical ideals of the fascist creed, and as such it would be uncharacteristic in the 
extreme for him to permit even the hint of ‘social club fascism’ to develop at Coventry BUF 
branches over which he exerted influence and at which he had appointed a handpicked 
representative. 
While, as we have seen in the Stoke-on-Trent case-study, Chesterton’s response to the 
conditions he discovered in the Potteries branch was an ideological over-reaction to a 
salvageable situation by an increasingly unstable revolutionary fascist, his decision to shut down 
the Coventry BUF is readily justifiable. Whereas the Stoke-on-Trent BUF possessed the potential 
to regain its former position as a significant presence in the Potteries and at the time of 
Chesterton’s visit remained one of the largest BUF branches in the country with a large 
membership of loyal Mosleyites in an area of proven latent support, the experience of the 
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Coventry BUF from its founding was that of drudgery with little reward at the periphery of 
Warwickshire life. There was nothing in the prior development of the BUF in Coventry to suggest 
the branch could ever establish itself in the city as a prominent feature of any kind, and N.H.Q. 
evidently agreed with Chesterton’s action. Only a month had passed before N.H.Q. reversed the 
decision to close the Stoke-on-Trent BUF88 but by contrast it would not be until 1936 that any 
attempt would be made to revive the BUF branch in Coventry. The shutting down of the Coventry 
BUF was, therefore, unremarkable: one of dozens of inconsequential branches closed around the 
country during the January 1935 re-organisation89. 
 The BUF was extinct in Coventry during 193590. In early 1936 BUF N.H.Q. again 
introduced a series of important changes as part of a new national re-organisation. Chief among 
these was the creation of a new administrative body, the Department of Organisation, invested 
with executive authority over every aspect of the Mosley movement’s operations91. Neil Francis-
Hawkins was appointed head of the new department and his promotion, according to Linehan, 
‘would eventually prove the most significant of the January changes’. Francis-Hawkins prioritised 
matters of organisation and sought to reform the BUF into ‘an efficient political machine on the 
basis of a technically competent administrative base’92. Shortly after Francis-Hawkins’ 
appointment a decision was made to try to revive the Coventry BUF. As with the first attempt to 
form a Coventry branch in 1933, responsibility for the endeavour fell to the Organiser of the 
Birmingham BUF. Charles Bentinck-Budd, operating out of a central office in Corporation Street, 
Birmingham, dispatched propagandists to Coventry when funds allowed93 but their infrequent 
activities were unable to attract more than a handful of new members until October 1936.      
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 The events that occurred in east London on 4 October 1936 have subsequently become 
part of British political mythology94. As Deakin has detailed, ‘the Battle of Cable Street’ has 
inspired a host of ‘local’ legends95 but the most popular interpretation in the historical literature on 
British fascism is that the forces of anti-fascism scored a crushing victory that decisively checked 
Mosley’s political campaign in the east End of London96. Linehan believes this interpretation 
requires some qualification. In contradiction of much of the prevailing wisdom on the subject, he 
has found that police reports and oral testimony provided by Mosleyites suggests that the BUF 
profited from the Cable Street affair in terms of an impressive upsurge in recruitment. Linehan 
writes: ‘the immediate portents for the BUF following the 4 October affair were extremely 
favourable. In the following week, the Mosley movement held its most successful series of 
propaganda meetings since the BUF’s inception…Just as significant was the mood of these 
audiences, which was enthusiastic and manifestly pro-fascist in orientation. The BUF’s 
membership also increased substantially immediately subsequent to the Cable Street affair’97. As 
a consequence of a fierce local anti-Communist and anti-Jewish backlash the east London BUF 
was the chief recipient of this stimulus in membership98, but Special Branch noted that there had 
been increases in recruitment in many places in the provinces also99. This argument that rather 
than irreversibly damage the Mosley movement, the Cable Street affair actually benefited the 
BUF has been contested by, among others, Kushner and Valman who contest the reliability of the 
sources utilised, particularly the Special Branch reports. According to Kushner and Valman 
‘Special Branch…had particular reason to downplay the significance of 4 October 1936. The day 
itself was…one of general humiliation for the police, and Special Branch especially wanted to 
counter Communist party claims that it represented a ‘tremendous victory over 
fascism…Ultimately, however, [the Special Branch reports] tell us more about the anti-
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Communism of Special Branch than about the growth, or decline, of the BUF’100. While there may 
indeed be some validity to Kushner and Valman’s claim, the impact in Coventry of the Cable 
Street affair nonetheless conforms to Linehan’s position. The controversial scenes in London 
increased the membership of the Mosley movement in Coventry to eight and it seems those who 
enlisted were motivated by animosity towards Jews101. Although the resultant rise in numbers 
was small it was enough for the BUF to re-open a branch in the city free from Birmingham 
supervision early in the New Year102.  
Crucial to the re-opening was the recruitment during October 1936 of 27 year old 
motorcycle enthusiast Alfred Joseph Mazengarb, who as an engineer belonged to the ‘academic 
professional’ occupational sub-group attributed to the ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class in Table 
3103. For the next two years Mazengarb would be the figurehead of Mosleyite fascism in Coventry 
and the driving force behind the branch’s activism in the city. Mazengarb rose rapidly to the 
position of branch leader and his home at 1a Foleshill Road served as the Coventry BUF 
headquarters104. The propaganda message promoted in Coventry during 1937 and 1938 focused 
on the two themes of non-intervention in foreign disputes, and anti-Semitism. The public 
response to the fascist movement over these two years would expose the minor boost in 
membership of the tiny Coventry branch in the wake of Cable Street affair as representing an 
anomaly in the normal evolution of the BUF in the area.   
It has been suggested that the banning of political uniforms when the Public Order Act 
became law on 1 January 1937 had a devastating impact on BUF membership105. However, the 
introduction of the Public Order Act had no discernable negative effect on the BUF in Coventry. 
From the start of the New Year the Coventry branch was handicapped not by legislative action 
but by a lack of experienced public speakers and an unresponsive general public. A series of 
propaganda meetings expounding Mosley’s idea of isolationism were staged during January 1937 
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but the bulk of the speaking responsibility fell upon the shoulders of Mazengarb. If speakers from 
Birmingham were unable to assist then Mazengarb would proceed as a lone voice or the meeting 
wouldn’t go ahead at all. When the personnel could be mustered to stage an outdoor meeting it 
would invariably be held on a Sunday106. A lack of speakers and indifferent response from the 
Coventry public persuaded Mazengarb that a more effective and wider reaching way of promoting 
the fascist message in the area would be through selling literature on the city high streets and 
writing letters to the correspondence column of the local press. Mazengarb and his small band of 
activists duly concentrated on using these two propaganda outlet alternatives to public meetings 
during the spring and summer months of 1937. A favourite site at which to sell literature was 
Smithford Street near Coventry Arcade and it was at this location on 22 May that Mazengarb was 
arrested for wearing a uniform signifying association with a political party, an offence under the 
Public Order Act. Charged under Section 1 of the Public Order Act, Mazengarb appeared before 
Coventry magistrates in early June where he was found guilty and fined a nominal penalty of 10s. 
The local press eagerly informed the local public that prosecution was the first of its kind in 
Coventry and only the second in the country107. The wearing in public of a dressage ensemble 
which according to the court gave Mazengarb a general appearance that was ‘outstandingly 
recognisable as being a member of the Fascist Party’108 stands as a testament to his political 
fervour for the BUF that would soon find its way into print.  
In late May 1937 the British government agreed to accept into the country 4,000 child 
refugees fleeing the Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War109. The majority of these children 
were accommodated on the South Coast but a number were housed elsewhere in the country, 
offering nearby BUF members the opportunity to promote within an immediate local context 
Mosley’s ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ message110. The Coventry BUF exploited just such an 
opportunity when the Coventry and District Co-Operative Society accepted into its care twenty 
Basque child refugees who were accommodated at Wolvey Abbey, a 900 acre estate the 
                                                 
106 Blackshirt January 2 1937, p6; Blackshirt January 16 1937, p6.  
107 MDT 9 June 1937, p10. 
108 MDT 9 June 1937, p10. 
109 MDT 21 May 1937, p7. 
110 Blackshirt 25 September 1937, p3. 
 152
organisation had been bequeathed near Coventry111, and fund raising appeals for the benefit of 
Basque children at home and abroad were launched by various Coventry organisations and 
individuals112. Throughout June a stream of letters written by Coventry BUF propagandists on the 
subject of the child refugees and associated issues were published in the Midland Daily 
Telegraph. While Mosley, as Linehan points out, did not involve his movement overtly in Franco’s 
campaign against the Republican government113, the BUF position of advocating non-intervention 
in the Spanish Civil War was in part motivated by a desire to see the Nationalist forces, with their 
minority fascist contingent, triumph in the conflict. The British fascist leader launched a sustained 
campaign in his movement’s press opposing the arrival of the Basque children114 and the 
sentiments expressed were replicated in the writings of the Coventry BUF published in the local 
press. Under the slogan ‘Charity Begins At Home’ the Coventry BUF denounced the efforts to 
assist the Basque children. While the Coventry BUF in public at least refrained from following 
Mosley’s example of demonising the children as ungrateful and violent pests115, stating that ‘we 
are not concerned with the children themselves. Having been brought here they are entitled to be 
sheltered and fed’116, it was claimed that the British people had been deceived into believing they 
would be mistreated under Franco. The Leader of the Spanish ‘rebels’, it was asserted, was a 
man of honour who could be trusted to keep a promise he had made to treat well the people of 
the Basque country117. It was an outrage, therefore, that foreigners should receive undeserved 
charity while millions of indigenous unemployed ‘poor souls’, particularly veterans of the Great 
War, and their children ‘know the pangs of hunger’ in the many deeply distressed areas of the 
country118. Rhetorical questions were posed indignantly: ‘Have we no poor and hungry in 
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England to worry about? Mosley is right when he says “Britain for the British!”119 Lancashire in 
particular was singled out as a deprived part of the country where the aid being squandered on 
the Basques would be rightfully better spent120.  
Cullen, writing on the development of BUF ideas, found that the Mosley movement was 
different from other manifestations of fascism in Europe in that it celebrated the spirit of 
comradeship and loyalty of life in the trenches of the Great War but refused to glorify war and 
although not pacifist contained a distinct outlook that could be described as ‘pacificistic or, at the 
very least isolationist’121. This element of BUF thinking intrigued the Coventry Pacifist Party and 
its members invited the local fascist leadership to a debate on Mosley’s isolationist position 
towards the Spanish Civil War. The debate was held before a small audience in a local 
community hall but Mazengarb and his lieutenants reportedly failed to impress and a further 
invitation was not forthcoming122. 
In early July 1937 the Coventry BUF launched a month-long propaganda campaign 
against Jews. The local fascist writers denounced Jews as a ‘state within a state’ undermining 
and dominating Britain in their own self-interest. It was suggested that the Jews, via their 
nefarious control of the international system of finance, were the cause of all poverty in the 
country. ‘The people who think this country is governed by the windbags of Westminster are sadly 
misled123’, wrote Mazengarb. The Jews, warned the Coventry BUF feverishly, exercised a 
stranglehold over national affairs and were working their ‘Red, pink and pale blue’ puppets in 
Parliament in the hope of fomenting a war between Britain and world fascism124. Thurlow has 
categorised Mosley’s espoused anti-Semitism as being strongly ‘neo-Lamarkian’, meaning that 
the fascist leader suggested that behaviour was governed not by race but culture and therefore 
Jews could be divided into two typological constructs ‘good’ and ‘bad’ according to their ethical 
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conduct125. This ‘neo-Lamarkian’ strand to Mosley’s anti-Semitic rhetoric was faithfully replicated 
in the Coventry BUF propaganda message. Mazengarb would repeatedly insist that the Mosley 
movement did not cultivate anti-Jewish hatred, writing that any Jew who was ready to put the 
interests of Britain before the interests of ‘International Jewry’ had nothing to fear from the BUF126. 
This campaign against the Jews marks the first publicly expressed instance of anti-Semitic 
hostility from the Coventry BUF. Although MacDonald reportedly held anti-Semitic beliefs127 there 
is no recorded example in the material available of anti-Jewish sentiment being present in the 
propaganda pursued by the Coventry BUF prior to Mazengarb’s time in charge of the branch. 
The propaganda campaigns undertaken against the Basque refugees and the Jews failed 
to increase membership numbers in the Coventry branch. When in late 1937 Mazengarb revived 
outdoor BUF meetings in Coventry the results were as disappointing and ineffectual for the 
branch as those held at the beginning of the year. Still reliant on visiting speakers from outside 
the city, Mazengarb was unable to elicit a sympathetic response from consistently small 
audiences, although his passion for the cause remained admired by his fascist peers128. By the 
end of October 1937 membership had fallen to a meagre three in number129. Brewer has written 
on languishing BUF provincial branches: ‘Being starved of success often leads to the 
exaggeration of minor incidents out of all proportion. The function is [twofold]. It helps keep the 
morale of members high while illustrating they are defiant not defeated. It might also convince 
some that the movement was larger and more effective than it really was’130. Brewer’s words 
describe the Coventry branch in early December 1937 when, as their last public act of the year, 
the entire membership waited at the exit of the Coventry Corn Exchange on a Sunday evening to 
greet with the fascist salute and shouts of ‘Mosley’ the famous left-wing publisher Victor Gollancz 
as he left the building and got into his waiting car after a pro-Spain meeting. By the time the 
Coventry fascists had written up this rather prankish episode for the fascist press, ‘Gollancz 
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Encounters Coventry Blackshirts’ had been transformed into a triumphant victory over the forces 
of anti-fascism in the area131. As the year drew to a close the Coventry fascists were struggling to 
justify the decision to re-open a BUF branch in the city.  
In 1936 Mosley began what would become known in his movement as the yearly 
‘Leader’s Autumn Tour’ where at ‘central points’ around the country branch officials gathered to 
‘have the benefit of the Leader’s advice and inspiration’132. At these conferences provincial fascist 
leaders discussed with Mosley the progress made in their areas, reported on prospects, and the 
special needs of Districts. Mazengarb was among the thirty provincial leaders, organisers and 
officials to meet with Mosley in private conference on the evening of 6 December when his 1937 
‘Autumn Tour’ made a stop at Birmingham BUF headquarters133. 
  The detail of the discussion between Mosley and the Coventry fascist remains 
undisclosed but events during the next twelve months suggest that the meeting failed to provide 
the benefits intended. 1938 would mark the final year of an organised BUF presence in Coventry. 
After the meeting with Mosley the Coventry BUF branch ceased all propaganda work in the city 
until November 1938, although individual Coventry branch members are known to have been 
present among the Midlands contingent who attended Mosley’s large meeting at Tower Ballrooms 
in Birmingham on the evening of 30 October 1938134. The fascists of the Coventry BUF branch 
were roused from their inactivity in the city when in early November 1938 the Mayor appealed for 
financial support from the local populace to aid Czechoslovakian refugees fleeing Germany’s 
acquisition of the Sudetenland135. While on this occasion the humanitarian effort would not 
involve bringing Czechs to Britain let alone housing them locally, the subsequent Coventry BUF 
propaganda mobilisation assumed a similar form to that of the 1937 campaign against the 
Basque children. Letters were preferred to public meetings and filled the correspondence 
columns of the local press until late November. Employing the familiar slogans of ‘Charity Begins 
At Home’, ‘Britain First’, and ‘Mind Britain’s Business’, the Coventry fascist propagandists 
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declared that to suggest aid of any kind should be provided to the Czech people formally resident 
in the Sudetenland was a gross insult to, and a wicked and wilful betrayal of, the unemployed and 
old age pensioners of Britain, particularly those living in the distressed areas of Northern England 
and South Wales. The Czech refugees were entirely undeserving of sympathy. As their migration 
into the Sudetenland had been encouraged by the Czechoslovakian government that had illegally 
annexed the German territory, explained an indignant Coventry BUF branch, it was the 
responsibility of the Czech government and no other nation to help them now136. The response of 
the Coventry public to the fascist anti-Czech propaganda campaign mirrored that to the Basque 
children and membership remained static137. 
 It was hoped that a visit by Mosley himself would succeed where the latest local 
demonstration of his isolationist ideas had failed. Cullen suggests that the high point of belonging 
to a branch of the BUF in the provinces was to host a Mosley meeting, writing: ‘The rousing 
oratory of the Leader in a packed hall must have been like manna in the desert to many 
struggling Blackshirts in the provinces’138. Certainly, the announcement that Mosley would be 
speaking in Coventry at the Corn Exchange on Sunday 27 November provoked great excitement 
in the Coventry fascists that spilled over into boastful public statements claiming an address by 
the movement’s leader would significantly increase the local branch membership139. 
In the days following the announcement of Mosley’s impending visit the Coventry far-left 
initiated for the first time since the founding of the fascist movement an anti-BUF campaign in the 
city but, unlike many other anti-fascist mobilisations around the country140, this Communist action 
remained strictly non-violent. In the week before the scheduled Mosley meeting the Coventry far-
left focused its energies on lobbying the city Corporation to cancel the fascist booking at the 
municipally-owned Corn Exchange, urging: ‘Coventry is to be asked to listen to the same type of 
political philosophy that has resulted in the shameful barbarities being perpetrated in Germany at 
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the present time against a racial minority….To grant the use of our halls to Fascists in order that 
they may propagate a political philosophy that has proved itself to be directed against the best 
ideals of democracy and civilisation is not in the best interests of the people of Coventry’141. 
Replying that ‘democracy should hesitate before endeavouring to eliminate unpopular political 
parties by the simple process of strangling them’142, the Corporation resisted Communist 
pressure and Mosley’s meeting went ahead as arranged.  
On the evening of 27 November 1938 the BUF leader addressed a large audience for 
ninety minutes before devoting a further thirty-five minutes to answering written and verbal 
questions. Mosley’s speech focused principally on international affairs. He insisted that Great 
Britain ‘should look after her own affairs’, although, he suggested, the possibility of a European 
peace would be heightened by forming an ‘understanding’ with Germany and Italy. A general 
defence of the Third Reich was launched amid cheers from the audience, with Mosley declaring: 
‘I have had enough of this drivelling cowardice which shows itself every time a German gets one 
inch bigger round the chest’143.   
The Mosley meeting passed devoid of incident. Although admission was free144, the 
Coventry far-left resisted the temptation to disrupt the fascist leader’s speech and chose instead 
to organise a noisy but peaceful demonstration outside the hall in Smithford Street. The 
unsympathetic crowd was cordoned off from the carriage way by police and a large section sang 
the ‘Red Flag’ and chanted ‘derisive doggerel’ at Mosley when he finally departed from the Corn 
Exchange unmolested145. 
The confidence expressed by the local fascists in advance that the meeting would boost 
the branch’s tiny membership proved to be misplaced. Mosley’s first visit to Coventry as leader of 
the BUF had failed to induce a notable number of new enlistments in the local branch. His second 
visit to the city almost five years later was similarly unsuccessful in raising membership 
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numbers146, suggesting that the large enthusiastic audience who turned out to hear the fascist 
leader were a part of the travelling ‘stage army’ described by John Beckett147. Cross also 
discusses this tactic of concentrating forces from a wide area in one particular spot, writing that in 
the provinces, where BUF branches were small and widely dispersed, the movement’s organizers 
developed a particularly efficient technique of transporting blackshirts from around the country in 
buses and lorries148. The lack of positive response among the local public in the aftermath of 
Mosley’s visit appears to have sounded the death knell for the Coventry BUF branch. For the 
remaining eighteen months before the proscription of the national movement there is not a single 
mention of fascist activity in Warwickshire in the evidence available. 
Cullen suggests that after the Olympia scandal most BUF branches in the provinces 
faced years of struggle to maintain interest, members, supporters and even their local leaders149. 
While the experience of the BUF in Coventry from mid-1934 onwards conforms to this description, 
life as a member of the Mosley movement in the city had from the beginning of the branch been 
arduous and unglamorous with precious little reward. The inability of the BUF branch to any time 
in its existence attract a substantial following in Coventry is attributable to the fact that there was 
no room in the city available to the Mosley movement in which to construct a mass base of 
support.  
The Mosleyite efforts to promote the revolutionary Corporate State were redundant at a 
time when the city was enjoying uninterrupted economic growth and prosperity150. Coventry 
during the 1930s was a ‘boom town’151. The interwar period would make Coventry’s name as one 
of the most dynamic local economies of the first half of the twentieth-century as the city became 
one of the centres of the new industries that, in the words of Thoms and Donnelly, ‘in many ways 
epitomized the new industrial Britain, standing in stark contrast to South Wales, the North West, 
Merseyside and Central Scotland’152. During the depression of 1929-1931 the Coventry economy 
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appears to have suffered little in comparison with areas reliant on the old staple industries such 
as coal, steel, and shipbuilding. Scholars have noted that the impression gained of the motor car 
production during this period is one of ‘industrial dynamism…placing the city at the forefront of the 
UK motor industry with both mass and specialist producers functioning side by side’153. The 
motor industry in Coventry experienced rapid growth during the 1930s as sales rose to record 
levels. In mid-1934, one Coventry factory turned out 3,000 motor cars in a week to meet a 
demand that had pushed up sales by 60% on the previous year154. The expansion of the motor 
car industry in the 1930s was paralleled by a similarly rapid growth and development of artificial 
silks, aircraft, and electrics and telecommunications industries. Courtaulds, the artificial silk 
production firm based at a substantial plant in Coventry, has been described as ‘one of the 
outstanding industrial successes of the period’155. Many of the car firms based in Coventry 
diversified into producing aircraft and assisted by the creation of nearby Baginton Airport156, the 
city soon became home to Britain’s emerging aero industry with Armstrong-Whitworth 
establishing itself as the largest manufacturer157. ‘The emergence of the motor, aircraft and 
electrics industries between the wars were all part of the “revolution in communications” and in a 
Coventry context this is highlighted by the rapid development of General Electric Company with 
its emphasis on radio and telephone equipment’158. Founded in 1920, by 1936 the G.E.C. in 
Coventry employed approximately 6,000 people, which constituted an increase of 4,000 people 
on 1933159.  
At the time of the founding of the inaugural BUF branch in Coventry unemployment in the 
city was approximately 5.5% while the national average was recorded to be more than double this 
percentage160. By the time of Rothermere’s infamous ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’ editorial and 
Ludlam’s adoption of the Mosleyite fascist creed in early 1934 there were only 5,131 men and 
women on the unemployment registers of the Coventry Labour Exchange, or 2.8 % of the total 
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population, a figure below the 3% Beveridge would later suggest represented full employment. A 
proud local populace would have agreed with Beveridge’s analysis, revelling in the consensus 
among the city’s financial and employment experts that Coventry was ‘one of the busiest towns 
today’ and that ‘it can be claimed that Coventry is, at the moment, very near the zero mark so far 
as unemployment is concerned’161. While at mid-1934 the national average unemployment figure 
was 16.6% and the areas hardest hit by the slump were recording local unemployment at 40% 
and over162, Coventry was booming with an out of work total of 4,000 people or a tiny 2.2% and 
these men and women, it was boasted officially by the manager of the Coventry Employment 
Exchange, were mainly composed of ‘those for whom there is unlikely to be an open labour 
market even in the most vigorous trade periods’. There was ‘every likelihood’, he added, that it 
would soon be necessary to call married women back into paid employment from ‘the semi-
retirement of the home’163. New local industries continued to be established, empty factories re-
occupied and new factories built, and existing enterprises extended. Shortages of skilled workers 
began to be reported in the building and engineering trades164. 
According to Lynam the benefits of Coventry’s economic strength in the first half of the 
1930s was enjoyed across the social class spectrum. Large numbers of the Coventry populace 
saw their standard of living rise and pay for the majority was good, with the car manufacturers in 
particular paying relatively well. Friendly relations were enjoyed between workers, management, 
and owners. Employers in general were content to increase pay if productivity was also 
increasing165. Many Coventry firm owners assumed a progressive attitude to their workforce. 
Managers such as John Black at Standard Motors have become recognised as being in advance 
of their time in paying unprecedented attention to health and safety in their factories166. Writing on 
the nature of recreation in Coventry in the inter-war period, Crump believes the confidence and 
prosperity of the local population in the 1930s was typified by the expansion of ‘brash, glossy, 
mass’ private leisure activities in the city during the decade: ‘Coventry’s rapid economic 
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growth…was the base for the development of a wide range of popular recreation with some 
distinctive local features. While the activities were much the same as those elsewhere, in 
Coventry the pattern of ownership and promotion was distinctive. It reflected a booming local 
capitalism, and catered principally for skilled and semi-skilled workers in the large firms. The 
people…had access to the leading sports and social clubs, with their new pavilions and 
refurbished ballrooms, to the super-cinemas and to commercial dance-halls’167. 
Throughout the 1930s Coventry council utilised the economic prosperity of the city to 
spend ‘vast sums of money’ on improving public services, a policy that was supported 
enthusiastically by the local population and which served to negate much potential discontent 
towards local mainstream parties and the established political system. The development of the 
new growth industries brought an increase in rateable value in the city from £811,563 in 1929 to 
£1,559,805 in 1939, and Richardson believes the use made of this money, and of additional 
government grants, is best indicated by a steady rise in the total of the city’s loan debt which by 
1939 stood at £8,864,655168. Regardless of political affiliations, successive Coventry councils 
persisted over the course of the decade in large scale building and reconstruction projects to 
improve the quality of life for residents of the city. The local authority met the demands of the 
community for both private and to a lesser degree council accommodation. A thousand slum 
houses were demolished before 1938 as part of a comprehensive five year programme to clear 
slums in the city and were replaced with ‘decent red brick working-class houses’169. During the 
1930s ‘Coventry enjoyed the fastest rate of growth in house-building in Britain’. Substantial 
additions were made to the city’s civic amenities, including hundreds of thousands of pounds 
spent on new sewage systems, road improvements, and extensions to municipal buildings. The 
council built various new elementary schools and the demands of the city’s engineering-based 
industries for increased provision in technical education were satisfied at a cost of approximately 
£140,000170. Sustained and substantial investment in public medicine, including the opening of a 
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new modern hospital in 1934, and efficient management by the city’s highly admired Medical 
Officer, ensured that the young people attending the new educational facilities were the healthiest 
in Coventry history. The city’s general health improved throughout the 1930s and consistently 
rated above the national average171. 
However, as we have seen in the Birmingham case-study, it is possible for a fascist 
organisation to successfully overcome the barrier to its development presented by an 
unfavourable socio-economic context if there was contained within a locality a deep-seated fear 
of potential or impending unemployment. In sharp contrast to Birmingham, the towns adjacent to 
Coventry in the South Midlands were similarly prosperous and cushioned from the slump172. The 
Coventry of the first half of the twentieth century was a youthful and vibrant city populated by a 
people with ‘immense self-confidence’ in their approach to industrial affairs and their ability to 
stave off potential economic adversity through innovation173. The self-assured character and 
upbeat nature of the average Coventry resident in the first half of the 1930s was commented 
upon by the writer J. B. Priestley in his travelogue of the period English Journeys, who concluded 
it had developed because ‘the famous new city of bicycles and motor cars and wireless sets…is 
one of those towns that have often changed their trades and have had many vicissitudes, but 
unlike nearly all the rest, it has managed to come out on top’174. 
When the focus of propaganda disseminated by the Coventry BUF moved during the 
second half of 1930s from that of corporatism pursued throughout 1934 to the two themes of non-
intervention in foreign disputes and anti-Semitism the local fascists were unable to find a 
receptive audience in the city. As we shall see this is explained by the fact that an isolationist 
position on foreign affairs was strongly articulated within the established Coventry polity while 
anti-Jewish rhetoric was an irrelevancy in the city. 
 Public satisfaction with the established mainstream political parties in Coventry extended 
to widespread approval of the MP who represented the city constituency throughout the 1930s, 
Captain W. F. Strickland. Hard-working, and heavily involved in social work in the city, particularly 
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through the British Legion where he was hailed as ‘the finest exponent…they had had in 
Coventry’175, Strickland offered a popular and respectable alternative to the Coventry BUF ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’ propaganda mobilisations around the Spanish Civil War and the 
Czechoslovakian Crisis. Campaigning vigorously that ‘Britain should leave Spain strictly alone’176, 
Strickland passionately promoted two arguments in defence of his position of strict neutrality 
towards the Spanish Civil War. Firstly, the moral line that Britain did not have the right to interfere 
in the domestic affairs of other nations177. The second argument was the pragmatic assertion that 
intervention would possibly lead to another European war with Italy and Germany, a war 
Strickland did not believe that at that time Britain had the military capability to win178. Strickland 
was widely acknowledged, often grudgingly by those in favour of intervention, as dutifully 
representing the voice of the Coventry people on this issue, the vast majority of whom reiterated 
through opinion polls and the local press that they believed non-intervention to be ‘the only 
possible course’ however distasteful many of them may have found the Nationalist cause179. 
Strickland’s response to the Czechoslovakian crisis was similarly well received by the bulk of 
Coventry people180. Maintaining that ‘one day we shall learn to leave these squabbles alone, 
concentrating upon our ability to settle our own problems as they arise’, Strickland asserted that 
Britain had nothing to gain from interfering in an affair in which Germany, it could be argued, had 
on this occasion right on its side. The reclaiming of the Sudetenland, it was posited, had not 
seriously affected the rights of other nations and to intervene, even in the traditional role of 
mediator, would earn Britain ‘little but odium’ and potentially lead to a European war181. The 
average man and woman in Coventry, the local press reported, were fully behind their Member of 
Parliament on this question182. 
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If the BUF’s isolationism failed to distinguish the movement, there was simply no notable 
appetite for anti-Semitism in Coventry during the second half of the 1930s. Nor, apparently, had 
there been at any time in the city’s history. A prior tradition of nativist racism was entirely absent 
from Coventry. Levine writes of the warm and mutually respectful relationship between the Jews 
and Gentiles in Warwickshire which ‘runs like a golden thread throughout the hundred years 
history of the county’183. Andreski suggests racial antagonism becomes active when a minority 
group constitutes 10% of a given location’s total population184. Never throughout its 
approximately two hundred years existence in Coventry had the Jewish community exceeded 
0.1% of the whole population. In the words of Levine in Coventry ‘the Jews were, in fact, a mere 
handful of citizens’185. During the 1930s the Jewish population of the city averaged a miniscule 
0.060% of the total population or just 120 people186. In 1938 the Jewish community consisted of 
only 35 families187. The Jewish people in Coventry were dispersed throughout the city and were 
assimilated into general society to such a degree that more traditional Jews outside the area were 
concerned that there was a potential danger that their co-religionists would eventually at best 
struggle for recognition as a community by the civic authorities and at worst abandon their faith188. 
The Jews of Coventry were not viewed as a sectional interest group in social and economic 
competition with the Gentile community but were respected and admired in recognition of the 
great contribution people of Jewish descent like Siegfried Bettman had made to the city’s 
industries, prosperity, and civic and political development. An immigrant from Germany, Bettman 
had arrived in Coventry in 1863 whereupon he founded the hugely successful Triumph Company 
producing bicycles and later motorbikes. Esteemed for his ‘benevolence and for his philanthropy’, 
Bettman was elected a Liberal councillor in 1903, served as Vice-President of the Coventry 
Liberal Association, was elected President of the Chamber of Commerce in 1907, and became 
Mayor of the city in 1913189. 
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The BUF found that there was simply no need or desire for a radical alternative in the city 
to the established socio-economic, political, and cultural system, and as a consequence the 
Mosley movement was from its very inception consigned permanently to the obscure margins of 
Coventry life. 
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Chapter Five: The BUF in Leicester, 1932 – 1940. 
 
1. 1932 – 1934. 
 
Although historically no single town or city has been able to play a particularly dominant role 
in the east Midlands, Leicester has from its founding as a Viking settlement been the area’s 
largest and most industrially active urban centre1. Located in the county of Leicestershire, the 
city of Leicester occupies a central geographical position ringed with isolated market towns 
near the edge of the county2. The decennial Census records that in 1931 Leicester 
encompassed 8,582 acres3 and its population numbered 239,1694. The city was comprised 
of sixteen municipal wards5 which were divided into three parliamentary constituencies: 
Leicester East; Leicester South; and Leicester West6. The development of Britain’s transport 
networks transformed Leicester into a major manufacturing centre and the city became one of 
the country’s principal producers of hosiery and footwear7. During the Industrial Revolution 
the hosiery industry expanded into silk weaving, cotton, lace and elastic-web manufacture8. 
Industrial diversification continued into the twentieth century with Leicester moving away from 
an emphasis on hosiery and footwear towards other industries, particularly precision 
engineering such as the production of clocks, lenses, optical goods, bicycle making and the 
manufacturing of agricultural machinery9. By the early 1930s Leicester was noted nationwide 
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for this range of industries, with no one industry any longer dominant in the city’s economic 
life10. 
Attempts to form a branch of the BUF in the east Midlands began much later than in 
any other part of the region. Ironically, Leicester was home to one of the earliest official 
members of the Mosley movement, Walter Gough, who upon hearing of the formation of the 
new fascist organisation had in October 1932 at the age of 17 written to the then BUF 
National Headquarters in King’s Round, Chelsea, enquiring about possible membership. 
Invited to London for an interview, Gough was as impressed with the blackshirts he met there 
as they were with him and his enlistment proved a formality. Gough recalled of the experience 
years later: ‘I went down to Chelsea and joined at the place, paid a shilling and you got like a 
trade union card and they put a black stamp on for a shilling. You are supposed to pay a 
shilling a month. ‘Course I turn up as the [laughing] first member for Chelsea’11.  
Gough believed that N.H.Q. judged him ill-suited to the position of Branch Organiser 
at this time and preferred to wait until a more suitable candidate from Leicester enlisted 
before authorising an attempt to form a branch in the city12. Although N.H.Q. recognised that 
as Leicester had no pre-existing personal or political association with Mosley and therefore a 
latent reservoir of support from which to draw, it probably did not expect to have to wait until 
spring 1934 before finding someone considered eligible for the position. Gough remained 
inactive, and probably the solitary member in Leicester of the BUF, until he suddenly received 
a letter around April 1934 from a Colonel O. Alwyne Brown who lived in Humberside Drive in 
the city. Brown was a recent recruit and in him N.H.Q. felt they had finally found the man 
capable of starting a branch of the fascist movement in Leicester. The two men met at 
Brown’s house and after acquiring a cadre of six new members began in early May organising 
with the aim of establishing a BUF branch in the city13. During the month before the Olympia 
meeting of 5 June 1934 the BUF in Leicester would experience rapid growth in membership 
and reach what would prove to be its peak in the city. 
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The propaganda pursued by the Mosleyites in Leicester prior to the infamous London 
rally and for the rest of 1934 focused on promoting Mosley’s idea of the Corporate State. This 
propaganda theme was disseminated through indoor and outdoor meetings, literature 
distribution, and letters written to the correspondence column of Leicestershire’s premier local 
daily newspaper the Leicester Mercury14.  
Only two outdoor meetings would be held in Leicester before 5 June 1934, with the 
local fascists during this period disseminating their message primarily through the 
correspondence column of the Leicester Mercury. The first outdoor meeting was a small, 
deliberately low-key affair at the Turkey Café, a regular haunt for the cadre of members in the 
city, on the evening of Monday 14 May 193415. The journalist who covered the event for the 
local press confessed to being somewhat surprised at the modest and sedate nature of the 
meeting, writing: ‘It was quite unlike the Fascist gathering of popular imagination. A company 
of Blackshirt supporters and others interested…listened in complete silence to an official of 
the British Union of Fascists, who gave a quiet and sober address on Fascist economics and 
ideals’. The speaker was A. K. Chesterton, Officer-in-Charge Midlands Area, who was 
supported by prominent local member Captain W. A. Porter M. C.16. Porter was a self-
employed farmer, an occupation which ascribes him ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ social 
class status in Table 3. Another self-employed farmer among the Leicester membership was 
a J. Tramall17. Chesterton’s speech concentrated on detailing ‘the various workings of the 
Corporate State’18. 
The Turkey Café was again the location when the Leicester members of the BUF 
held their second outdoor meeting on the evening of Monday 28 May 1934. A letter from 
Mosley was read in which he urged that self-abnegation and the spirit of service in the fascist 
movement should be remembered by all his followers in the city. ‘All Fascists must remember 
that their task is the greatest that has ever been undertaken in our land’, the fascist leader 
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wrote. ‘Fascism is a dynamic creed of the modern age, is destined to awake in the hour of 
decay and surrender a mighty will of the race which has always known how to bring triumph 
out of adversity’. Also during this meeting arrangements were made for a ‘big fascist 
gathering’ to be held in the city’s Oriental Hall on 14 June 1934, at which it was hoped to 
officially inaugurate a branch of the BUF in Leicester19. 
It was not because of the threat of disruption by organised opposition that the 
Leicester Mosleyites staged only two outdoor meetings in the city in the short period of time in 
which they were active prior to the Olympia scandal. Organised opposition to the local fascists 
came solely from a range of left-wing organisations in the city, all of which believed that 
‘fascism was just another form of Capitalism, and if workers did not unite against it, they 
would have to suffer’20. While the Conservative response to the presence of Mosleyite 
fascism in the city was to ignore it21, the Leicester Labour Party, the Leicester Independent 
Labour Party, and the Leicester Communist party and its front organisations, immediately 
began challenging the spread of BUF propaganda in Leicester. These groups refused to co-
operate with each other but their respective campaigns nonetheless assumed an identical 
form. All believed at this stage that the most effective way of countering the growth of the BUF 
in Leicester would be through the local Mosleyites’ own most favoured medium: the 
correspondence column of the Leicester Mercury. The anti-fascist counter propaganda 
adopted the line of argument that the ‘Incorporate State’ as it was dubbed was merely a 
collection of vague and woolly ideas and was in practice unworkable. Evidence for the alleged 
fatal flaws in corporatism was provided by the low wage rate in a fascist Italy that had that 
very year acknowledged a huge deficit in its Budget22. 
The Leicester BUF felt it appropriate to respond to the anti-fascist criticism and a 
series of letters were written to the Leicester Mercury by P. D. Turner, chief Propaganda 
Officer in the city. Turner was a former activist for the New Party in Birmingham who initially 
joined the BUF as a result of an enduring idolization of Sir Oswald Mosley as man and 
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leader23. Linehan has noted that this motivational reason for enlisting in the fascist movement 
was common, writing: ‘Many individuals were enticed into the party by Mosley’s presence 
alone. In many ways, Mosley was the quintessential charismatic fascist leader-figure, the type 
whom masses of individuals were drawn towards throughout continental Europe between the 
wars’24. As Turner immersed himself in the new movement his absolute personal devotion to 
Mosley, which he continued to express in fervent tributes to the man in the fascist press, 
expanded into a passionate embracing of his idol’s fascist ideas25. Turner produced lengthy 
expositions in reply to the suggestion that the concept of the Corporate State lacked coherent 
detail26. The troubled state of the Italian economy was deemed worthy of only brief attention 
in his writings, swept comfortably aside as the natural consequence of the corporate system 
spending the vast sums of money needed to regenerate Italy from the chaos into which it had 
fallen before the rise of Mussolini. Turner conceded that wages had fallen but accused his 
opponents of neglecting the fact that rents and the cost of living generally had been reduced 
in Italy under the fascist regime27. Cullen has noted that the BUF was highly sensitive to the 
suggestion that its ideas were a foreign importation28, and Turner insisted that although there 
existed ‘certain fundamentals’ to fascism such as the Corporate State the development of a 
fascist movement in an individual country was ultimately shaped by national culture much in 
the same way that socialist parties in two different countries could share common values and 
beliefs but had assumed differing political forms29. ‘What British fascism teaches’, the 
Propaganda Officer wrote, ‘is what matters for Britain’30.   
 The organised opposition was unable to prevent the number of BUF members in 
Leicester rising rapidly to approximately 100 by the days immediately prior to the Olympia 
scandal31. The evidence suggests that the membership at this time was composed primarily 
of occupational ‘types’ allocated to the ‘lower’ and ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ social 
class categories in Table 3. Gough recalled that the greatest influx of recruits had come from 
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two groupings: young people and self-made local businessmen32. According to the local 
press the vast majority of the young people who had joined the BUF in Leicester were manual 
workers in various local factories33. However, not all of the young fascists in the city belonged 
to the occupational sub-groups 1 and 2 which form the ‘lower’ social class category. Both the 
Security Services and the Blackshirt noted that a small number of men in the Leicester branch 
were undergraduates at the University College in nearby Loughborough where a fascist group 
was organised under the supervision of schoolteacher and local Unit Leader R. G. Jagger34. 
Members who belonged to the occupational sub-group ‘students (upper school/university)’ are 
allocated ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class in Table 3. An apparent ability to appeal to the 
young is a generic fascist trait35. For many young people fascism represented, in the words of 
Linehan, ‘a rebellion of youth against age and the perceived old and decadent bourgeois 
world of tradition, compromise and delay’36. For Gough it was this disillusionment with the 
existing political system and old political parties in which they could see no hope that 
motivated a large number of the young people in Leicester who enlisted in the ranks of the 
BUF37. While Skidelsky points out that a sizeable proportion of fascist leaders throughout the 
country were in their twenties or thirties38, Gough believed that his own youth was less 
attractive to N.H.Q. than a record of military service, and this was why he was overlooked for 
the position of inaugural Leicester Organiser in favour of Colonel Brown. Colonel Brown, he 
claimed, was representative of most of the ex-servicemen, usually veterans of the Great War, 
who joined the BUF in Leicester pre-Olympia: ‘After about twelve or thirteen years they were 
getting into their fifties and sixties and they retained their intense patriotism and they always 
wore their ribbons and things like that and always retained their handles that they had in the 
war’39.  
According to Gough the local businessmen he claimed were heavily represented in 
the Leicester branch were shopkeepers and small independent traders, occupational ‘types’ 
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who form the ‘merchants (self-employed)’ sub-group listed in Table 3 and belong to the 
‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ social class category. Apparently these businessmen felt 
unable ‘for occupational reasons’ to declare their political persuasion at that time and so 
refrained from publicly endorsing the Mosley movement or allowing their membership to 
become known outside the ranks of fellow recruits. As we have noted in previous chapters 
this reluctance to advertise their allegiance to the BUF appears to have been a common 
characteristic among many businessmen fascists. Gough recalled that it was the Corporate 
State’s ‘fantastic’ objective of nationalist economic autarky which attracted to the local BUF 
the ‘considerable support’ of significant numbers of shopkeepers and small independent 
traders in Leicester during May and the early days of June 1934. He explained: ‘They were 
very much dependent on the preservation and development of the home market you see. Our 
simple [idea] at that time that we don’t import anything from anywhere that can be made in 
this country was sound economic sense and they joined us purely on the economic simplicity 
of the programme because at that time…the Labour party and… National Government as well 
were tending towards free trade’40. Interestingly, while in Leicester the Mosley movement 
attracted a noticeable level of endorsement among shopkeepers and small traders as early as 
mid-1934, the BUF nationally did not make a determined play for their support until 1935 
onwards that developed in a more systematic manner during 1938 and 193941. 
Local anti-fascists believed that coverage given to the fascist movement in the 
national press exerted a noteworthy degree of influence in generating support for the BUF 
among shopkeepers and businessmen in Leicester. Concern was expressed about the 
influence of ‘certain sections of the Press, who are backing up the foreign fascist movement in 
this country’ and were ‘shouting about…octopus and big-business methods’, prompting many 
opponents of the BUF in Leicester to ask: ‘Why this concern for the small trader’42. That the 
national press shaped public feeling in Leicester towards the Mosley movement would be 
confirmed when its reporting of the Olympia scandal severely undermined Mosleyite fortunes 
in the city.    
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2. 1934 – 1940. 
 
The experience of the BUF in Leicester from Olympia onwards was that of terminal decline. In 
the immediate wake of the disorderly events in London membership numbers plummeted43. 
This abrupt collapse is attributable to adverse news coverage in the local and national press 
associating the BUF with violence in the mind of the Leicester public. In common with many of 
the national newspapers the response of the local press to the events at Olympia was, in the 
words of Gough, ‘vehement’44. An indignant Leicester Mercury declared that ‘hooliganism at 
public meetings must not pass without censure’ and proceeded to brusquely condemn the 
actions of the fascists as alien to the constitutional traditions of Britain that had for 
generations enabled conflicting interests to debate in ‘perfect security’. The stewarding at 
Olympia was an example of ‘organised violence’ and as such should not be tolerated ‘under 
any circumstances’. The editor expressed the hope that the ‘full force of public opinion’ would 
now be directed against the BUF but inserted the caveat that such action must be ‘moral 
rather than physical’45. The senior officers of the Mosley movement in Leicester recognised 
that the hostile press coverage was exerting a crippling effect on local public perceptions of 
the BUF and on the loyalty of its membership in the city. A damage limitation exercise was 
launched that was directed as much at local members as at the wider Leicester populace. 
Meetings were held at the Turkey Café for local Mosley supporters at which a Colonel H. F. 
Crocker from N.H.Q., and Major and Mrs Shearer who, as we have seen, held the positions of 
Officer at the Coventry branch and Women’s Area Organiser for Warwickshire and 
Staffordshire respectively, gave short addresses about the disturbances at Olympia and 
answered questions. The speakers reiterated the official BUF account of the controversial 
events, explaining to the local Mosleyites assembled that ‘reports of rough handling by 
Blackshirts were greatly exaggerated’46. The disorder exhibited, the Leicester members were 
told, was sparked by organised Communist agitation: ‘The violence was created from outside, 
it definitely wasn’t the blackshirts themselves, they were provoked and they were trying to 
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preserve the freedom of speech’47. Gory tales of Blackshirts sustaining disfiguring facial 
injuries were relayed as evidence of the brutality unleashed indiscriminately against innocent 
stewards by ‘Red’ thugs48.                      
Fascist figures from outside the area were required to provide pro-BUF eye-witness 
accounts of the Olympia disorder because few members from Leicester had actually attended 
the London rally49. One of the local fascists who did travel to London and was involved in the 
meeting was Walter Gough and in the aftermath of the event he was assigned the 
responsibility of disseminating the Mosleyite perspective on the disorder to the local press. 
Gough informed the readers of the Leicester Mercury that as a participant in the activities 
inside Olympia he was able to place before their eyes ‘the facts’ about the mass rally. He 
wrote: ‘The Blackshirts held the biggest political meeting ever attempted. The overwhelming 
success of this significant rally has scared certain sections of the Press so much that, unable 
to answer the case of Fascism in fair debate, they have debased themselves to publishing 
sensational lies, alleging brutality by the Blackshirt stewards’. Rather than view the disorder at 
Olympia as a setback to the fascist cause, the people of Leicester were advised to recognise 
the incident as a triumph in the defence of the British tradition of freedom of speech 
threatened by the forces of Communism. Gough crowed that in the light of fascist actions at 
Olympia the BUF now stood alone ‘as the only trustworthy guardian of our national liberties’. 
From some time previous the Communist Party had openly advertised its intention of 
wrecking the Olympia meeting, and from the outset there was organised ‘Red’ interruption to 
the speech. Unfortunately interruptions became so frequent that force had been necessary to 
prevent the meeting from being smashed up. ‘Let it be known’, Gough appealed to emphasise 
his point, ‘that it was not questions that were shouted, but wails of “Down with Mosley,” and 
screams of the “Internationale”’50. Gottlieb has noted that the BUF ‘made great currency’ out 
of highlighting the common anti-fascist tactic of ‘using provocative women to act as 
interrupters and hecklers at Blackshirt meetings’ as alleged evidence of their male opponents’ 
‘impotence’51, and this practice is evident in Gough’s sneering statement: ‘And as is 
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customary with Reds, they used women to do their dirty work!’ While the teenage Mosleyite 
emphatically denied that any of the stewards or blackshirts in the audience carried weapons, 
he claimed that the Communist agitators were armed and belligerent: ‘I saw hooligans 
actually draw “knuckledusters,” razors, socks full of broken glass, and bricks, and savagely 
slash at our stewards. No wonder half a dozen Blackshirts were required to deal with each 
dispenser…Would any Britisher tolerate such disgusting tactics?’52  
Attempts to negate the adverse publicity directed towards the BUF in the local and 
national press appear to have proved fruitless. Within the space of a week after the Olympia 
rally a mass exodus had reduced the Leicester membership to a rump of 30 people53. The 
haemorrhaging of membership under the glare of publicity generated by events in London 
suggests the majority of people who had joined the Mosley movement in Leicester were 
‘Rothermere fascists’: anti-socialists, disillusioned former Tories, and the politically 
inexperienced young54, all of whom had been attracted to the BUF on the back of the Daily 
Mail’s endorsement hoping to find a virility perceived as lacking in the mainstream parties but 
who abandoned Mosley after Olympia ‘because the new movement proved to be too exciting 
for their taste’55.  
Pugh has written that the media and public reaction to the Olympia disorder ‘even in 
the immediate situation’ was more complicated than previously thought, citing among his 
evidence Special Branch reports compiled at the time that suggest that the violence 
witnessed at Olympia heightened the allure of the fascist movement among young people and 
the militantly anti-Communist56. Special Branch advised:              
so far from causing widespread indignation…it provided an unprecedented  
fillip to recruitment. For the next two days people of different classes queued  
up from morning until night at the National Headquarters at Chelsea. A working  
man among the recruits remarked on the mixture of ex-officers, public  
schoolboys and working men, and the general admiration in the queue for the 
organisation of the Blackshirts and their determination to preserve the right of  
free speech57.  
   
In contrast to the bustling scenes described at the fascist door in West London, the violent 
actions at Olympia inspired only two new members to join the Mosley movement in Leicester. 
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While both new recruits fitted Pugh’s profile of being young men, neither was inspired to enlist 
by hatred of Communism or a determination to preserve the British tradition of freedom of 
speech. Gough recalled the two men were motivated by an attraction to the excitement 
engendered by potential physical confrontation, but their enlistment was more the product of a 
boyish thirst for adventure than what Brewer called ‘the appeal of the cosh and castor oil’58 to 
men of violence: ‘[the new recruits] thought “oh here’s a good thing to [join]”, rather like joining 
a football supporters group, here’s an opportunity to get into a fling of active life for young 
people’59.       
 Over the remainder of the decade these two young men, if they stayed in the Mosley 
movement, would have found plenty of opportunity to sample the ‘active life for young people’ 
available within the ranks of the Leicester BUF, beginning with events surrounding the first 
fascist meeting of significance in Leicester which was held on the evening of 14 June 1934. 
Arrangements for the gathering in the Oriental Hall, Leicester, had been made in late May 
when it had been announced the meeting would mark the official inauguration of a BUF 
branch in the city and a headquarters was to open at 84 London Road60. The meeting went 
ahead as scheduled and passed without interruption inside the hall where an audience of 150 
listened as Birmingham BUF leader and Midlands Area Organiser A. K. Chesterton delivered 
an address on the general principles of the Corporate State that lasted for two hours. Outside 
the hall, however, a hostile crowd had gathered under the banner of the Leicester Anti-Fascist 
Movement61.  
Formed in the days following Olympia, the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement consisted 
of the local Communist Party and its front organisation the National Unemployed Workers’ 
Movement; the Guild of Youth, which was the youth wing of the Independent Labour Party; 
the Unemployed Broad Council, a local organisation that embraced workless men and women 
of various political creeds; and a small number of prominent figures within the Leicester 
Labour Party. In joining the Anti-Fascist Movement these Leicester Labourites were ignoring 
the party’s officially established policy of non-engagement with the Mosley movement and 
non-association with the Communist party in the campaign against fascism. The national 
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Labour leadership prohibited association with the Communists on the grounds that 
‘communism stood for as ruthless a form of dictatorship as fascism, and that it was ludicrous 
to ask those who believed in democracy to unite with those who did not in the struggle against 
dictatorship’, while it was believed in addition that the adoption of the Communist-approved 
‘extremist’ policy of confronting fascists on the streets would serve only to accelerate the 
growth of fascism in Britain62. Interestingly, however, it does not appear that any of the 
Labour transgressors were ever censured in any way by either the local or national Labour 
party, even though their participation in direct action against the Leicester BUF was publicly 
acknowledged on many occasions. The total membership of this organised movement in 
Leicester numbered several hundred and its express aim was to constrain the growth of 
fascism in the city through the systematic harassment of local fascists and disruption of 
Leicester BUF meetings, violently if necessary63. The Anti-Fascist Movement in Leicester was 
not a front organisation for the Communist Party, which was small in the city and historically 
unimportant64. A confidential Home Office report compiled later in the decade for the Home 
Secretary following a conference with the Chief Constable of Leicester suggests it was a 
genuine reflection of widespread left-wing anti-fascist resentment ‘among a very large section 
of the working class population’65.  
In the days immediately before the Oriental Hall gathering notices were chalked in 
different parts of the city declaring local anti-fascists’ intention of breaking up the BUF event66. 
It had been originally planned by the BUF that the meeting in the Oriental Hall would be 
preceded by a large march through the main streets of Leicester, which as Cross has pointed 
out was a standard practice when the Mosley movement was inaugurating a new branch67. 
However the procession was cancelled on police advice when it was realised the fascists 
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would have to pass a counter-demonstration in Leicester Market Place and the anti-fascists 
were proposing to follow the fascist column ‘some distance behind’ to the hall68.  
When the announcement had been made prior to Olympia that the Oriental Hall 
meeting was being arranged it was anticipated that several hundred blackshirts from across 
the Midlands would participate in the procession through Leicester to advertise the event 
before serving as stewards inside the hall69. It is illustrative of the decline of the Mosley 
movement membership in Leicester, and that of the wider Midlands BUF generally, that on 
the occasion of the Oriental Hall gathering barely 50 blackshirts could be raised, most from 
Birmingham and only ten from Leicester70. If these ten blackshirts are assumed to represent 
the total active membership in Leicester, then utilising Webber’s ratio of one active member to 
every one-and-a-half non-active members71 suggests the total BUF membership in the local 
area at this time had fallen to 25. During the time the Mosleyites had been holding their 
meeting, a series of Communist speakers took turns to address a large and enthusiastic anti-
fascist crowd at the Market Place next door. When the Communists concluded their speeches 
the anti-fascist demonstration moved the short distance to outside the Oriental Hall where a 
donkey in a black shirt was being paraded up and down the street and the crowd of several 
hundreds sought to drown out the fascist speakers with booing and hissing. At the close of 
the BUF meeting the attitude of the demonstrators became more aggressive. As the fascists 
began leaving the building they were greeted with storms of booing and a cordon of police 
endeavoured to keep the crowd back. Fascists and anti-fascists came to blows as the 
blackshirt contingent began parading around the block of buildings where the meeting was 
held and a man was knocked-out in a back street. Elaborate precautions to prevent trouble 
had been taken by the police, and at the first hint of disorder a special posse of reserves were 
rushed to the scene and immediately proceeded to clear the streets. The police then escorted 
the travelling blackshirts through hostile crowds without interference to a motor-coach waiting 
nearly a quarter of a mile from the hall, and the Leicester blackshirts were accompanied by 
police officers to the newly taken branch headquarters at London Road. It is likely that but for 
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the intervention of the police the small complement of blackshirts would have found 
themselves the focus of a full-scale riot72.  
The hostile demonstration and resulting disorderly events at the Oriental Hall meeting 
were a foretaste of the anti-fascist strategy that would dog the BUF in Leicester for the 
remainder of its existence. From mid-1934 onwards nearly every single BUF meeting held in 
the city other than those held inside the branch headquarters would be subjected to organised 
and effective disruption. The uncompromising campaign of hostility waged by the organised 
anti-fascist Left in Leicester over the course of the decade would prove highly successful and 
provided a barrier to fascism which the BUF branch in the city struggled to overcome. 
In late August the Leicester BUF announced it had mapped out a ‘comprehensive 
programme’ of propaganda work to be conducted over the autumn of 1934. The 
dissemination of BUF propaganda was considered ‘one of the biggest jobs’ for fascists in the 
area and outdoor meetings rather than letter writing were now identified as crucial in 
spreading the Mosley message73. During September and early October 1934 a series of 
meetings to promote the BUF Corporate State were arranged to be held in the Market Place 
and at the Victoria Park gates, Leicester’s traditional centres for open-air political meetings. 
Occasionally a speaker from the Birmingham branch or outside the Midlands region would 
share the platform with the local fascist orators74. The presence of upwards of 800 angry 
demonstrators from the organised anti-fascist Left ensured that these meetings were 
humiliating and chaotic failures. The fascist speakers were unable to make themselves heard 
above incessant booing and barracking. At several of the meetings blackshirts were assaulted 
despite a heavy police presence, and the likelihood that serious disorder would develop 
compelled the police to intervene and clear the crowds. On the evening of 7 September the 
fascists felt sufficiently threatened to address the hostile crowd from behind a barricade of 
wooden benches and stalls. At the end of each meeting police protection was required for the 
fascists to march unmolested back to the branch headquarters with large angry crowds 
following behind the small blackshirt procession, resisting police attempts at dispersal. On 
each occasion the police made attempts to turn back the crowd by forming hand-chains 
                                                 
72 LM 15 June 1934, p8. 
73 Blackshirt 24 August 1934, p10. 
74 NA: HO144/20145, p120, 129; LM 20 November 1934, p9. 
 180
across the principal thoroughfares, but the majority of the men and women evaded this 
measure, forcing the police to form a cordon outside the Leicester headquarters building and 
keep guard over the fascists inside for the remainder of the evening in anticipation of an 
attack75.  
  The impact of the organised anti-fascist Left’s ‘physical force’ tactics during the 
second half of 1934 on BUF development in Leicester was devastating. The disorder created 
by the hostile demonstrators reinforced in the mind of the average Leicester citizen the 
alienating association between the BUF and political violence that had taken root in the 
aftermath of the Olympia scandal. Gough recalled: ‘The success that the opposition…had in 
creating violence [meant] that every meeting then was to be picketed and disrupted wherever 
possible, so we were faced then with organised opposition throughout and the reputation got 
round that the blackshirts were troublemakers because every meeting they had was trouble’76. 
Fear of continued disorder prompted the civic authorities to prohibit the fascists from holding 
meetings in outdoor locations traditionally associated with political discourse in Leicester. The 
disturbances throughout September and during early October 1934, coupled with the 
declared intention of the organised anti-fascist Left to cause ‘further and more serious 
disturbances’ at all future open-air fascist meetings in the Market Place and at the gates of 
Victoria Park, had convinced the Chief Constable of Leicester, O. J. B. Cole, and his senior 
officers that ‘there was a risk of serious breaches of the peace occurring’ if the fascists 
continued to use these respective locations for their meetings. The Chief Constable 
accordingly decided to inform the local Mosleyites that their meetings would not in future be 
permitted in the Market Place, or at Victoria Gates but that their meetings could be held at 
‘suitable sites’ away from the places that had been the scene of the disturbances77. 
Correspondence thereupon followed with William Joyce, Director of Propaganda, at N.H.Q. in 
the course of which the Chief Constable explained the reasons for his decision78. Chief 
Constables did not at that time possess statutory power to forbid the holding of meetings on 
sites which had been traditionally used for that purpose, and this fact was pointed out to Cole 
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by a typically acerbic Joyce. However, despite veiled threats of legal action Joyce conceded 
that the BUF were unwilling to enter into ‘legal quibbles’ at this time and grudgingly submitted 
to the police decision on the condition that the Chief Constable identified the replacement 
site79. As Pugh has noted, ‘this was a shrewd way of ensuring that the police would accept 
responsibility for controlling any counter-demonstration’80. After consultation with Propaganda 
Officer Turner the Chief Constable allocated a site for fascist meetings in the Haymarket 
about 400 yards from the Market Place81. While the following year upon the arrival of a new 
branch Organiser the Leicester BUF would appeal against the Chief Constable’s decision82, it 
appears that in late 1934 the local fascist leadership was quite satisfied with the 
arrangements made by the police for the holding of open-air meetings in Leicester83. Pugh 
suggests that while the BUF was in general permitted to police its own indoor meetings, at 
outdoor meetings the Chief Constables ‘adopted a more consistently interventionist policy’. 
The police had no legal right to prohibit fascist meetings, hence their reluctance to intervene 
too frequently, but in practice often endeavoured to regulate the time and location84.     
The Chief Constable’s decision to ban the Leicester BUF from using the Market Place 
and Victoria Park gates for outdoor meetings appears to have been motivated more by a fear 
of Communist growth in the city than an expression of anti-fascist feeling. In a series of 
consultations with a Home Office wary of the legality of the Leicester police action it was 
conceded that the fascists in Leicester in 1934 were the law-abiding targets of unprovoked 
assault. A senior civil servant advised the Secretary of State: ‘The position would no doubt be 
different if disturbance of the peace was the natural consequence of the acts of the Fascists 
taking part in the meetings in the Market Place, but, so far as we are aware it was the conduct 
not of the Fascists, but of their opponents which gave rise to apprehension of disorder’85. The 
Chief Constable expressed deep concern that whilst the Communist Party had ‘comparatively 
few adherents’ locally ‘a little Communist eloquence’ could potentially transform the 
‘considerable anti-fascist following’ in the area from an anti-BUF coalition into a pro-
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Communist ‘trouble making mob’86. With every disrupted BUF meeting, he suggested, 
support for the Communists was growing87. In fearing a fascist presence only in so much as it 
could serve to stimulate the growth of arch-rival Communism, the Chief Constable of 
Leicester was articulating sentiments shared by the Security Service, with MI5 warning at the 
end of November 1934 that nationally the most unfortunate effect of BUF activity hitherto had 
been ‘the fillip which it has given to the Communist movement’88.        
The fear of ‘anti-fascist demonstrations and consequent trouble’ compelled Leicester 
council to refuse to let the sizeable DeMontfort Hall to the BUF for a Mosley meeting that the 
fascists hoped to stage on the evening of 26 November 193489. An earlier application for 
Mosley to speak at the Hall on the evening of the 9 November had been accepted, and the 
organised anti-fascist Left in Leicester had arranged a ‘big meeting’ to coincide with the 
fascist leader’s first ever political appearance in the city90, but the fascist meeting arranged 
was cancelled owing to the hearing of summonses against Mosley at a court in Worthing91. 
The Leicester fascists were hoping that a visit by their leader would have a rejuvenating effect 
on local morale and recruitment92. As we shall see below, the Leicester BUF was in these 
respects in dire need of inspiration. Explaining its unanimous decision, the cross-party 
committee responsible for the letting of public halls in Leicester stated it feared that if a BUF 
meeting were held ‘there might be large crowds outside and counter-demonstrations…We 
also considered the possibility of people…smashing up the meeting’93. The committee could 
find no insurance company willing to insure the historic Hall and its grounds against the risk of 
damage for this meeting, stating: ‘We are mindful of the fact we are the custodians on behalf 
of the citizens of Leicester of that beautiful building, and its lovely surroundings….we felt we 
could not take the risk of having damage done to them’94. Furious fascist allegations that a 
politically-biased council were ‘capitulating to the worst elements in society’ and admitting ‘the 
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administration of affairs in Leicester is controlled by the mob’95 were spiked by the 
committee’s offer of the Granby Hall as an alternative venue for the same date96. The 
leadership of the Leicester BUF spurned the offer of Granby Hall, claiming that N.H.Q. 
believed a Mosley meeting at this much larger venue could not be organised on time, and an 
alternative date offered in the middle of December was ‘too near Christmas’97.             
The organised anti-fascist Left, by creating disturbances at BUF meetings, succeeded 
in driving fascist gatherings off the streets of the city of Leicester until summer 193598. 
Although the Leicester BUF had agreed to the allocation of the Haymarket site, it seems the 
local fascists had no desire to experience further confrontation with the forces of militant anti-
fascism in the city and preferred the comparative calm and safety of meetings advocating the 
Corporate State outdoors in outlying districts of Leicestershire and inside at the branch 
headquarters in the city. During the final quarter of 1934 fascist propagandists from the 
Leicester BUF travelled to small villages and towns on the outskirts of the county like Ratby, 
Oakham, Loughborough, Market Harborough, and Melton Mowbray, where impromptu 
outdoor meetings and sales drives would be staged undisturbed, usually in the market place if 
one existed99. When the Leicester BUF activists were not holding these outdoor meetings 
during late autumn and winter 1934 they were busying themselves inside the local 
headquarters at 84 London Road delivering propaganda addresses, organising speaking 
classes and holding fund-raising events. Every Tuesday night a lecture was given by a 
Mosleyite speaker either from within the ranks of the Leicester BUF or from outside. On 
Thursday nights speakers’ classes were provided which were described as ‘severely practical’. 
Early December witnessed the first whist drive held by the Leicester branch. Members of the 
Leicester general public were free to attend all these events except the speakers’ classes but 
entry was carefully vetted to prevent infiltration by disruptive elements100. 
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The spoiling tactics of the organised anti-fascist left had successfully prevented BUF 
public speakers from reaching an audience of any size or enthusiasm during the second half 
of 1934. Shifting its propaganda meetings off the streets of the city enabled the Leicester BUF 
to operate for a period without fear of disruptive opposition but achieved little or nothing in 
terms of successfully spreading the fascist message. The audiences attracted to hear the 
fascist expositions on the Corporate State proved disappointingly small and apathetic101. The 
sole propaganda outlet that allowed the Leicester BUF to reach a wide audience during the 
second half of 1934 was the correspondence columns of the Leicester Mercury and a steady 
stream of propaganda letters promoting corporatism appeared in the local press from mid-
June until September102.    
  Membership of the Mosley movement in Leicester had plummeted in the week 
following the disorder at the Olympia scandal and continued to fall over the second half of 
1934. The decline of the Leicester BUF was noted by the Chief Constable of Leicestershire 
who reported to the Security Service as early as mid-July 1934 that ‘the fascist movement is 
practically negligible in the county’103. At the end of September 1934 the BUF branch in 
Leicester consisted of six members only104.  
Among this tiny pool of fascists was prominent local political activist Mr Swinfield-
Wells, who until he defected to the BUF in mid-June 1934 had been a well known figure in the 
Leicester Labour party and a familiar face on various socialist forums including the Leicester 
Unemployed Board Council, a deputation of socialists who served on the city council as 
representatives of the out of work105. In his reconstruction of the BUF presence in east 
London, Linehan discovered that a number of ‘joiners’ had been active in the Labour Party 
prior to enlisting in the Mosley movement. Instrumental in recruiting these members was their 
protracted disillusionment with the Labour Party’s tendency towards moderate politics during 
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the preceding period, and the attraction of Mosley’s radical new policies for social change and 
national regeneration106. Similarly, Swinfield-Wells in Leicester had become thoroughly 
disillusioned with the Labour party at the local and national level and believed that Mosley’s 
brand of fascism, like socialism, offered a utopian solution to the problems afflicting British 
society. In explaining his decision to join the BUF Swinfield-Wells informed the people of 
Leicester that the Labour leaders were absolutely indifferent to the plight of the working class, 
the Labour Party lacked any constructive policy, and that the local Labour leaders with few 
exceptions were ‘more concerned with their own petty affairs and jealousies than the people 
they boast they represent’107. That Swinfield-Wells decided to join the BUF in the aftermath of 
the Olympia disorder during the period when local membership of the Mosley movement was 
collapsing suggests, perhaps, an additional motivating factor was a personal disgust at 
Communist-inspired political violence. Swinfield-Wells certainly harboured an intense dislike 
of Communism108, while the son of John Beckett suggests Communist attacks on meetings 
addressed by his father on an ILP platform played a motivational part in the ex-MP later 
joining the BUF. In the early 1930s the Communist Party operated under the so-called ‘class 
against class’ policy wherein all its rivals on the left were attacked as ‘social fascists’. J. T. 
Murphy, a leading Communist who left the party in 1931, recalled: ‘The history of not a few 
ex-Communists and ex-members of the ILP who became members of Mosley’s organisation 
is due to that process’109.    
The conversion of Swinfield-Wells to fascism astonished the local population and 
made him a special focus for the anger of the anti-fascist Left in Leicester who alternately 
branded him ‘traitor’, ‘Worse than Ramsay [MacDonald]’, and ‘Joseph – the man with the 
political coat of many colours’110. Swinfield-Wells became an active public speaker for the 
Mosley cause in Leicester during early to mid-autumn 1934 but addressed only one meeting 
in the city before the branch moved its propaganda activities indoors at headquarters or out 
into the small isolated districts111. The solitary meeting in question was held at the Market 
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Square in early September but as had become customary the audience was dominated by 
the presence of a typically hostile anti-fascist crowd and the fascist speakers’ words were 
inaudible above constant jeering and shouting112. 
 While a noteworthy figure in local politics and an active propagandist, Swinfield-Wells 
failed to bring new members with him into the Leicester BUF and the branch continued to 
decline during the duration of his membership, which terminated in April 1935113 and appears 
in this case to corroborate Rawnsley’s suggestion that ‘those members of the Labour 
movement who joined the BUF seemed on the whole to have flirted with fascism rather than 
to have experienced a deeper commitment’114. 
The operation of the branch in Leicester apparently met with the approval of A. K. 
Chesterton when he visited as Midlands Inspector at the beginning of January 1935 during 
the recently launched nationwide re-organisation to inject a new spirit of austerity and 
activism into the BUF. In stark contrast to the experience of the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent and 
Coventry, social club fascism had been entirely absent from the Leicester branch since its 
founding. While numerically tiny at the time of Chesterton’s inspection tour of the Midlands 
and unable to establish itself as a credible feature of the local political scene, the cadre of 
members who remained loyal to the Mosley movement in Leicester had persisted in actively 
propagating a fascist propaganda message. This demonstration of dedication in the face of 
overwhelming public hostility would have undoubtedly appealed to Chesterton’s profound 
belief in fascism as a heroic revolutionary creed whose adherents in the words of an article he 
wrote shortly after returning from his inspection tour were ‘implacably determined to make no 
peace with the bad, old world’115 and explains why the Leicester branch received the 
endorsement to continue to function while many branches, like Coventry, which were similarly 
small and marginalised but had become nothing more than social clubs where the members 
were passive and politically inactive were closed down throughout Britain during the early 
1935 national re-organisation116.  
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The BUF would maintain an active presence in Leicester until mid-1938 and from 
1935 onwards the remaining local fascists would focus their energies on constructing an 
efficient electoral machine in pursuance of the movement’s new conventional political strategy 
and launching propaganda campaigns advocating British neutrality in foreign disputes. 
However, in a break with the tradition established from the earliest days of BUF propaganda 
dissemination in the city the Leicester fascist message would cease to be promoted through 
the correspondence columns of the local press. Letters published in the Leicester Mercury 
had proved popular among the Leicester BUF as an outlet for spreading its propaganda 
agenda but when Propaganda Officer P. D. Turner was forced to withdraw from activism 
owing to illness in early 1935 it appears that there was a not a single local fascist willing or 
able to continue this method of promoting Mosley’s ideas which Turner had utilised since 
before the branch’s inception. The inability to find an adequate replacement for Turner 
suggests a lack of propaganda talent among the small handful of fascists who had remained 
loyal to the branch following the haemorrhage in membership suffered over the preceding six 
months.  
From late winter until late spring 1935 the Leicester BUF continued to avoid 
propagandising on the streets of the city, preferring as it had since autumn 1934 to stage 
meetings inside the branch headquarters and outdoors in the outskirts of Leicestershire117. 
The political activity of the branch during the first months of 1935 was supervised by Area 
Deputy Propaganda Officer Captain Roberts, who was appointed temporary branch organiser 
upon Captain Brown resigning from the Mosley movement at the beginning of the year118.     
In early April the branch moved from London Road to new premises in the Florence 
Building, St Nicholas Street, which were officially opened by Lady Mosley, accompanied by 
Midlands National Inspector S. C. Symes119. The move coincided with a minor re-organisation 
of key senior positions in the branch, with C. E. Joyce becoming District Officer, Walter 
Gough appointed District Treasurer, and Charles Leslie Till promoted to Area District 
Officer120. The first major task undertaken by these men in their new roles was at short notice 
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to organise the first ever Mosley meeting staged in Leicester. On the evening of Sunday 14 
April 1935 Mosley delivered an address at the Granby Halls121. The fascist leader’s speech 
unfolded as a unrelenting tirade against ‘Jewish international power’ which according to the 
local press was up to that time one of the most strident ever made by Mosley in the provinces 
on this theme122.  
This speech by Mosley and two addresses made by William Joyce at meetings in the 
city in 1936123 represent the only occasions on which a representative of the BUF present in 
Leicester would express to a public audience hostility towards Jews. Ideological anti-Semites 
were present in the Leicester BUF during the second half of the 1930s. Gough recalled: ‘It 
was generally recognized at that time…the power they held in Marks and Spencers and all 
the big shopping concerns and means of distribution, the control of newspapers. 
Rothermere…had to give this [the BUF] up after three months because he lost all his 
advertising from all these Jewish business houses see and that was the bread and butter of a 
newspaper you see, so that forced him out’124. Leicester Mosleyites who harboured anti-
Jewish hostility did not, however, reveal their enmity in public. The theme of anti-Semitism is 
entirely absent in the material available on the propaganda output of the Leicester BUF and 
other activism conducted in the presence of the local populace from the inception of the 
branch in the city until the proscription of the Mosley movement in June 1940. Leicester 
fascist speakers at public meetings in the city appear to have steadfastly avoided mentioning 
Jews, a situation which in the immediate aftermath of the ‘Battle of Cable Street’ so enraged 
one young local anti-fascist he promptly assaulted violently at an otherwise peaceful outdoor 
gathering a Leicester BUF propagandist who persistently refused to answer his question 
‘about what the fascists were going to do with the Jews’125. The refusal of the Leicester BUF 
to be drawn into discussing ‘the Jewish Question’ had been earlier observed with fury by 
another representative of the local organised anti-fascist Left who complained bitterly to the 
local press that ‘it is tact that gives us this barren silence on the question of the treatment to 
be meted out to…racial minorities’ and suggested that to gain an accurate picture of the 
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Mosley movement’s attitude to Jews the people of Leicestershire should read a fascist 
newspaper rather than listen to local fascist speakers126. The maintained absence of anti-
Semitic rhetoric in Leicester BUF propaganda over the second half of the 1930s was noted by 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews127. It is doubtful that the promotion of anti-Semitism in 
Leicester would have attracted notable support for the local BUF branch. Andreski’s model of 
internal change suggests that anti-Semitism becomes active in a host community when Jews 
number one-in-ten of the total population128. In Leicester Jews were a tiny minority. In 1938 
there were only 330 Jewish people living in Leicester, a population density of just 0.128%129. 
The Jewish population of Leicester was not easily identifiable as a physical or cultural 
presence in the city. Widespread assimilation and residential dispersal meant that most Jews 
in Leicester were indistinct from the Gentile majority130. There was no tradition of anti-
Semitism in the region’s socio-political or economic system and the average local citizen was 
proud of this attitude of tolerance131.   
On the significance of Mosley meetings to the provincial membership Cullen writes: 
‘Undoubtedly, the high point of belonging to the BUF in the provinces was to attend, or, better, 
to belong to the branch hosting, a Mosley meeting’132. Gough validates Cullen’s observation, 
recalling: ‘In the early days of the branch the leaders meeting was our greatest ambition’. The 
excited branch membership welcomed the visit by Mosley as an opportunity to experience ‘an 
epic achievement worthy of all efforts’ and an encouragement ‘to give our all to the cause’133. 
However, the reality for the Leicester branch of hosting a Mosley meeting proved a deep 
disappointment. The BUF failed to fill the 6,000 capacity Hall, with the audience numbering 
1,500134. Gough recalled that ticket sales for the meeting had been disastrous and only two 
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hundred were sold in advance135. The remainder of the undersized audience was comprised 
primarily of the ‘great stage army’ of imported BUF activists described by John Beckett136.  
The inability of the BUF to mobilise mass support from the local people to sell-out the 
largest Hall in Leicester stood in embarrassing contrast to the efforts of the city’s organised 
anti-fascist Left. From the moment the Leicester BUF announced the arrangement of 
Mosley’s visit in a large expensive advertisement published in the Leicester Mercury in early 
April137 the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement initiated extensive steps to organise a counter-
demonstration outside the Granby Hall and disrupt the meeting inside. On the evening of the 
Mosley address Leicester Market Place was the scene of a preliminary anti-fascist meeting 
which was followed by a march in procession under a banner bearing ‘Unite against Mosley’ 
to the Granby Halls where the marchers, who numbered around 150, joined with up to 9,000 
protestors who had gathered outside the venue138. An organised anti-fascist presence in the 
hall systematically disrupted Mosley’s speech throughout his address, with shouts, jeers, and 
in the words of Gough a ‘barrage of howls’, often drowning out the speakers’ voice139. 
Proceedings were further interrupted when attempts by fascist stewards and the many police 
officers on duty at the meeting to eject protestors triggered numerous fights in a number of 
places in the Hall at the same time and chairs were brandished around the venue. Additional 
scenes occurred and fights broke out at the conclusion of the meeting and spilled out of the 
entrance onto the street. If it had not been for skilled police handling inside and outside the 
Hall the disorderly scenes might well have escalated into a riot140. Although the police 
officially absolved the blackshirt stewards of culpability for the disorderly scenes at the 
Granby Halls meeting and attributed the blame solely to pre-meditated anti-fascist aggression, 
according to the local press the clashes at the Mosley meeting reportedly served to 
compound deeper in the mind of the average Leicester citizen the prevailing disreputable 
association between the BUF and political violence141. 
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The presence of fascists from London, Oxford, Bedford, Wellingborough, 
Northampton, and several other cities explains the rapturous applause that greeted Mosley’s 
anti-Semitic statements in a city where a tradition of antagonism towards Jews was absent 
and the local BUF branch had studiously avoided introducing ethnic hostility into its public 
propaganda work142. The importation of fascists from outside Leicestershire also explains 
how the attendance of a large and ostensibly enthusiastic audience could fail to translate into 
fresh enlistments in the local branch. Mosley’s appearance in the city had humiliatingly failed 
to excite the people of Leicester and the spurning of the opportunity by all but a minority to 
hear the fascist leader speak reflects the almost total lack of appetite for fascism in the city 
against which the members of the local BUF branch had been fighting, and losing, a war of 
attrition since the beginning of the year. Where Webber suggests that sales of the fascist 
press represent the level of latent support for the fascist movement in any given locality143, in 
late January 1935 Special Branch reported that sales of the Blackshirt in Leicester were 
‘practically nil’144. The meetings held by the Leicester BUF in the three months of the New 
Year prior to Mosley’s visit to the city had been as ineffective as those conducted over the 
second half of 1934 with the audiences gathered to hear the fascist speakers at headquarters 
and in the outlying districts being similarly tiny and unresponsive. Writing on BUF branch life 
Brewer noted ‘being starved of success often leads to the exaggeration of minor incidents out 
of all proportion’145 and this mindset became prevalent in Leicester during the first quarter of 
1935 with the branch considering it newsworthy to report to the fascist press when the interest 
of the people had been gained rather than their support won. A ‘promise’ by three people at 
the end of a meeting to become members of the fascist movement was considered an 
incident worthy of celebration146. 
 In mid-1935 the Leicester branch of the BUF was as peripheral as it was unpopular, a 
seeming irrelevancy to the lives of all local residents except the handful of harassed members 
who continued to faithfully promulgate the Mosley message and its opponents in the 
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organised anti-fascist Left147. It was a situation that would endure until all fascist activity 
ceased in the city in mid-1938, and it was into this unappetising environment that C. Hillman, 
an officer at N.H.Q., was despatched by the national leadership in July 1935 to replace Brown 
as Organiser of the Leicester BUF148. Hillman’s first action upon arriving in the city was to 
challenge ‘on a question of principle’ the Chief Constable’s ban on fascist speakers 
addressing audiences in the Market Place and at the Victoria Park gates. The Chief 
Constable informed the fascist Organiser in an interview that he ‘still thought it necessary to 
maintain his prohibition’ in the interests of the city generally, and upon receiving the full 
backing of the Secretary of State officially declined to lift his ban. However, the offer of the 
use of the Haymarket as an alternative site remained on the table149.  
Although the Director of Blackshirt Organisation Neil Francis-Hawkins believed the 
Chief Constable had taken an action that appeared to be in excess of his statutory powers the 
Mosleyites had no intention of forcibly resisting the ban or of making the prohibition the 
subject of a test court case150. Fascist disappointment at the refusal of the Chief Constable to 
permit BUF meetings to be held in the Market Place and at the Victoria Park gates was 
tempered by the knowledge that the alternative location offered to them at the Haymarket in 
the city was, in Hillman’s assessment, ‘a central site and a good one’151, and a promise from 
the Chief Constable that he was prepared to arrange adequate police protection for fascist 
meetings to be held on the alternative site with officers instructed to deal with any disorder on 
the part of anti-fascist interrupters152.           
 It was at the Haymarket site that the branch resumed outdoor propaganda meetings 
in Leicester when at the beginning of August 1935 the BUF launched its Abyssinian peace 
campaign. Gough provides a summary of the local branch’s position on Mussolini’s invasion 
of the African state:  
 Our simple policy there was…[Italy] was an Empire which didn’t got no  
Empire at all, which like England had to expand or explode and they were  
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going to take over what to me was nothing more than a desert area anyway  
for exploration and development. So it was a question of keep out of  
Abyssinia and we had to. There was a threat that England might have gone  
into war you see as it was brought up at the League of Nations at that time  
and they wanted sanctions against Italy so the meetings we had during that  
period were all on the one theme…The err colonists of the day, Empireists of  
the day saw that Italian war not as an err flagrant breach of freedom but as  
an err legitimate colonisation and err to go to war over a thing like that was 
considered unconceivable so we launched a Keep Britain Out Campaign153. 
 
The entire branch membership of six mobilised to promote the message of non-intervention in 
the Italo-Abyssinian conflict and despite the sparse number managed reportedly to stage 
several outdoor propaganda meetings a week at the Haymarket throughout August and 
September, often in inclement weather. The frequency with which the meetings were staged 
slackened as the international crisis eased during October154. The return of local fascist 
activists to the streets of Leicester failed to make a noticeable impression on the citizens of 
the city. Crowds attracted to the Haymarket gatherings numbered in single figures and 
humiliatingly for the local fascists were often outnumbered by the police who were posted in 
the vicinity in case there was trouble155. The absence of crowds could not be blamed upon 
fear that the propaganda meetings would descend into disorder as in Leicester the ‘Mind 
Britain’s Business’ campaign passed peacefully without a single meeting suffering anti-fascist 
disruption. The explanation for why the local fascists were able to disseminate their 
propaganda in public in Leicester without molestation for the first time since before the 
Oriental Hall disorder lies in a fear among the leading members of the Anti-Fascist Movement 
that any attempt at interruption would involve clashes with the extra police now on duty at 
these events which could prompt the Chief Constable to extend his prohibition on fascist 
gatherings at the Market Place to include anti-fascist meetings156. The Anti-Fascist Movement 
did not resume its policy of disruption and harassment until early 1936.  
The peace campaign was followed at the end of autumn by a fresh re-organisation 
that divided Leicester into three districts: East, South, and West. Headquarters were 
established in each district, ‘usually street corner shops which were rented for ten bob a 
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week’157. The Leicester East HQ was located at 1 Beaumont Road; the Leicester South HQ 
was opened at 205 Marlborough Road; and the Leicester West HQ was founded at 140 
London Road. A Central Office housing the local District Inspector and County Propaganda 
Officer was also located at 205 Marlborough Road but was distinct from the Leicester South 
headquarters158. Owing to the local fascists focusing on this re-organisation outdoor 
propaganda meetings in Leicester promoting the fascist movement’s isolationist attitude to 
foreign disputes were a rarity during the final two months of 1935. The meetings staged were 
desperate affairs, with Gough and Till trying vainly to attract an audience that numbered more 
than a handful of passing people159. The fortunes of the Leicester BUF at this time had fallen 
so low it was considered newsworthy to report to the fascist press when a crowd ‘remained to 
the end’160.       
 The re-organisation had been initiated as part of the movement’s ambition of 
establishing an efficient electoral machine capable of contesting a future General Election in 
every parliamentary constituency in the country. Crucial to this new conventional political 
strategy was the task of canvassing, which Gottlieb describes as ‘a challenging occupation 
which demanded faculty for persuasion’161, and it was on this aspect of orthodox electoral 
machinery in Leicester that the local fascists concentrated their energies unmolested during 
the first four months of 1936 until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War triggered a new 
national peace campaign in the late spring162. The Leicester fascists in setting about the task 
of canvassing utilised the ‘street-block system’ developed by the Nazis and advocated by 
BUF N.H.Q. where a ward was sub-divided into blocks of houses with each block under the 
charge of an individual blackshirt who in turn reported to a ward leader163. Gough recalled of 
his time as a ward leader during canvassing campaigns in Leicester:   
The idea was that in our electoral ward we had the map and you had a block  
of five or six streets… and all these streets were solid streets of houses,  
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people living in them…You were responsible for house to house. You were 
responsible with any surplus members you could get living in that area to  
canvas the area so you built up a picture of everybody that lives there…ask  
who votes and who it supported and build it up so you’ve got quite a big  
library of information there…164
 
Although the handful of remaining Leicester BUF members were instructed in the block-house 
system by Hillman, who was recognised in the Mosley movement as an expert on the subject 
and in 1938 would be appointed National Electoral Instructor, the canvassing campaign in 
early 1936 was supervised by Charles Till who shortly afterwards became Leicester 
Organiser when Hillman was unexpectedly recalled to N.H.Q165.  
 The Leicester BUF took a temporary break from canvassing during the summer of 
1936 to undertake a propaganda campaign against British intervention in the escalating 
Spanish Civil War. Total membership now stood at five166. In his study of East End branches 
Linehan found that some members engaged in unofficial demonstrations of open and active 
support for the Spanish Nationalists, including the commandeering of Republican vessels 
docked at British ports167. The miniscule membership of the Leicester branch was strongly 
pro-Nationalist and while it abided by the official BUF stance of non-intervention in foreign 
conflicts sympathy for the Franco regime inspired the renaming in 1938 of the main 
headquarters in the city ‘Alcazar House’ after the Spanish castle which Franco’s men 
defended successfully for nearly 18 months against Communist assault168.  
Gough recalled that the only local people to take an interest in the ardent propaganda 
efforts of the small band of loyal Mosleyites campaigning against British involvement in the 
Spanish conflict were the supporters of the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement169. Enraged by 
the plight of the Left in Spain, the organised anti-fascist Left in Leicester disrupted the 
Mosleyite branch’s series of small propaganda meetings held throughout the summer at the 
Haymarket with an intensity that came as a surprise even to the local fascists170. The 
organised anti-fascist Left had also been the only people other than the membership of the 
local Mosleyite branch and fascists imported from Birmingham and London to attend a BUF 
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meeting addressed by William Joyce at the Leicester YMCA in mid-January 1936. Supporters 
of the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement interrupted the meeting throughout its duration and 
the event ended with fighting between stewards and protestors at the back of the hall. Joyce’s 
typically acerbic speech, which focused primarily on condemning the Government for its 
‘undignified behaviour’ during the Abyssinian Crisis, concluded with a brief exposition on the 
‘great danger’ of a ‘Hebrew’ plot to manipulate Britain and France into declaring war on 
Germany, rhetoric that constitutes only the second recorded example of anti-Semitism being 
promoted by a fascist speaker in Leicester171.  
The disorderly scenes witnessed at the Leicester BUF meetings in the Haymarket 
and at the Joyce gathering in 1936 were recreated on a much larger scale when Mosley 
visited Leicester for the second time to address an audience at the Granby Halls on the 
evening of 24 May. A large audience of local people had gathered to supplement the 
‘travelling army’ of imported fascists present in the hall but the majority preferred not to sit but 
stand at the back of the hall having, in the assessment of a respected local journalist, 
‘obviously come for the purpose of seeing some excitement’. With the plight of the Spanish 
Left uppermost in the mind of its supporters the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement were 
determined that Britain’s leading fascist would be denied the opportunity to spread his 
message in person in the city. Mosley was interrupted from the very outset of his speech by 
protestors shouting anti-fascist slogans. Attempts by blackshirt stewards to remove the 
interrupters triggered melees throughout the hall and the gathering descended into chaos. 
Long before the customary question time near the conclusion of the meeting the hall was half 
empty. Outside at the end of the meeting Mosley was bundled into a waiting car and driven 
away at speed while bus loads of fascists leaving the city were ‘hooted’ by a hostile crowd 
that had gathered around the building, where they sang the ‘Red Flag’172.  
Organised anti-fascist agitators continued to violently disrupt propaganda meetings 
held by the Leicester BUF in the Haymarket until October, on several occasions managing to 
evade the police protection present and charge the speaking platform to physically assault the 
few fascists conducting the gatherings173. The beleaguered Mosleyite branch as it had under 
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similar circumstances in late 1934 retreated for the final two months of the year away from the 
hostility confronting it on the streets of Leicester city and into the comparative safety of the 
branch headquarters and the outlying districts of the county. A change of location failed to 
improve the public response to the propaganda theme of non-intervention in foreign disputes. 
As they had been at the end of 1934 the audiences attracted to Leicester BUF indoor 
meetings at branch headquarters and at impromptu meetings in isolated villages like Coalville 
were miniscule and indifferent174.  
 In the words of Gough the Leicester BUF ‘plodded on’ during 1937 but over the 
course of the year even the handful of doctrinal fascists who had remained loyal to the 
movement over the course of the previous two years in the face of unrelenting organised 
hostility and general public apathy, began to question the value of continuing to expend their 
time and energy working for the Mosley cause in Leicester175.            
 At the end of 1936 and in early 1937 Mosley announced the names of 100 fascist 
candidates and the respective Parliamentary constituencies it was intended these men and 
women would contest at the next General Election. 1937 began for the Leicester BUF with 
N.H.Q. informing the local press that a Charles Beauclerk had been selected to stand as 
prospective BUF candidate for the Leicester West division at the next parliamentary 
election176. Beauclerk had no connections whatsoever to Leicester and news of his 
appointment came as a complete surprise to the local branch which had not been consulted 
on this matter177. As a member of the ‘students (upper school/university) occupational sub-
group Beauclerk is ascribed ‘elite or upper-middle’ social class status in Table 3. The 
incumbent secretary of the Fascist Association at Cambridge University where he was 
studying, he had been educated at Eton and became an enthusiastic admirer of Nazism while 
attending Munich University in 1932. After reading The Greater Britain upon his return to 
Britain he joined the BUF in 1933 and immediately began active propaganda work in South 
West London178. After the announcement was made over the heads of the resident branch 
that Beauclerk was to contest a local seat at the next General Election he was never heard of 
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again in Leicester and his candidature appears to have been quietly dropped, corroborating 
Pugh’s suggestion that many of Mosley’s 100 electoral nominees had been put forward 
exclusively for temporary propaganda gain at a specific time in the movement’s history: 
‘Mosley boasted one hundred fascist candidates. These included some highly respectable 
names….As the new Public Order Act was about to come into force this announcement was 
timely, for adoption of candidates went some way to discrediting accusations that the 
Movement was aiming to acquire power through violence’179. Gough conceded the 
appointment of Beauclerk represented a short-term publicity stunt, stating: ‘It was just a case 
of appointing a candidate’180.  
 The Leicester BUF spent the first seven months of 1937 pursuing the building of a 
ward organisation capable of efficiently contesting either a council or parliamentary election at 
some time in the future, whoever the candidate at that unforeseen point might be181. The 
branch’s work was severely undermined by a debilitating lack of numbers but the handful of 
members turned out every Thursday, Friday, and Saturday evening to canvass streets in 
Leicester. The fascist press was fulsome in its praise of the ‘outstanding’ canvassing work 
performed by the ‘small band of stalwarts’182. The canvassing campaign passed without anti-
fascist disruption, the provisional nature of the activity denying to the movement’s opponents 
the opportunity to organise in advance or even be aware it was taking place. However, this 
minor victory over the forces of anti-fascism in Leicester failed to prevent the resignations of 
two of the remaining handful of branch members so that by autumn 1937 the Leicester BUF 
was reduced to longstanding leading officers Till, Joyce and Gough.  
In October 1937 Gough replaced Till as Organiser of the Leicester BUF although the 
latter remained an active member of the branch. Gough would retain the position of leader of 
the Leicester branch until the Mosley movement was proscribed. The sole noticeable 
alteration made by Gough to the organising of the Leicester branch over the remainder of 
1937 was the inauguration of weekly propaganda meetings held directly outside the front door 
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of the branch headquarters in Marlborough Road. The choice of location indicated the extent 
to which the remaining trio of members felt vulnerable to attack by the organised anti-fascist 
Left in the city, with the meetings seemingly staged in such a way that the fascist speaker was 
able to immediately retreat into the protection of the branch premises should violent 
interruption break out183. However, Gough, Joyce and Till need not have feared for their 
physical safety at this point in the history of the BUF branch in Leicester. After years of 
sustained opposition and direct action the organised anti-fascist Left believed that the ‘Mosley 
menace’ in the city had been effectively eradicated and the trio of remaining members were 
engaged in activism sufficiently insignificant as to no longer warrant attention184. From this 
period onwards the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement pledged to devote its energies 
exclusively to campaigning against the ‘gangsterdom’ of Nazi Germany185.   
From 1938 onwards the Leicester BUF branch entered into the final stage of the 
sustained decline it had suffered since the aftermath of the Olympia scandal. In January the 
three district headquarters opened in late 1935 were closed and the branch returned to 
operating out of a single small premises. The new Leicester headquarters was located at 187 
Wellington Street. Owing to the membership consisting of only three people the branch 
premises were closed until the end of the working day186, while active political work on the 
streets was limited to Tuesday evenings. Gough, Joyce, and Till attempted to maintain a 
campaign of canvassing and meetings staged directly outside the front door of 187 Wellington 
Street187 but by mid-1938 the efforts of the trio of remaining fascists had petered out and all 
political activity on behalf of the BUF in Leicester appears to have come to an end. While 
Joyce and Till retired from radical politics at this point, Gough remaining passionately loyal to 
the Mosley movement but finally accepting that Leicester had become barren ground for the 
fascist message departed the city and worked around the country as a speaker at BUF 
meetings until ceasing all political activity on the occasion of the outbreak of World War Two. 
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The final public fascist meeting addressed by Gough was held in August 1939 at Portsmouth 
Docks188.  
 The Leicester BUF was unable to reverse or even check over the second half of the 
1930s what proved to be a terminal decline triggered initially by the local public response to 
the Olympia scandal. The violence-marred meeting in London created an unfavourable image 
of fascism in the minds of many Leicester people which severely undermined the local fascist 
branch’s ability to present the Mosley movement as representing a legitimate and necessary 
alternative to the established political parties in the city. Over the course of the second half of 
1934 and then from 1935 onwards until all fascist activity ceased in the city this crucial ability 
was eroded further by anti-fascist opposition and the promotion of propaganda themes which 
failed to resonate with the local populace. 
 The Leicester branch perhaps suffered for being founded so much later than many 
other BUF branches in the country. Although it experienced rapid growth it had little time in 
which to establish itself as a credible presence in the political life of the city and foster an 
enduring sense of loyalty among significant numbers of the membership before the disorderly 
events of 5 June 1934. The lack of time in which to develop a deeper foothold in the city must 
have made it easier in the immediate wake of the Olympia scandal both for local members to 
walk away and for the local public to accept the media depiction of the BUF as a violent 
organisation. The collapse in membership numbers prompted by the disorderly scenes in 
London left the remnants of the local movement highly vulnerable to direct forms of anti-
fascist opposition. The sustained and uncompromising campaign of disruption of Mosleyite 
activities perpetrated by the Leicester Anti-Fascist Movement from mid-1934 onwards 
constituted a powerful barrier to the subsequent development of the local BUF branch. The 
aggressive opposition of the organised anti-fascist Left limited the potential audience for 
Mosley’s ideas by making it extremely difficult for the Leicester fascists to organise in the 
public outdoor locations associated with reputable local politics, drained the morale and 
enthusiasm of even the most ardent activists, and crucially saddled the local branch members 
with the public blame for the ensuing violence and disorder.  
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 This anti-fascist barrier may not have proved insurmountable, however, if the fascist 
message disseminated in Leicester post-Olympia had been of pertinence in the area. 
Unfortunately for the Leicester branch the themes upon which it focused its propaganda 
energies were, in the prevailing local context of the periods in question, irrelevant and unable 
to exert any notable appeal. 
The propaganda theme of the Corporate State was pursued over the second half of 
1934, a period when the local economy was beginning to recover strongly from a downturn 
triggered by the Depression. Although the diverse nature of Leicester’s industrial structure 
had protected the city from the worst of the economic crisis the level of unemployment 
experienced by local people up to mid-1934 was acute and was widely acknowledged as 
such189. At the time of the official founding of the BUF branch in the city the total number of 
men and women out of work locally stood at nearly 16,000190. However, mid-1934 proved to 
be a turning point in the strength of the local economy. The number out of work peaked and 
then started to fall rapidly over the remainder of 1934 as Leicester emerged from the slump it 
had suffered since 1930 and entered a record breaking run of economic prosperity and levels 
of employment that lasted until late in the decade191. This improvement was mirrored in the 
cities and towns adjacent to Leicester in the east Midlands192. By the end of 1934 
unemployment in Leicester had fallen by 30% on the figure recorded in the month before the 
Olympia scandal and it was reported that the general feeling locally was that the depression 
in Leicester was over193. The local press would soon reflect upon the optimism and 
confidence in the existing liberal democratic system which the people in the city and the 
county had expressed over the second half of 1934194. A recovering economy and trust in the 
established political institutions from mid-1934 until the end of the year rendered fascist 
proposals for a Corporate State unnecessary. 
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The theme of non-intervention in foreign disputes, upon which the Leicester BUF 
focused its propaganda output from 1935 until mid-1938, was of little interest to the people of 
the city. The cultural character of Leicester during this period in which the local BUF was 
active was extremely insular in outlook, a fact which was a long-standing source of irritation 
and consternation to the local political elite. Leicester people were apparently uninterested in 
foreign affairs, despite the efforts of the local MPs and councillors to persuade their fellow city 
men and women to adopt a more outward approach to life. This disinterested attitude to 
events outside of British shores was reportedly deeply rooted in Leicester history195. Harold 
Nicholson, one time member of the New Party and in the second half of the 1930s the MP for 
Leicester West, believed he spoke for the leadership of all the established political parties in 
Leicester when he lamented in late 1938 the ‘aloofness’ with which the ‘remote city’ had 
consistently regarded international events since his arrival in the municipality in 1935196. The 
apathy of which he complained was reflected in the Leicester Mercury. A review of the local 
press from the founding of the national BUF reveals a distinct lack of attention to international 
affairs until the Munich Crisis of September 1938, by which point all fascist efforts in the city 
had been abandoned. 
Local people had nothing to gain by joining the BUF in Leicester during the second 
half of the 1930s. Without an appealing message capable of boosting its membership 
numbers the tiny Leicester branch was condemned to operating in harassed obscurity on the 
cultural and political fringe of the city until it was extinguished in mid-1938.  
                                                 
195 LM 21 October 1935, p12; LM 15 March 1937, p12; LM 18 March 1937, p14; LM 21 October 1937, 
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196 LM 21 October 1938, p18. 
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Conclusion. 
 
The aims of this thesis were twofold. The first aim was to produce a detailed examination of 
the emergence and development of the BUF in the Midlands between 1932 and 1940. The 
second aim was to test and contribute to arguments about the Mosley movement in the 
secondary literature relating to three themes: (a) the social class composition of BUF 
membership; (b) the strength of BUF membership; and (c) the focus of BUF propaganda. The 
evidence gathered in the preceding case-studies generates the following reflections on these 
themes in relation to the local and national Mosley movement. 
 
(a) The social class composition of BUF membership in the Midlands. 
 
The deployment of an enhanced version of the conceptual model utilised by Linehan and 
Mitchell to identify the social class composition of BUF membership has provided a valuable 
insight into the types of people attracted into the ranks of the Mosley movement in the 
Midlands. Adoption of this methodological approach to appraise recruits to the BUF in 
Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester has revealed that the fascist 
membership in the region was not dominated by any one social class. The portrait of a 
‘typical’ BUF member being someone of ‘middle class’ social status as employed by Cross 
failed to hold true in the Midlands. In conformity with the findings of the other detailed major 
regional studies, the evidence gathered about the emergence and development of the Mosley 
movement in the region demonstrates that the Midlands BUF was diverse in terms of social 
class composition. People from all the social classes represented in the conceptual model 
responded to the fascist appeal in the Midlands. ‘Lower-middle and middle-middle’ class 
members appear to have comprised the largest local social class contribution between 1932 
and 1940. However, enough members were recruited from outside this social class grouping 
to suggest it would be misleading to present a ‘typical’ Mosleyite fascist in the region as a 
person of ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ social status. The BUF in the Midlands also 
proved attractive to a significant intake of ‘lower’ class recruits. Therefore with regard to social 
class structure the Midlands membership appears to have been closer in composition to the 
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BUF in East Anglia than it was to the Mosley movement in east London. The noteworthy 
participation of unskilled and skilled workers in the ranks has been demonstrated at various 
points in the development of the respective BUF branches investigated in the Midlands. The 
diverse membership established in Birmingham by early 1935 included a variety of ‘lower’ 
class Mosleyites, while propaganda campaigns in the city agitating against the provision of 
local aid to foreign refugees proved notably effective in attracting new enlistments of people 
belonging to this social category during the second half of the 1930s. The final leader of the 
BUF in Birmingham, who held the position of Organiser in the city between May 1937 until his 
arrest and incarceration under DR 18b (1a) in June 1940, was found to be of ‘lower’ class 
social status. Many members of the BUF in the Potteries were found to belong to the ‘lower’ 
social class category. The evidence suggests that during the period of Rothermere’s 
sponsorship the BUF may have served in Stoke-on-Trent as an alternative focus of allegiance 
to the traditional organisations of the labour movement for significant numbers of local 
unskilled and skilled workers. As was the case in Birmingham, the final leader of the BUF in 
the Potteries was a man who belonged to the ‘lower’ social class. Although it has to be 
recognised that the membership involved was small, the social core of the Coventry branch 
during the second half of 1934 was identified as being ‘lower’ class in composition. A 
substantial proportion of ‘lower’ class members were revealed to have been present in the 
ranks of the BUF branch in Leicester prior to the Olympia scandal. Alongside the ‘lower’ class 
and ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ class members of the Midlands BUF were people 
classified as belonging to the ‘elite or upper-middle’ class who, it seems, were recruited on a 
modest scale in the Midlands.  
The ‘unskilled and skilled workers’ identified as comprising the ‘lower’ class recruits in 
the Midlands were factory and workshop workers; labourers; menial office workers; railway 
workers; shop assistants; bus and lorry drivers; waitresses; and domestic workers. The 
occupational sub-groups that contributed ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ class members to 
the Mosley movement in the region were ‘non-academic professionals’; ‘lower/intermediate 
(petty) employees’; ‘lower/intermediate civil servants’; ‘merchants (self-employed)’; and 
‘farmers (self-employed)’. The ‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ class occupational ‘types’ 
attracted into the Midlands BUF have been documented as schoolteachers; nurses; 
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journalists; clerks; commercial travellers; insurance agents; local authority minor officials; 
farmers; shopkeepers and the proprietors of independent small local businesses which 
included breweries, factories, restaurants and coal merchants. A distinctive feature of the 
‘lower-middle and middle-middle’ class membership of the Midlands BUF, which is mirrored in 
Linehan and Mitchell’s respective findings on the fascist formations in east London and East 
Anglia, is the heavy presence of self-employed merchants. These shopkeepers and owners of 
small businesses in the region were representatives of, as Skidelsky put it, ‘those 
intermediate groups that fell outside the labour-capital confrontation’1 and considered 
themselves overlooked by the prevailing political culture of the decade. They were among the 
archetypal ‘small men’ of the ‘lower-middle and middle-middle class’ who operated outside 
big-business and trade union support but clamoured for the two things they believed neither 
liberal capitalism nor orthodox socialism could combine: protection and continued 
independence, ‘in a modern age where economic life was increasingly geared towards mass 
production and mass services’2. The occupational sub-groups from which ‘elite or upper-
middle’ class Mosleyites were drawn in the region were ‘managers’; ‘students (public 
school/upper school/university)’; ‘academic professionals’; and ‘entrepreneurs’. These ‘elite or 
upper-middle’ class members were found to be senior executives; publicity directors; 
engineers; university students; solicitors; doctors; a newspaper editor and proprietor; and 
owners of large businesses.  
This study into the emergence and development of the BUF presence in Birmingham, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester represents a new contribution to the debate 
surrounding the Mosley movement’s social composition. In finding that BUF membership in 
the Midlands was diverse it continues the pattern established by Linehan and Mitchell of 
major regional studies challenging Cross’s assertion that the ‘typical’ recruit belonged to the 
‘middle class’. The evidence presented demonstrates that while it is appropriate to highlight 
the ‘middle class’ aspect of BUF membership it is no longer acceptable to focus attention 
exclusively on this particular social class category when considering the social class 
                                                 
1 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, p327. 
2 Linehan, British fascism, p164. 
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composition of the Mosley movement and confirms Linehan’s assertion that the ‘middle-class 
paradigm’ has begun ‘to crack under the strain’3.  
 
(b) The strength of BUF membership in the Midlands. 
 
Extensive and detailed investigation into the BUF presence in the Midlands has for the first 
time provided figures on how many people joined the Mosley movement in the region. As a 
consequence it is possible to determine whether the Midlands, as has been shown to be the 
case with the regions scrutinised by Rawnsley and Mitchell, conforms to Webber’s paradigms 
on regional membership strength in the provinces. The BUF in the Midlands enjoyed rapid 
growth in numbers which peaked in mid-1934 before experiencing a collapse in membership 
over the second half of that year. However, in a contradiction of Cross and Benewick’s 
interpretation of membership trends this decline did not prove to be irreversible and the 
Midlands BUF experienced a limited revival in total numbers during the late 1930s. In 
avoiding the entering into a terminal downward trend in membership strength post-1934, the 
development in the Midlands mirrors that of the BUF in northern England and East Anglia, 
and constitutes fresh support for Webber’s argument that not all provincial fascist formations 
fell into permanent decline in terms of numbers after peaking under Rothermere’s 
sponsorship. In parallel with the major regional studies produced by Rawnsley and Mitchell 
the study of the Midlands BUF endorses Webber’s proposition that in those provincial regions 
where the membership did not collapse post-1934 into terminal decline the fascist numbers 
were boosted by an influx of anti-war recruits during the final years of the decade. Unlike in 
northern England and East Anglia, however, the flow of pro-appeasement enlistments from 
1938 onwards did not increase the total membership strength of the BUF in the Midlands to a 
level higher than at any time other than mid-1934.  
However, when total membership numbers in the region are separated 
geographically into the individual contributions of the four leading municipalities it is revealed 
that the rise in the numerical strength of the BUF in the Midlands from the Munich Crisis 
onwards is attributable exclusively to the increase in Mosleyites recorded in Birmingham 
                                                 
3 Linehan, British fascism, p165. 
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during the final years of the decade. Whereas Webber suggests that in many of the provincial 
regions where membership of the BUF increased during Mosley’s final ‘Peace Campaign’ the 
ranks of a number of local branches located around the area would have been boosted by 
new recruits, and this was indeed found to be the case in northern England and East Anglia, 
during these years the Birmingham branches contributed almost the entire membership of the 
fascist movement in the Midlands. We have seen that of the leading municipalities in the 
region only in Birmingham did the local BUF evade falling into a terminal decline over the 
second half of the 1930s and proceed to raise its membership numbers during the period of 
the British government’s appeasement of Nazi Germany. It was during these years that the 
fascist branches in the Second City received an influx of enlistments motivated by anti-war 
sensibilities. However, the number of the new enlistments recorded in Birmingham was 
modest and stands in humbling contrast to the huge gains Rawnsley uncovered in major 
industrial northern cities where membership in September 1939 soared into thousands4.   
It was in Birmingham that Mosleyite fascism made its greatest impact in the Midlands 
in terms of size and range of membership. BUF membership in Birmingham had grown 
rapidly from the first local branch’s founding until reaching a considerable high-water mark of 
support immediately prior to the Olympia scandal. At the beginning of 1935 recruitment in 
Birmingham had lost all momentum and membership strength had fallen sharply. The BUF in 
Birmingham did not, however, enter into a permanent decline and in a contradiction of 
Webber’s suggestion that Mosley’s pro-appeasement position was indispensable to the 
revival of branch recruitment in the provincial regions actually begun to stage a minor but 
sustained recovery in numbers as early as 1935.  
The Midlands proves to be unique among regions in the provinces where the BUF 
has been subjected to substantial academic scrutiny in that only one local branch 
experienced a recovery, however minor, in membership during the second half of the 1930s. 
BUF membership strength in Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester peaked in the days 
directly preceding the disorder at Olympia but by the beginning of 1935 the fascist branches 
in these three cities had experienced an exodus in numbers and decayed into moribund 
states. The general downward trend in membership strength experienced by the respective 
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BUF branches in Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester post-1935 proved to be 
unsalvageable and in 1938 all fascist activity in these three cities came to an end.  
The BUF branches in Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and Leicester followed similar paths 
in terms of membership strength over the second half of the 1930s but had experienced 
contrasting histories in recruitment numbers in the period from the time of their respective 
openings to the scandal surrounding events at Olympia. The growth of fascist membership in 
Stoke-on-Trent from the founding of the first branch to the infamous London rally was rapid 
and sizeable. Although the BUF branch in Leicester peaked at a comparatively modest 
membership figure it had been active for only a month and a half prior to the disorder at 
Olympia. Recruitment in the BUF branch in Coventry from inauguration until June 1934 was 
both slow and small. It is a moot but interesting point to speculate on what course the 
membership numbers of the Stoke-on-Trent BUF would have taken if A. K. Chesterton had 
not in January 1935 impulsively expelled the entire membership and closed the local branch. 
As revealed in the respective case-studies, at the time of Chesterton’s infamous visit to 
Stoke-on-Trent the number of local members who had remained loyal to the Mosley 
movement following the post-Olympia collapse was in fact higher than their counterparts in 
the Birmingham branch. A fascist presence was established in both cities in October 1932 
and these respective branches had shared a comparable pattern of substantial growth. It is 
not perhaps unreasonable to suggest that had the Potteries branch been placed under the 
guidance of a suitably able leader the Stoke-on-Trent BUF may have like in Birmingham 
avoided falling into a terminal decline and enjoyed a recovery to some degree in membership 
during the second half of the 1930s. 
 
(c) The focus of BUF propaganda in the Midlands. 
 
Charting the emergence and development of the BUF presence in the Midlands between 
1932 and 1940 has revealed that the focus of the propaganda disseminated by the fascists in 
the region was not uniform across the branches examined over the course of the decade. The 
evidence suggests that the propaganda priorities of the respective branches were determined 
by the exigencies of the local areas with regard to the theme of the Corporate State and that 
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the character of senior branch officials decided whether or not the theme of anti-Semitism 
would be adopted.  
Rawnsley and Mitchell have demonstrated that between the years 1932 and 1935 the 
BUF branches in the regions of northern England and East Anglia focused their propaganda 
attention on promoting the economic programme of the fascist Corporate State tailored to suit 
the grievances of local industry. The Midlands BUF did not mirror the fascist movement in 
these other areas. The Birmingham, Coventry, and Leicester branches all focused their 
propaganda output during the first half of the 1930s on promoting the Corporate State in its 
entirety without ever concentrating on any one particular aspect. Economics was discussed 
as part of the general programme of Mosley’s idea but without reference to any specific 
industry or product. It was only in Stoke-on-Trent that the local BUF emulated the branches 
investigated by Rawnsley and Mitchell. While in northern England and East Anglia the 
respective local branches concentrated their propaganda content on explaining how the 
economic policies of the Corporate State would solve all the problems faced by the textile and 
agriculture industries respectively, it was found that in Stoke-on-Trent the fascist activists 
focused their energies firmly on extolling the purportedly unprecedented merits of corporate 
economics in rejuvenating the pottery industry. As was the case with textiles in northern 
England and agriculture in East Anglia, in Stoke-on-Trent an ailing dominant industry was 
facing an easily identifiable and highly emotive foreign threat which offered the local BUF the 
opportunity to adapt propaganda in such a way as to present fascist corporate economics as 
a solution both highly effective and proudly patriotic in nature. By contrast the diverse 
character of the local economies in Birmingham, Coventry and Leicester militated against 
adapting the fascist economic message around a specific local industry and denied the 
possibility of addressing the needs of a principal industry. The absence of a similar focus in 
the propaganda output of the branches in the Midlands outside of the Potteries suggests that 
the concentrating on content tailored to suit local economic grievances was not reserved for 
regions in the provinces which were dominated by staple but ailing industries. The experience 
in Stoke-on-Trent demonstrates how it could also be favoured by branches in much smaller 
areas, such as a city, equally reliant on one main but declining traditional industry in an 
otherwise economically diverse provincial region.   
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When the propaganda disseminated by the BUF in the Midlands is assessed to 
determine which of Mosley’s ideas were communicated by the fascist branches to the local 
public over the course of the second half of the 1930s Coventry alone was found to conform 
to the national pattern identified by Thurlow of focus moving away from the single theme of 
promoting corporatism and towards the two themes of non-intervention in foreign disputes, 
and anti-Semitism. While in Stoke-on-Trent and Leicester the BUF branches de-emphasised 
corporatism when communicating with the local public in favour of opposing British 
intervention in foreign affairs there is in the material available no evidence to suggest that the 
local fascists ever engaged in disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda in these two cities. In 
Birmingham from 1935 onwards the focus of the propaganda disseminated by the BUF in the 
city was revealed to have shifted away from promoting the theme of the Corporate State but 
apart from a short period in May 1937 when the local fascists attempted to conduct anti-
Semitic campaigns the Mosleyite propaganda message concentrated on advocating the 
theme of isolationism. However, the efforts to introduce anti-Jewish sentiment into the fascist 
message promoted in Birmingham was curtailed by the intervention of the Chief Constable 
and it is probable that without the actions he took against the local fascists the theme of anti-
Semitism would have continued to be adopted along with that of isolationism in the 
propaganda pursued by the local BUF in the Second City during the remainder of the decade. 
 This study offers support for Linehan’s explanation for the introduction of the theme of 
anti-Semitism into BUF propaganda. None of the other five principal explanations proposed in 
the secondary literature are applicable to the experience of the BUF in the Midlands. If the 
adoption of anti-Semitic campaigning can be explained, as Benewick and Mandle proposed, 
as a cynical device of political mobilisation to resuscitate an ailing movement then surely 
Mosley’s anti-Jewish position would have been employed as a theme of the fascist 
propaganda disseminated across the leading municipalities in the Midlands rather than be 
restricted to the Coventry branch and a brief period in the history of the Birmingham BUF. The 
Stoke-on-Trent and Leicester branches were in desperate need of a boost from 1935 
onwards. It would also have been introduced into the fascist propaganda for the first time in 
Coventry and Birmingham earlier than July and May 1937 respectively. At the time that anti-
Semitic campaigning was adopted in Birmingham the fascist movement in the city was 
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actually undergoing a modest but steady recovery in membership. The explanation proposed 
by Skidelsky is similarly invalid at the local level: there is no evidence available to suggest 
that the BUF branches in Coventry and Birmingham were ever in their histories the subject of 
anti-fascist Jewish attacks. If, as Dorril claims, the anti-Semitic campaigning of the BUF was 
central to the fascist movement’s ambitions and was pre-planned and worked to a timetable it 
would have been introduced into the propaganda disseminated by all the branches in the 
Midlands, not just Birmingham and Coventry. And it would have become a theme in the 
leading municipalities when the national trend began to emerge in early 1935 after Mosley’s 
announcement at the Albert Hall in late October 1934 that his movement would be publicly 
embracing anti-Semitism and engaging in campaigns against Jews. Holmes’ ‘specific social 
milieu’5 was not a feature of either Birmingham or Coventry. A number of the ‘interacting 
measures’ he identified were not present in the two Midlands cities. As stated above, the 
meetings and other activities of the Birmingham and Coventry BUF branches were not 
disrupted by Jewish anti-fascists. In both cities Jews apparently refrained from becoming 
identifiably involved in militant anti-fascist activism. Indeed, in Coventry the BUF branch 
operated throughout its history without ever clashing physically with any kind of anti-fascist 
opposition. The cultural and historical narratives of nativist anti-Semitism discussed by 
Holmes were absent in Birmingham and Coventry. There was no tradition of anti-Jewish 
hostility in these two cities. In Birmingham and Coventry the local Jewish communities were 
admired and respected and represented a tiny percentage of the respective populations. 
Neither as adherents to Judaism nor as members of an ethnic group did the Jews in 
Birmingham or Coventry have a specific relationship of any kind to the local socio-political 
systems which had in the past or could have in the present caused resentment among the 
Gentile community or be exploited. In Birmingham and Coventry the Jews were not a political, 
economic or ethnic minority bloc. The Jews of these cities were undifferentiated from the 
general population and were difficult to identify as a structural entity. ‘Jewish cultural habits 
there were in plenty but they were not interpreted or widespread enough to constitute a 
specific way of life peculiar to Jews’6.  
Linehan’s research suggests that at the local level the adoption of anti-Semitic 
                                                 
5 Holmes, ‘Anti-Semitism and the BUF’, p128. 
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campaigning principally depended on the contingent factor of ‘uncompromising anti-Jewish 
elements’7 being present within the fascist decision-making hierarchy who were pushing for 
the introduction into propaganda activity of overt aggressive anti-Jewish sentiment. Anti-
Semitic campaigning was absent in Birmingham and Coventry until Irvine and Mazengarb 
became the respective leaders in these cities. Both of these Mosleyites fall into the category 
of senior officer described by Linehan. Irvine was a fascist who believed in, and practised 
through leading by energising example, aggressive street-based propaganda activism with a 
confrontational attitude to the authorities and his opponents. Although no evidence has been 
uncovered to demonstrate his enlistment in the BUF was motivated by anti-Jewish feeling or 
that he was expressing opposition to Jews before he arrived in Birmingham, it would be 
implausible to suggest Irvine’s strident anti-Semitism in the city was in any way insincere. 
Holmes has written that there is insufficient proof to say that, in general, members of the BUF 
possessed personalities which required the support of prejudice to function8. However, the 
historiography records that those alienated by the official embrace of anti-Semitism in late 
1934 soon thereafter left the BUF9. While to claim it was possible for a person to be a 
member of a publicly anti-Jewish movement such as the BUF became and be unsympathetic 
to anti-Semitism is intellectually incoherent. Refuting this position on anti-Semitism from a 
female fascist in Liverpool who claimed that ‘as I knew no Jew and Mosley seemed to object 
to their apparent monopoly of British money and business, it did not seem to me very 
important, compared with [other ideas]’, Gottlieb writes scornfully: ‘And yet fascism was a 
package deal, and scape-goating, xenophobia, and rhetorical violence against the Jews were 
inextricable from the British fascist…discourse’10. Mazengarb was a similarly committed and 
active Mosleyite leader whose diligence and energy at times it seems single-handedly kept 
the Coventry branch afloat. Mazengarb was found to be what Linehan has termed ‘Cable 
Street fascists’: men and women who joined the Mosley movement as a consequence of a 
fierce anti-Communist and anti-Jewish backlash following the infamous events of 4 October 
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193611. It would be improbable to believe that Irvine and Mazengarb’s characteristically 
assertive brand of fascism and genuine dislike of Jews would not extend to a determination to 
see this hostility promoted in the propaganda disseminated in their respective cities. The prior 
history of the BUF in Birmingham and Coventry suggests that without the ascendancy of 
these two men to leadership positions in these two cities the propaganda theme of anti-
Semitism may not have been promoted in any of the leading municipalities in the Midlands 
during the second half of the 1930s. 
 
(d) Concluding thoughts. 
 
This thesis confirms a suggestion by Webber that the BUF was ‘largely unsuccessful’ in the 
Midlands over the course of the 1930s12. As a final reflection we will examine how we might 
understand the ultimately limited progress made by the local fascists in the four case-studies 
in light of a body of secondary literature which seeks to provide answers for the BUF’s failure 
nationally. Thurlow has identified four main areas which existing interpretations have 
highlighted to explain why the national movement was never of more than marginal 
significance to the politics of inter-war Britain. These explanations relate to: the BUF’s 
misconception of the nature of the crisis in British society in the inter-war years; fascism’s lack 
of resonance with the established tenets of British political culture; the internal weaknesses of 
the BUF; and opposition to British fascism by militant anti-fascist activists and state 
management of the BUF13. Thurlow writes that the main interpretations accept that all of 
these explanations were important14. It is therefore necessary to provide an overview of each 
general category of explanation before proceeding to discuss which if any of these critical 
external and internal factors are relevant when accounting for the failure of the BUF in the 
Midlands.  
 The role of crisis and Mosley’s misreading of its nature in the Britain of the 1930s has 
been examined in detail by Lewis15. Mosley founded the BUF under the assumption 
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capitalism was entering its final stages and that the collapse of the economy was imminent. 
However the societal crisis which Mosley had diagnosed as having arrived in 1932 and which 
he believed was an essential requirement for the success of the BUF never materialized. 
Lewis suggests that Britain’s political system did not undergo the same degree of ‘trauma’ as 
other countries in Europe during the inter-war period. In his interpretation the existence of 
trauma within a society, caused by the impact of modernisation, the onset of severe economic 
depression, and the divisive legacy of defeat in the Great War, created and sustained ‘a 
climate of disintegration’ which was a vital precondition for the growth of fascism16. Britain, of 
course, was not defeated, and while it would be fatuous to claim the 1930s were not for many 
people in Britain ten years of deep suffering and terrible hardship, the popular image of a 
‘devil’s decade’17 of endemic unemployment and accompanying social deprivation which an 
ineffectual Government was unable to solve is misleading. ‘In Britain the onset of the 
depression was very much more gradual than elsewhere. The British economy had never 
recovered its pre-war position and during the 1920s remained relatively stagnant, with a 
permanent pool of over a million unemployed. Although the situation worsened after 1929, it 
lacked the air of a sudden and dramatic crisis’18. Crucially the effects of the depression were 
not uniform and the worst was relatively short-lived in most parts of Britain. Although areas 
dependent on traditional staple industries like Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and northern 
England bore the brunt of the impact, the rest of the country escaped comparatively lightly. 
‘Indeed, many prospered amid the hardship. Imports became cheaper and new opportunities 
for investment presented themselves. For those in work stable wage rates and falling prices 
increased real wages significantly. There was a boom in private houses, motor vehicles, and 
other new consumer industries’19. Those who lived outside the depressed areas of Britain and 
who continued in employment remained largely immune to the ‘ravages of the slump’, while 
the economy staged a revival in the 1930s which by the middle years of the decade included 
signs of a modest improvement even in heavy industry20. It was a haphazard rather than 
planned solution but the revival was overseen by the National Government nonetheless and 
                                                 
16 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, pp223-224. 
17 A. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1965), p317. 
18 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p263. 
19 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p263. 
20 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p263. 
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showed that economic recovery did not require the authoritarian revolutions advocated by 
political extremists. There was no serious disintegration in the socio-economic fabric or 
political institutions in Britain. The established political parties and organisations retained their 
membership and the National Government proved to be acceptable to the majority of British 
people21.  
 The second argument identified by Thurlow which has been used to explain the 
BUF’s failure was that fascism was alien to Britain’s political culture. This interpretation has 
been emphasised by Benewick, who suggests that the BUF’s methods and ideas, particularly 
the search for order through political violence and the promotion of anti-Semitism, proved 
anathema to an essentially moderate and tolerant national character which was deeply 
committed to the relatively peaceful evolutionary traditions of British liberal democracy and 
associated institutions. This distinctly British ‘politics of civility’ included respect for the rights 
of the individual, an attachment to religious pluralism, an adherence to constitutional 
procedures that opposed authoritarian solutions while accommodating innovation, and 
respect for the rule of law that abhorred political violence22. A more restrained and nuanced 
version of this argument has been proposed by Holmes who maintains that the BUF’s 
attempts to attract support through the adoption of anti-Jewish campaigning was, in part, 
impeded by ‘a tradition, deriving from the historical development of liberalism, which placed 
limits upon the expression and influence of anti-Semitism’. However, he stresses an important 
caveat, writing that it would ‘be unwise to assume that it was universally accepted and 
dangerous to discuss it as some kind of autonomous, universal force inherent within the 
nation’23. Holmes suggests that adding colonial episodes to historical incidents of ill-treatment 
of racial minorities in Britain offers a ‘firmer picture of the limits which existed upon the 
civilised decency of British society, even if its track record was better than that of a number of 
other countries’24. 
 Internal weaknesses were the third general category explaining why the BUF made 
little impact. Thurlow has written in detail on the national fascist movement’s many 
shortcomings. As a leader Mosley was too trusting, had a poor tactical sense, an inability to 
                                                 
21 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p266. 
22 Benewick, Political Violence, pp13-14. 
23 Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society, p196. 
24 Holmes, ‘Anti-Semitism and the BUF’, p126. 
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judge character, and a susceptibility to flattery which led him to surround himself with 
sycophantic incompetents to whom he would delegate organisational, administrative, and 
financial functions. At various points in the 1930s the BUF was disrupted by problems of 
mismanagement, factional divisions, personal acrimonies, corruption, expulsions and 
resignations25. 
 The fourth general category of explanation for the failure of the BUF was that of 
opposition to it both by militant anti-fascists and the state. The aggressive and confrontational 
‘direct action’ tactics of the militant anti-fascist movement hindered the operational 
effectiveness of the BUF and helped to create an unfavourable image for fascism. The 
interruption and breaking up of meetings, the disruption of marches, and general harassment 
of fascists on the street made it difficult for the BUF to organise political activity and 
disseminate propaganda26 and led, in the words of Thurlow, to ‘violence and public order 
problems which public opinion chiefly blamed the fascists for creating’27. Thurlow has 
researched extensively the role played by state management of the BUF in containing the 
Mosley movement. From November 1933 the BUF was placed under surveillance by the 
Security Service28. After Rothermere split with Mosley in July 1934 newspaper editors and the 
BBC were encouraged to boycott or give only negative publicity to the BUF. Local authorities 
increasingly refused to allow council property to be used for fascist meetings. Thurlow writes: 
‘The state thought the best means of shunting Mosley into the political sidings was to ignore 
him’29. However, when civil disorder was threatened in 1936 after the ‘Battle of Cable Street’ 
and when the nation faced the threat of a potential pro-Nazi fifth column in 1940 the British 
state turned to legislative counter-measures and implemented the Public Order Act and 
Defence Regulations 18b (1a) and (AA) respectively30.     
Examination of the fascist experience in the four leading municipalities during the 
                                                 
25 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, pp132-144; Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’, pp75-77. 
26 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p310. 
27 Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’, p77. See also R. Thurlow, ‘Blaming the Blackshirts: the 
authorities and the anti-Jewish disturbances in the 1930s’, in P. Panayi (ed.) Racial Violence in Britain 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London, Leicester University Press, 1993), pp112-130.  
28 R. Thurlow, ‘British Fascism and State Surveillance 1934-45’, Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol.3, No.1 (1988), pp77-79; Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’, p79; R. Thurlow, ‘State 
Management of the British Union of in the 1930s’, in Cronin, M. (ed.) The Failure of British Fascism: 
The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), pp29-52. 
29 Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’, p80. 
30 Thurlow, ‘The Failure of British Fascism’, pp79-84; R. Thurlow, The Secret State. British Internal 
Security in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), pp173-213.  
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1930s suggests that all of the main factors in the secondary literature identified by Thurlow to 
explain the failure of the national movement are of significance when accounting for the 
limited development of the BUF in the Midlands. However, as we shall now see, the 
applicability of these explanations is not consistent across the individual cities.  
The long-term failure of the BUF in Birmingham is explained by a combination of 
three of the four factors. In an endorsement of Benewick’s analysis of the nature of ‘civil 
society’ in Britain the use of political violence at the Town Hall meeting in May 1935 horrified 
the local public and undermined attempts to present the BUF as a legitimate political 
movement. The prospects for fascism in Birmingham had already been severely disrupted by 
internal weakness in the shape of a crippling rivalry between the two most senior officers in 
the area which N.H.Q. had incompetently failed to recognise and then proved sluggish in 
resolving. The personal animosity between Hill and Revett caused organisational stagnation, 
the haemorrhaging of a substantial membership, and gained for the Birmingham branches an 
unsavoury reputation. The third contributing factor was both militant anti-fascist activity and 
opposition from the state. Organised Communist opposition led to disorder at the Mosley 
meeting of May 1935 which the Birmingham public blamed the local fascists for creating. The 
association between the BUF and violence in the minds of the local populace compelled 
Birmingham council to prohibit the use of public buildings for fascist meetings, a constraint 
which denied to the city’s Mosleyites a respectable and effective outlet for disseminating 
propaganda and proved a powerful barrier to re-establishing credibility and support. The 
authorities’ implementation of Defence Regulation 18b (1a) in Birmingham in June 1940 
effectively destroyed the BUF in the city. 
An explanation for the eventual failure of the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent was also found 
among the factors discussed by Thurlow. The lack of a sense of societal crisis among 
significant numbers of local people contributed to fascist disappointment in the city. From 
1935 onwards the established political forces in the Potteries were able to satisfy comfortably 
the concerns and demands of the local population. The second contributing factor was that 
the political violence unleashed at Olympia alienated the sensibilities of both the majority of 
the local supporters and the general public, resulting in a collapse in membership which had 
hitherto been significant in numbers and an undermining of the fascist movement’s reputation 
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among the people of Stoke-on-Trent. Internal deficiencies played a crucial role in the failure of 
fascism in the Potteries; the expulsion of the entire membership in January 1935 was an 
example of gross mismanagement which had a devastating impact on the BUF’s prospects in 
the east Midlands. Unlike in Birmingham, the BUF in Stoke-on-Trent faced opposition from 
militant anti-fascists but not from the state. State management appears to have played no 
apparent role in disrupting the progress of the Mosley movement in Stoke-on-Trent. The anti-
fascist activity organised against the local BUF made it difficult for the Mosleyites to organise 
and disseminate propaganda, weakened morale, and hindered their ability to present the 
Mosley movement as a credible alternative to the existing political parties. 
The BUF was never at any time in its existence able to attract a significant following 
in Coventry, and the local branch from its founding languished on the periphery of life in the 
city. This consistent failure is explained by the combination of two factors identified by 
Thurlow which were present in the city throughout the 1930s. Coventry during this decade 
was a dynamic and confident city which like its neighbours in the south Midlands enjoyed 
great economic prosperity the benefits of which were shared across the social class spectrum. 
The established political parties remained respected, popular and were widely regarded as 
being representative and effective. Therefore in Coventry the growth of the BUF was 
constrained by the absence of a sense of socio-economic trauma which could have 
persuaded a notable percentage of the population to believe the city required a radical 
alternative to the existing liberal democratic system. The other barrier to fascist progress in 
Coventry was the alien nature of anti-Semitism in the city’s political culture. The propaganda 
disseminated by the Coventry BUF during the second half of the 1930s focused on the two 
themes of isolationism and anti-Semitism. The theme of non-intervention in foreign disputes 
was successfully articulated in the city’s established polity but the fascists did not appear to 
have any rivals, respectable or otherwise, in their campaigns against Jews. However, in 
another corroboration of Benewick the anti-Jewish activities of the local fascists in Coventry 
proved to be of no interest to the population of a city noted for its historically moderate and 
tolerant attitude towards Jews.  
The two factors which account for the BUF’s lack of success in Coventry also 
contributed to the limited development of the fascist branch in Leicester. The strong economic 
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recovery experienced by Leicester and nearby towns and cities in the east Midlands over the 
course of the second half of 1934 negated any sense of crisis which could be exploited during 
a period when the local fascists were pursuing the propaganda theme of the Corporate State. 
The method of seeking order through political violence on display at the infamous Olympia 
meeting proved unacceptable to most supporters of the BUF in Leicester and instilled a 
deeply unfavourable impression of fascism in the minds of many local people. In the 
immediate wake of the disorderly rally in London the branch, which up to this point had been 
growing in numbers rapidly, lost the majority of its membership and the Mosley movement in 
Leicester was left floundering in its efforts to present itself as a reputable feature of political 
life in the city. The third factor in the failure of the BUF in Leicester was that the local branch 
from 1935 until it was extinguished in mid-1938 persisted in focusing its propaganda message 
on the theme of non-intervention in foreign disputes. It can be argued that this represents an 
internal weakness of the Leicester branch. In Birmingham, Stoke-on-Trent and Coventry the 
idea that Britain should adopt an isolationist position towards foreign crises exerted a strong 
appeal among a notable number of local people. Unfortunately for the BUF in the respective 
cities of the north and south Midlands the fascists were unable to capitalise to any degree on 
this potential opportunity for growth because the local MPs were strongly in favour of 
neutrality and non-intervention and therefore represented a respectable and popular 
alternative to the Mosley movement. In Leicester by contrast the general public were 
uninterested in foreign affairs which meant that during the second half of the decade the local 
fascists were disseminating an irrelevant propaganda message which, even when echoed by 
respected mainstream political figures, was unable to attract a sympathetic audience of any 
note. As was the case in Stoke-on-Trent, the BUF in Leicester was opposed by militant anti-
fascists but not it seems by the state. The activities of anti-fascist protesters played a 
significant role in marginalising fascism in Leicester by restricting the ability of the local 
fascists to operate in outdoors locations associated with respectable politics in the city, 
sapped the morale and energy of activists, and most importantly saddled the BUF with the 
blame among public opinion for the resulting violence and public order problems. 
In none of the individual cities examined in this thesis did all four of the factors 
proposed in the secondary literature and highlighted by Thurlow play a role in the failure of 
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the local branches. Indeed, the combination of the factors which do account for lack of 
success was different in each respective city. While the BUF’s misconception of the nature of 
crisis in 1930s Britain, Mosleyite fascism’s lack of resonance with Britain’s political traditions, 
and internal deficiencies were each relevant in at least two of the Midlands cities, the fourth 
category of hostility by militant anti-fascists and state management was found to have 
hindered the BUF in Birmingham only. Direct action by anti-fascists disrupted the progress of 
the fascist movement in Stoke-on-Trent and Leicester but it was in the leading city of the west 
Midlands that the local BUF faced opposition both by militant anti-fascists and the state. This 
is not to say, however, that the experience of the fascists in the Midlands suggests that state 
management of the BUF was important nationally but of little significance at the local level. It 
has been demonstrated in this study that during the second half of the 1930s the vast bulk of 
BUF membership in the Midlands belonged to the Birmingham branches, while from late 1938 
onwards fascism in the three other leading municipalities had ceased to exist. Consequently 
during the final eighteen months of the national movement’s existence the fascist presence in 
Birmingham to all intents and purposes constituted the Midlands BUF. As state management 
played a part in limiting the growth of the Mosley movement in Birmingham during the second 
half of the 1930s it can be stated that opposition from the authorities was indeed significant in 
the long-term failure of the BUF in the region. Therefore while the applicability of the four 
factors was inconsistent across the leading municipalities, each category was found to have 
contributed to the failure of Mosleyite fascism in the Midlands, which suggests that the main 
explanations in the secondary literature for why the BUF was never of more than marginal 
significance at the national level can also provide an answer for why the Mosley movement 
failed at the regional level. 
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